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1. Introduction 
 
Why heroin smugglers and dealers? 
 
 
 
 
A Bayer ad for heroin from the New York Medical Journal 
  
When heroin was commercially introduced in 1898 by the Bayer Company, it was as a 
prescription-free cough suppressant. Ironically, a year later the Bayer Company introduced 
aspirin, as a prescription drug (Fernandez 1998 p. 25).Today, dealing and importing heroin 
can lead to a maximum penalty of 21 years within the Norwegian legal system. According to 
British social scientists, Tom Carnwath and Ian Smith (2002 p. 1), no drug has been more 
argued over and legislated against; no drug has been more subjected to misinformation and 
moral panic than heroin. More than any other drug, heroin is associated with death 
(overdoses), stigmatization and criminality. Thus, heroin is truly a drug from which “myths 
are made.”  
 
In my view, heroin is a drug which lends itself perfectly to the study of how “truths” are 
constructed, and more importantly, what implications these different “truths” have for the 
people involved in heroin dealing and smuggling. According to Ian Hacking (2000 p. 6), most 
social constructionist approaches are based on the following principal: “X need not have 
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existed, nor need it at all to be as it is. X as it is at the present, is not determined by the nature 
of things, it is not inevitable.” In this dissertation, I will use a social constructionist approach, 
making my first mission to clarify what this study’s X is. In other words, what is it in this 
study which I view as not inevitable? This study’s X is as follows: “understandings of heroin 
smugglers and dealers.” Given the historical fact that heroin was introduced as an over-the-
counter drug, it seems rather obvious that a heroin dealer in 1898 wouldn’t be described in 
similar terms as a heroin dealer today, nor understand him or herself in light of the same 
classifications. Thus, to introduce the notion that the category for heroin smugglers and 
dealers is a social construction, which is defined and given meaning within its historical and 
social context, does not seem like a very novel idea. However, specifying connections 
between how a social category is defined, and the individual’s self understanding within that 
category might hold more promise. 
 
Hacking (2000 p. 105) tells us that one of the valuable insights from a social constructionist 
approach, is that we can, and do, make up people or “human kinds.” For Hacking, this making 
up people happens through a “looping effect” that occurs between culture and cognition, or to 
put it another way, between everyday practice and classificatory practices. To specify, once a 
social category gets classified and becomes an object for knowledge, control and punishment, 
the members of that category will tend to react and respond to such treatment. The reaction 
will tend to create new identities for the social category. In this way a “looping effect” is 
initiated in which classifications and knowledge create each other.  
 
In this dissertation I will focus on the “looping effect” between the stories told by heroin 
smugglers and dealers and the juridical practices. This is not to claim that this is the only 
“looping effect” in operation that produces an understanding of heroin smuggling and dealing. 
However, I will argue that it is a highly potent one.  
 
The feedback loop between the offenders` narratives and the judicial discourse can be 
illustrated as follows.  
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Figure 1. The feedback loop between narratives and the judicial practices  
 
 
 
 
The realization that such a feedback loop might be in play between the judicial practices and 
the heroin smugglers and dealers’ stories slowly dawned on me during the first part of this 
study, when I was focusing on the organizational aspects of the heroin market. 
 
SIRUS’ mission was to uncover information about individuals who are serving sentences for 
heroin felonies, and to expose details about their lives and experiences with smuggling and 
dealing heroin. Moreover, experienced police officers who had generally worked on drug 
cases, and specifically heroin cases, were interviewed about the heroin market and its 
development. Through these different sources I was able to elaborate on issues related to 
heroin trafficking, and its organizational aspects and development.  
 
One surprising finding in the initial stages of this study was that images of the heroin market 
and its development were described similarly by the offenders and the police. The image of 
the heroin market that was expressed by these very different sources can be summed up as 
follows: the heroin market is divided between the non-ethnic Norwegians, on the one side, 
who run the importation of heroin and deal in large quantities, and on the other side, the 
ethnic Norwegians who themselves are heroin users and deal heroin in small quantities.  
 
The development of the heroin market was explained like this: There were small quantities of 
very expensive heroin in circulation in the 1970s. The first dealers/smugglers were ethnic 
Norwegian heroin users, who travelled to the Netherlands and Denmark to obtain the drug. 
There was still relatively little heroin traffic through the 1980s. However, ethnic Norwegian 
Narratives Judicial practices
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dealers/smugglers began to obtain heroin from Thailand, in addition to the Netherlands and 
Denmark. They smuggled small quantities of heroin in their body cavities. As the 1980s 
progressed, new groups of non-ethnic Norwegians, such as the Turkish and Pakistanis, 
established themselves in the heroin market, using more specialized smuggling equipment 
such as hidden storage compartments in cars.  
 
In the 1990s, even more perpetrators asserted themselves in the heroin market, in particular, 
people from the former Yugoslavia (such as Kosovo Albanians). The price of heroin declined 
throughout the 1990s, so a new system of division was introduced, which led to significantly 
larger user dosages. The ethnic Norwegian users/dealers, who had previously smuggled 
heroin into Norway, began disappearing from the market. The main reason for this was that 
they could not compete in price with the non-ethnic Norwegian groups, who supplied larger 
quantities of heroin. In the 2000s, the price and quality of heroin continued to fall. Both the 
police and the offenders stressed that heroin smuggling in Norway had become 
internationalized and organized. However, the retail dealing was still fairly unorganized, and 
the markets were open and unregulated. Any single group faced difficulties in maintaining a 
monopoly position of control, supply, and prices (Snertingdal 2007).  
  
Instead of feeling at ease, citing the similarities in the stories given by the offenders and the 
police, I felt uncomfortable, and very curious to discover more about how the “truths” of 
heroin smuggling and dealing were created. To elaborate, first, it was obvious that the image 
of the heroin market was created out of the registered heroin crimes, in other words, what was 
known by the authorities and registered by the police. Second, and closely interrelated with 
the first point, the police were building their understanding of the heroin market on 
information from the same sources as I did, and, in many cases, even the exact same people. 
Seen from this perspective, it would have been surprising if the offenders had told a 
completely different story than the police about the heroin market.  
 
This line of thought set me on to the idea of studying the interconnectedness between the 
stories told by the offenders and the judicial practices. To study this, I wanted first to delve 
deeper into the stories told by the offenders, and particularly their motivation and explanation 
for their illegal activities. Would the explanations and motivations be similar for ethnic 
Norwegians, dealing small quantities of heroin, to those given by the smugglers or importers 
of large quantities of heroin?  I also wanted to determine what the offenders’ stories revealed 
5 
 
about their social identities, and their expression of personal responsibilities. Next, I wanted 
to find out how the judicial practices with their specific logic and rhetoric, ratified and 
legitimized a certain understanding of heroin crimes, and how this, in turn, affected the stories 
that the heroin dealers and smugglers told. In other words, I set out to understand the in-depth 
stories told by the offenders and the judicial discourse and their interwoven existence.    
Why the offenders’ stories? 
 
Following are three reasons why I believe the offenders’ stories are important to study: 
(1)Through the offenders’ stories different understandings of heroin smuggling and dealing 
are created.  
(2) The offenders’ stories are vital because they emphasize that the offenders have different 
orientations toward past and future criminal activity.  
(3) By identifying different narrative structures, I can identify patterns in what type of people 
tell what type of narrative, and study whether any of them is a successful narrative in court.    
 
First, the offenders’ stories are important because through them perceptions of heroin 
smuggling and dealing are created. In analyzing the offenders’ stories, I draw extensively on 
the works of narrative scholars such as Donald Polkinghorne (1988), Paul Ricoeur (1984, 
1991) and Jerome Bruner (2003). A central assumption in these contributions is that language 
does not have an innocent and transparent function in knowledge creation. Rather, the 
rhetorical and narrative structures constitute, that is, impose form upon, that which they are 
intended to give meaning. Language then filters and organizes every experience we have, and 
translates it into meaning. Seen from this perspective, the narrative can be studied as a source 
where different interpretations of heroin smuggling and dealing are created.   
 
Moreover, I touch base with previous studies on drug smuggling and dealing in analyzing the 
offenders’ narratives. Fundamental contributions include: Street level dealing, Edward Preble 
and John Casey (1967), Michael Agar (1973, 2002), Phillippe Bourgois (1995), Bengt 
Svensson (1996, 1997); Smuggling and upper level dealing, Patricia Adler (1985), Peter 
Reuter et al. (1989, 2008) Nicholas Dorn et al. (1992, 1998, 2005), Geoffrey Pearson and 
Dick Hobbs (2001), and Damián Zaitch (2002). My primary interest in these studies is to 
identify how drug dealers and smugglers previously have been described, and what types of 
explanations were given for drug smuggling and dealing.  
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My intention is not to discover whether any of these results are more fitting than others for 
analyzing the heroin smugglers and dealers in this study, but to demonstrate how these 
criminological and sociological findings are socially embedded. Hence, I will look at ways in 
which the offenders utilize these findings in their narrative constructions and elaborate what 
consequences could contribute to the offenders’ expressions of motives and personal 
responsibilities. Additionally, and as importantly, I will investigate how these different 
narratives are received in court. 
 
Second, the offenders’ stories are vital because they emphasize that the offenders have 
different orientations toward past and future criminal activity. My main inspiration in 
analyzing the narratives is previous empirical narrative studies done on crime, addiction, and 
illness with major contributions from: Crime, Patricia O’Connor (2000), John P McKendy 
(2006), Loise Presser (2008); Addiction, Dorte Hecksher (2006), James McIntosh and Neil 
McKeganey (2000); and Illness, Arthur Frank (1997). These narrative studies on crime and 
addiction share two common assumptions, which are also basic to my research. First, people 
tell stories about themselves to make sense of their lives. Second, deviant narratives, similar 
to deviant identities, promote deviant actions. Therefore, the significance of the offenders’ 
stories is how they evaluate their past and future actions, their sense of personal 
responsibility, guilt, and own reform potential. 
 
Third, the reason for studying the offenders’ stories is that by identifying different narrative 
structures, I can identify patterns of who tells what narrative and determine whether any of the 
narratives are successful in court. It is important to recognize that none of the aforementioned 
narrative studies of crime focus directly on the judicial practices. Although these studies 
identify different accounts given by offenders, they neither identify how these different 
narratives manifest themselves in judicial procedures, nor do they ask whether any of the 
accounts is a “winning” story in court.  
 
Similarly, these previous studies do not offer detailed examinations of judicial practices, or 
the use of logic and rhetoric in drug felonies. According to Iver B Neumann (2008 p. 11), 
“There is always the possibility that a lack of extant studies of a given phenomena may be the 
result of well placed and well deserved neglect.” Next, I will argue the relevance of studying 
judicial practices in relation to the offenders’ narratives.  
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Why the judicial practices?    
 
Following are three reasons why I believe the judicial practices are relevant to study: 
 
(1)Through the judicial practices different understandings of heroin smuggling and dealing 
are evaluated and made legitimate.  
(2) Judges determine motives in heroin felonies, and hence, include some narratives told by 
the offenders and exclude others.  
(3) By identifying arguments that the judges used to punish heroin smuggling and dealing, I 
can identify ways in which offenders in heroin felonies are labelled, and discuss whether any 
of the narratives told by the offenders produce a stigmatization process. 
 
First, the judicial practices are important to investigate, because through them the heroin trade 
is evaluated. In my analysis of the judicial practices, I am strongly influenced by Norwegian 
contributions to the sociology of law made from scholars such as Vilhelm Auber (1972), and 
Thomas Mathisen (1984). These contributions share two assumptions, which are also central 
to this study. First, a sociological interpretation of the law differs from a judicial one, where 
the former represents the internal perspectives of the legal sciences, and the latter represents 
an external approach to the empirical characteristics and consequences of law1. Second, the 
judicial practises are not understood as an objective practice, in the sense of finding the only 
truths in different cases; they are understood as a result of specific interests that are 
historically and culturally sited. Hence, a main objective in a sociological approach to the 
legal practices is to show how these practices can sustain inequality. For the purposes of this 
study, it is important to investigate how the different selection mechanisms in the court 
system establish different outcomes, and what consequences this might lead to for the 
offenders. In other words, the judicial practices validate certain perspectives on heroin 
smuggling and dealing, and discredit others. For the offenders on trail this is not only about 
the elevated issues of ideas of heroin smuggling and dealing, but a concrete matter of how 
hard and extensive they will be punished. 
 
                                                 
1 The definition of the sociological approach to law has its historical roots in Max Weber’s writings. Weber, who 
was trained as a lawyer, formulated the basis for the sociology of law as an external approach engaged in a 
theoretically-driven empirical study of law to examine the characteristics of existing systems of law including 
cause and effect, and functions and objectives of the intuitions and practices of law (see Deflem 2008 p.1). 
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Second, judicial practices are important to study because the decisions handed down by 
judges draw lines between motives in heroin felonies, and thus include some narratives told 
by the offenders and exclude others. Therefore, motives are a crucial concept in this study. In 
conceptualizing motives, I draw on contributions both from within the internal perspective of 
law represented by Johannes Andenæs (1965, 1999) and from the classic sociological 
contribution of Alfred Schutz ((1932) 1967). My intent is to draw attention to the distinctions 
between these two ways of conceptualizing motives. I wish to further investigate how the 
judicial definition of motives led to various consequences for the offenders in heroin felonies. 
I intend to show that the selective functions of the courts are connected to what types of 
motives are viewed as legitimate by the judges. Moreover, drawing on contributions from 
sociologists C. Wright Mills (1940), Stanford M Lyman and Marvin Scott (1989), I 
understand that judicial practices with their specific rhetoric and logic establish a “vocabulary 
of motives.” This means that different motives are given varying degrees of credibility by the 
judges, defining what types of narratives are considered relevant in court and, just as 
importantly, what types are deemed irrelevant. 
 
Third, the judicial practices are important to study because by identifying what arguments the 
judges use when punishing heroin smugglers and dealers, I can clarify ways in which 
offenders in heroin felonies are labelled.  This helps to illuminate whether any of the 
narratives told by the offenders results in a stigmatization process. In analyzing labeling and 
stigmatizations, I draw on, on the one side, a deterrence perspective as understood in 
contributions from Andenæs (1971, 1977), and on the other side, a labeling perspective as 
expressed in the classical sociological contributions from Howard Becker (1963). Moreover, 
influenced by John Braithwaite’s (1989) theory of re-integrative shaming, which combines 
elements from both deterrence theory and labeling theory, I investigate further whether any of 
the offenders’ narratives can be construed as expressions of a stigmatization process2.  
 
This study’s research questions 
 
In light of the aforementioned arguments for the relevance of this study, I can describe the 
research as follows: 
                                                 
2 The mentioned narrative studies of crime (O’Connor 2000, McKendy 2006, Presser 2008) do encapsulate 
discussions about labeling and stigmatization, however they do not elaborate the specifics of the judicial rhetoric 
and arguments in relation to the accounts given by the offenders or include discussions of whether stigmatization 
processes might differ as an effect of different sanctions placed upon offenders.   
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How do heroin smugglers and dealers present themselves and their illegal activities? What 
explanations and motivation do they give for their illegal actions? What types of 
representations of personal responsibility and guilt, along with expressions of “agency” are 
found in their narratives?   
 
In what way do the offenders’ narratives manifest themselves in the judicial practices? What 
characterize the heroin cases in the appellate court? What type of judicial argument is used 
when issuing punishment? How are the narratives of the offender mirrored in the judge’s 
argument? 
 
The structure of the thesis 
 
In Chapter 2, I present the data foundation of this study and, evaluate these sources of 
knowledge and the reason for their selection. Moreover, I address what type of knowledge can 
be generated from these sources and their strengths and weaknesses. In evaluating the 
qualitative interviews, I discuss prison as a context for the interviews, and the concepts of 
rapport, neutrality, objectivity and reflexivity. In evaluating the court decisions as sources of 
knowledge, I discuss what type of base the court decisions make for descriptions and analysis 
of the heroin cases within the judicial practices. I also illustrate how the court decisions can 
shed light on the judicial logic and rhetoric in heroin cases, and hence illuminate the types of 
narratives authorized by the judicial practices. 
 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I present this study’s theoretical approach, beginning with a short 
introduction to previous studies of heroin smuggling and dealing. A striking characteristic of 
the literature on this topic is that it is divided between studies done on street-level dealing and 
those on upper-level drug trafficking. In my presentation of previous studies, I follow this 
duality to emphasize how drug dealers and smugglers have previously been characterized and 
explained. In Chapter 4, I elaborate on this study’s theoretical and conceptual framework, 
synthesizing and integrating insight from narrative analysis and cultural studies. In the 
summary at the end of the chapter, I evaluate this study’s theoretical approach in relation to 
previous studies by discussing the question: What can narrative analysis contribute to the 
study of heroin smuggling and dealing?      
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In Chapters 5 through 9, I present and analyze four different narratives found within the 
smugglers’ and dealers’ stories. These are as follows: The Victim of Social Injustice, The 
Victim of Organized Crime, The Victim of Addiction and The Entrepreneur Narrative. These 
four narratives are presented in order in each chapter. To begin, I analyze the structure of the 
different narratives and present their beginning, middle and end. Next, I turn my attention to 
the type of plots and motivations that can be located in the different narratives. Finally, I 
explore the type of agency expressions, reform potential and personal responsibilities 
expressed in the narratives.  
 
In Chapter 10, I explore the ways in which the offenders’ narratives manifest themselves in 
the judicial practices. To accomplish this, I provide descriptions of what characterizes the 
heroin cases in the appellate court from 1995-2005. Then I examine what characterizes the 
judicial logic and rhetoric in these court decisions. Finally, I analyze how the narratives of the 
heroin smugglers and dealers are mirrored in the judges’ arguments in these court decisions.    
 
In Chapter 11, I summarize this study’s findings and bind the different treatises of this 
dissertation together. 
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2. Methods 
 
This study it is based on 24 qualitative face-to-face interviews with imprisoned heroin dealers 
and smugglers, and two interviews with heroin dealers outside of prison. Further, this study is 
based on statistics generated on the basis of all the heroin cases in the appellate court from 
1995 through 2005, and a document analysis of a sample of appellate and Supreme Court 
decisions. In this chapter I evaluate these sources of knowledge and the reasons for their 
selection. I will also address the type of knowledge that can be generated from these sources, 
and hence their strength and weaknesses.  
 
In evaluating the qualitative interviews, I will discuss prison as a context for the interviews 
and the concepts of rapport, neutrality, objectivity and reflexivity. In elaborating on these 
concepts, I place this study within the philosophy of science. In discussing the interviews, I 
stress their ability to shed light on the offender’s self-presentations, narratives, explanations, 
and motivation for their illegal activities. Hence I emphasize these sources of knowledge as a 
means of understanding the offenders’ negotiations regarding their deviant identities. 
  
In evaluating court decisions as sources of knowledge, I will argue the following two points: 
1) They can provide a description of the types of heroin cases that are dealt with in the legal 
system. 2) They can shed light on judicial logic and rhetoric in heroin cases, and, therefore, 
illuminate the types of narratives that are ratified and authorized by the judicial practices and 
those that are not. 
   
 About the sample of interviews 
 
All off the interviews were conducted from November 2005 through March 2006. Moreover 
the prison interviews were carried out in four different prisons in the central eastern region of 
Norway. The sample can be described by using the heroin smugglers and dealers’ own 
descriptions of the tasks they had been performing in the heroin trade and /or their charges by 
law enforcement. There are five females and twenty-one males. Thirteen of them are ethnic 
Norwegian and thirteen belong to other ethnic groups. There are two bosses represented in the 
sample, both of whom are non-ethnic Norwegian males, one living in Norway, the other a 
citizen of another country. Furthermore, there are three couriers, two male and one female, all 
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of whom are non-ethnic Norwegian. Two of them are citizens of other countries and one lives 
in Norway. The sample includes four receivers and holders of heroin, all of whom are non-
ethnic Norwegian males living in Norway. The largest category in the sample is comprised of 
the retail dealers, which includes 13 offenders, four of whom are female. Among the retail 
dealers there is only one non-ethnic Norwegian, who also lives in Norway. The table below 
gives an overview of the different research participants according to the duties they performed 
in the heroin trade and their gender and ethnicity. 
 
Table 1. Sample of gender, ethnicity and duties preformed in the heroin trade. 
  
 Female Male Ethnic Norwegian Other ethnic 
groups 
Bosses (2) 0 2 0 2 
Couriers (3) 1 2 0 3 
Receivers and 
holders (4) 
0 4 0 4 
Wholesale 
dealers (4)  
0 4 1 3 
Retail dealers 
(13) 
4 9 12 1 
Total (26) 5 21 13 13 
 
Two of the research participants were, as mentioned earlier, interviewed outside of prison. 
Both of the drug dealers are know by the police, and have previously been arrested for dealing 
heroin. I drafted these dealers when working as an interviewer in a SIRUS study among 
intravenous drug users in Oslo (see Bretteville-Jensen 2005). I conducted the interviews at 
SIRUS`s office building after making appointments with the dealers3. The following 
methodical reflections also refer to theses interviews.      
The prison as a context of the interviews 
 
It is important to assess the strength and weaknesses of the prison as a context for 
interviewing since 24 out of the 26 interviews in this study were conducted here. 
Criminologists have often based their research studies on interviews with convicted offenders 
and elaborated on the limitations of these interviews. In such cases, the prison interview is 
often compared and contrasted to an ethnographical street approach. The central argument 
                                                 
3 Later in this chapter, I will describe how I obtained access to the prisons, and how the offenders’ in jail were 
drafted for this study.   
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made by the criminologists is that the street is a much better place to study crime than the 
prison. As early as the 1960s, Polsky (1967 p. 116) made the following claim which illustrates 
this point: “We can no longer afford the convenient fiction that studying criminals in their 
natural habitat, we would discover nothing really important that could not be discovered from 
criminals behind bars.” Other criminologists such as Richard Wright and Scott Decker (1997) 
argue that the accounts given by offenders in jail are distorted because of the prison 
environment. Hence, prisoners will try to present themselves in the best possible light, 
because they are worried that the information that they give to the researcher will influence 
their chances for early parole, regardless how much the researcher guaranties otherwise. 
Further, Wright and Decker (1997 p. 4) argue that most criminal behavior is a direct result of 
the pressure and or temptation on the streets, and that prisoners are removed from that 
pressure; hence, they respond quite differently as to how they would have reacted on the 
street.  
 
I agree with Wright and Decker in that there is an obvious difference in studying heroin 
dealing and smuggling through extensive field work, getting the “insider perspective,” and 
observing how heroin smuggling and dealing is done in practice, rather than studying heroin 
dealers and smugglers through singular prison interviews. Moreover, I understand the prison 
as the end station of a long process of legal procedures. Thus, I would argue that the prison 
and the presiding court cases and sanctioning influence the offender’s’ stories. Interviewing 
offenders in prison about crime could “push” these previous sanctions to the center of the 
offenders’ stories. Hence, the aim of the stories would be to explain how and why they ended 
up in prison. The accounts they give for their previous actions are often strongly influenced 
by their legal defense4. Contrary to Wright and Decker, I do not perceive these accounts as a 
disturbance that should be reduced or kept at a minimum to generate the “true” knowledge 
about heroin crimes, but I will argue for making these accounts and narratives the focal point 
of the analysis, and further study the interconnectedness of the narratives with the judicial 
practices. The main point of my argument is that the prison context and the way the 
interviews were conducted brought the offenders’ explanations and motivation to the forefront 
of their narratives. Moreover, focus on the offenders’ explanations and motivation for their 
                                                 
4 However, I did not find that it was a central element in the offenders’ narratives that they were trying to present 
themselves as “reformed” criminals wanting an early parole. Rather, the offenders were giving justification and 
excuse accounts of their previous illegal actions. 
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illegal actions is rarely the main center of attraction in an ethnographical approach5.  Still a 
question remains: Would the offenders have given different accounts and justifications for 
their illegal activities if they had been interviewed on the outside?   
 
The highly influential ethnographer Michael Agar (1977 pp.148-149) claims that ethnography 
has a bias of studying human behavior in natural contexts rather than in isolated interviews; 
hence, they communicate that “the truth can only be found on the streets.” Additionally, Agar 
asks what the differences are in the knowledge about drug users/dealers which is generated on 
the street or in the joint. To answer this question, Agar gives a literary review of the 
ethnographical fieldwork on drug users/dealers that is done both on the street and in prison (or 
other instructional settings), and finds that these study results are surprisingly similar. Thus, 
the drug users/dealers in prison and on the street tell very similar stories about themselves and 
their lives. However, Agar finds that drug users/dealers in prison tend to overestimate their 
own success as “streetwise.” Thus, they downplay the more quiet-paths of life on the street 
and their more unsuccessful missions. Quite contradictory to Wright and Decker (1997), who 
stress that the offenders need to portray themselves in the best possible light in terms of 
mainstream values to get an early parole, Agar (1977) claims that the offenders try to portray 
themselves in the best possible light of the street culture values and norms. However neither 
Agar nor Wright and Decker discuss what effect labeling and repeated sanctions have on the 
offenders’ stories. I will argue that the sanction process does influence the offenders’ 
narratives.  
   
Similar to Agar, I found that there were striking similarities in the stories told by the retail 
dealers I interviewed inside prison and the two retail dealers I interviewed on the outside who 
had previously been sanctioned. Further, the narratives told by the retail dealers had striking 
similarities with previous ethnographical studies of street level dealing. For example, most 
street level dealers claimed that they dealt drugs to finance their own drug addiction (see Agar 
1973, Bourgois 1995, Hanson 1985, Reuter, MacCoun & Murphy 1990, Lalander 2001 and 
Hoffer 2006)6. However, there are few ethnographical studies done on the top levels of drug 
smuggling and wholesale dealing; hence, the knowledge about heroin smugglers generated 
outside of a judicial context is rare, making this kind of comparison impossible. One way of 
construing this is that the stories told by the retail dealers are more established narratives than 
                                                 
5 I will return to this argumentation in the theory chapter. 
6 These contributions will be presented in the theory chapter. 
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the narratives told by the heroin smugglers. This is not problematic in itself, but, if this leads 
to a legitimization of the low level dealers’ stories and a suspicion toward the top level 
smugglers stories, it becomes more problematic. This might become more problematic if the 
differences in legitimization run together with ethnicity, where low level heroin dealers are 
ethnic Norwegian and the top level smugglers are non-ethnic Norwegian, and if these 
offenders’ stories are meet with a different attitude within the judicial practices.    
 
As a conclusion to why there were similarities in the knowledge generated both on the street 
and in the prison, Agar (1977) stresses the close relationship established between the 
ethnographer and research participants. Hence, the ethnographical key feature should not be 
that of a street setting approach, but that of establishing rapport. Although I agree that it is 
important to establish a good relationship with the research participants, I do not agree that 
this is the only explanation as to why it is possible to find similarities in the offenders’ stories.  
I will argue that the similarities in stories also have to do with those explanations that are 
established as culturally available motivations for drug crimes. Further, in establishing these 
culturally available motives, the judicial practices and discussions play a significant part.  
 
 Rapport, neutrality, objectivity and reflexivity 
 
In evaluations of qualitative interviews the great majority of method discussions are centered 
on four ideals—rapport, neutrality, objectivity and reflexivity (see for example Gadamer 2007 
(1960)), Haraway 1988, Harding 1991, 2006, Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000, Silverman 2006, 
Rapley 2006, Presser 2008). Moreover, the concepts of rapport and neutrality are often 
discussed in connection to the interviewer-participant relationship, whereas the concepts of 
objectivity and reflexivity are often discussed in regard to interpretations and analysis of 
qualitative data. In this method chapter I will discuss the concepts of rapport and neutrality in 
regard to the prison interviews and the concept of objectivity and reflexivity in relation to the 
interpretation and analysis of both the prison interview and the court decisions.  
 
The first concept, rapport, refers to the researcher’s ability to establish a suitably relaxed and 
encouraging relationship, where the research participants feel at ease. Hence, the interviewer 
must communicate trust, reassurance and even likeability (Rapley 2006 p. 19). Although 
rapport is an implicit factor of a successful interview, James Holstein and Jaber Gubrium 
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(2002) have pointed out that it is a surprisingly ill-defined concept, and that there are few 
methodological precedents of how to talk to research participants. I will address the issue of 
rapport by discussing the following questions: Why did the offenders want to talk to a 
researcher? What were the frames of the interviews? What did the offenders want to talk 
about? And How did we talk? Throughout this discussion, I will integrate relevant ethical 
considerations and reflections. 
 
The second idea, often discussed in the method literature in regard to interview conduct, is 
neutrality. Tim Rapley (2006 p. 19) argues that interviewer neutrality has been seen as either 
an “essential practice” or a “bad practice.” On one hand, researchers who argue that it is an 
essential practice, stress that if the interviewer is not neutral, she will bias the interviewees’ 
answers. The researcher then acts as though the goal were somehow to get rid of interpersonal 
effects to get at the truth, which would be evident if interpersonal characters of the interview 
did not interfere. One the other hand, researchers who argue that interview neutrality is a bad 
practice stress that it creates a hierarchical, asymmetrical relationship in which the research 
participants are treated as objects.  
 
In regard to my understanding of the concept of neutrality, I am inspired by Lois Presser7 
(2008 pp. 35-36) who argues for an interactive perspective in understanding her interviews 
with violent offenders; hence she understands the stories of the offenders as “co-authored” by 
her. However, Presser (2008 pp. 38-39) points out that the stories the offenders tell are not 
created in the interview context alone. The researcher’s influence on the narratives is only one 
of many social influences. I agree with Presser, and, additionally, I would point out that the 
offenders use an established vocabulary of motives when talking about their illegal activities. 
Similar to Presser, (2008 pp. 38-39) I will discuss the influence of my words and actions, 
insofar as I created different opportunities for the offenders to make certain self-presentations 
and emphasize certain motivations and explanations for their illegal activities. 
 
The third and fourth ideas often discussed in method literature are the concepts of objectivity 
and reflexivity, which are closely interrelated. The concept of reflexivity is not a new issue 
within social science but developed as a response to the idea of objectivity as assuming a 
researcher’s position of distance, disinterestedness and impartiality. The most influential 
                                                 
7 I will return to Presser’s contribution in the theory chapter.  
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writers on reflexivity are found within the feminist philosophy of science (e.g., Haraway 
1988, Harding 1991, 2006). Drawing extensively on hermeneutical (Gadamer 2007 (1960)) 
insights, feminists have further developed these ideas within different research traditions such 
as post structuralism (Haraway 1988) and standpoint theory (Harding 1991, 2006). Donna 
Haraway (1988) has argued that reflexivity is the key activity in studies which require not 
only acknowledging the specificities of the research positioning, but critically engaging with 
that positioning to analyze assumptions and conceptual frameworks which inform/influence 
the inquiry.   
 
Similarly the social scientists Mats Alvesson and Kaj Sköldberg (2000 p. 5) claim that 
reflexive research has two basic characteristics. The first attribute is that all references to 
empirical data are the result of interpretation; and secondly, reflection is an activity that turns 
the focus inward to the researcher`s use of concepts, scientific theories, and meta-theories. 
The underlying assumption of the reflexive approach is that empirical material does not 
simply mirror social reality, but is mediated through the interpretations of the researcher, and 
thereby constructed. Hence, the purpose of the reflexive method is not to find “one truth,” but 
to highlight the construction of the study object and the multiplicity of interpretations, to 
make explicit insights regarding ambiguity and to discuss the dominant theoretical views. The 
reflexive method then involves reflecting on and making explicit the mechanism by which the 
interpretive process shapes the inquiry outcomes. I will address the issue of reflexivity when 
elaborating on analytical strategies.          
  
Why did the offenders want to talk to a researcher? 
 
In national and international literature based on interviews with offenders, it is argued that it 
is easy to recruit research participants. The offenders often want a visitor and have a need to 
talk, and welcome everything that can break the monotony of the everyday life in prison. It is 
reasonable to believe that this affected the offenders’ willingness to talk to me and let me 
interview them. The strategy for recruiting research participants could also have affected the 
offenders’ willingness to talk to a researcher. The research participants in this study were 
chosen with the purpose of finding individuals who could tell stories about the Norwegian 
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heroin trade. Thus, this study is based on a purposive sample,8 which is a sample that starts 
with a purpose in mind and is thus selected to include people of interest and exclude those 
who do not suit the purpose. To conduct interviews in Norwegian prisons, one needs 
permission from the regional correctional service. Therefore, I applied for permission to 
conduct the interviews at the regions of interest, and hence the prisons of interest. In the 
application I gave a description of the project research questions and aims, which were to find 
out what offenders who serve sentences for heroin felonies want to tell about their life and 
their experiences in importing and dealing heroin. Furthermore, through this information, I 
indicated that we would discuss questions about the organizational aspects of heroin dealing 
and smuggling.  
 
In the letter to the correctional services I asked for help to localize and make contact with 
individuals who were serving heroin convictions and who might be willing to be interviewed. 
When the permit from the regional correctional services was granted, it was the prison guards 
and “local contact” at every division in the different prisons who contacted the prisoners and 
asked if they wanted to be interviewed. This may have resulted in the offenders feeling 
obliged or even pressured to cooperate and allow themselves to be interviewed. Therefore, 
keeping in line with the Norwegian ethical guidelines for social science NEHS9 (2006 p. 13) 
and Guideline Number Nine regarding free consent, I started all interviews by stressing the 
voluntary aspect of the interview and that the research participant, without giving any reason, 
could withdraw from the interview at any time. 
 
One aspect of recruiting the research participants with the help of the correctional services as 
a “middleman,” and with the researcher totally cut off from the prisoners, is that it can open 
up opportunities for misunderstandings10. Although I had sent written information to both the 
prison staff/guards and the prisoners about the project, some of the offenders were poorly 
                                                 
8 Purposive sampling is best used with small numbers of individuals, which may well be sufficient for 
understanding human perception, identity, motivations and explanation; hence, the power of purposive sampling 
lies in selecting information- rich-cases for analysis related to the central issues being studied (Silverman 2006 p. 
129). 
9 The National Committee for Research Ethics in Social Science and the Humanities (NESH) was formed in 
1990, and has drawn up guidelines for research ethics in the social sciences, law, the humanities, and theology. 
The first version of the guidelines was published in 1990, and was revised in 1999 and 2004 (Skilbrei 2003 p.26, 
Neumann Basberg 2007).   
10 The cooperation with the correctional services has been very diverse, from very good cooperation at one 
prison to a total rejection of the project at another prison. The point is that when the researcher is situated on the 
outside of a closed system, it is necessary to find a contact person on the inside who takes an interest in the 
project and has time and power to make the practical arrangements for the interviews. In one of the prisons I 
found a contact person like this.  
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informed and/or misinformed about the project and my goals. Few offenders had read any 
written material. Some prisoners wondered why I had contacted just them. One offender 
thought that he was going to talk to his defense lawyer, and one thought I was a visitor from 
the Ministry of Justice and police that he had waited a long time to meet. Although these 
gross misunderstandings are the exceptions in this study, I started all the interviews by 
presenting myself and the project, and discussing how I had located the research participants. 
Further, I stressed the voluntariness and the confidentiality of the project. 
 
However, I did not inform the research participants that the interviews were going to be used 
to analyze their self-presentation and their narratives. According to the NEHS Guideline 
Number Eight (NEHS 2006 p. 13), all research participants should be informed about the aim 
of the research, so that they can develop an informed opinion about the purpose of the study 
before giving their consent. The reason the participants were not informed about the focus on 
self-presentations and narratives was that these research questions sprang from the research 
process itself. In a qualitative research process it is not uncommon that new issues and 
research questions develop throughout the study. The flexibility, exploration and open-
endedness of the qualitative method often necessitates that research questions be reformulated 
and made more precise throughout the project. Hence, the flexibility that is inherent in a 
qualitative approach might present a conflict with the ideal of a detailed informed consensus. 
One way of avoiding this problem is for the researcher to stay in contact with the research 
participants throughout the research process, and, if necessary, contact them again to clear 
new agendas. Due to safety and practical reasons, I have not stayed in contact with the 
research participants. To locate the participants today would involve large practical problems; 
some would have been let out of prison, others would have moved to other prisons or 
institutions, and so on.   
 
Is it is reasonable to believe that the participants would have withdrawn from the interview if 
they had been informed that I was going to study their self-presentation and their narratives as 
well as the organizational aspects of the heroin trade? Ideally, they should have been given 
this information and the possibility to withdraw from the interview, and it is possible that 
some of the participants would have done this. More likely, however, the offender would not 
have withdrawn from the interview. When participants talk about their illegal activities, it is 
inherent in the issue that their stories will be evaluated. Thus, when they agree to talk about 
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their illegal activities, it is reasonable that they accept that their stories are subject to 
evaluation.  
 
However, none of the offenders withdrew from the interview. Some of the prisoners stressed 
from the start of the interview that they only had marginal knowledge about the heroin trade 
and wanted to talk about their own court case. Further they claimed that they had been forced 
or tricked into the heroin trade or that they had been convicted on false premises. Others 
claimed that they would tell their story if it could help others. That some offenders stressed 
their marginal involvement in the heroin trade from the beginning of the interview might also 
have had something to do with the way the interview was framed. 
 
What was the frame of the interview? 
 
I was always alone with the offenders during the interview, and we were locked inside the 
visiting room of the prison. The visiting rooms of the different prisons varied in their 
architectural structure, but I always tried to be seated across from the offenders so I could 
maintain eye contact and look at them while they talked. After approval by the research 
participants, I tape recorded all of the interviews. The interviews lasted from two to five 
hours, with an average of three hours. All interviews were conducted in Norwegian, except 
two, which were conducted in English. The non-ethnic Norwegian offenders had good 
Norwegian and English skills, and the interviews were not hindered by language problems.  
 
The start of the meeting was used for framing the interview. In the beginning of the interview 
I was concerned with balancing an interest in how the activities of drug smuggling and 
dealing is done in practice, with an openness toward what the offenders wanted to tell. Thus, 
from the beginning of the interview, I stressed my concerns, heroin smuggling and dealing. At 
the same time it was important to show my curiosity toward their stories and present myself 
as non-judgmental. I talked a lot at the start of the interview, which gave the offenders a 
chance to evaluate me and my sincerity. At this point of the interview I experienced some of 
the offenders as “on guard,” and others as outright suspicious. Some prisoners sat leaning 
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backward with their arms folded, staring at me with an intense and piercing gaze that I 
interpreted as, “Who are you and what do you want?11”  
 
An important issue is that if I had planned only to collect life stories from the onset, I 
probably would have entered the field in a more curious way regarding the issue of the 
offender’s illegal actions. However, I wanted to talk to individuals who presumably knew 
something about the heroin trade, which was my preliminary interest, and by following the 
ethical guidelines and informing the participants about my research interest, I could have set 
the stage for a moral confrontation which has parallels to the offenders’ previous court cases. 
Hence, I framed the interview in a way that made the offender’s explanations and motivations 
for their illegal activities more explicit than I would have by focusing on their life stories. 
Thus, I started my interviews by asking the following question: “Could you tell me about your 
relationship to heroin?”  
 
By comparison, Presser (2008 p. 49) states that she received consent from the offenders to do 
her interviews, but she does not elaborate on the reasons why she obtained this consent or 
how she introduced her research12. Moreover, Presser (2008) began her interviews by asking 
the very general question: “Tell me about your life.” Some of her offenders responded, “What 
do you mean the crime?” Presser (2008) answered, “What you like.” I, on the other hand, 
focused on the offender’s relationship to heroin, which in many cases brought the offenders 
thoughts directly to their previous court case, but in other cases, the offenders would start to 
talk about their own experiences using heroin. A central question remains: Would the 
offenders have told different stories and accounts of their illegal activities if I had framed the 
interview in a broader manner? I would argue that it is likely that a more open approach 
would have led to less resistance from the start of the interview with the offenders, and hence 
would have made rapport easier to establish. However the framing of the interview made the 
offenders’ motivation and explanations explicit from the start. Further, when the offenders 
started to tell their stories, I assumed a position of asking probing questions that were in line 
with their stories. 
 
                                                 
11 This preliminary suspicion and resistance among the offenders might also be linked to the fact that they had 
received little information prior to meeting me.  
12 However, Presser (2008 pp. 92-93) does discuss that she cued the interviews toward the judicial discourse, 
where she emphasizes that she focused on the sanctions the offenders had experienced and not the crime in itself, 
and thus avoided direct moral confrontations. 
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What did the offenders want to talk about? 
 
In preparing the interviews, I had made a detailed interview guide with open-ended questions. 
The themes in the guide were inspired by other studies on heroin dealing and organized crime 
and included issues such as general trends in the heroin market, general trends on the import 
of heroin, division of labor, values, contacts and relationships in the heroin market, trust and 
the establishment of trustworthiness, money, betrayal and violence. However, in meeting the 
first offender it became clear that he had his own agenda for what and how he would talk. He 
would, as he explained, tell his own story. I put away the interview guide and let the offenders 
tell their stories. Laying aside the interview guide helped me to establish rapport with the 
offenders, because I showed sensitivity toward their explanation and need to tell their stories 
in their own way. 
 
When I allowed the offenders to tell their story, it was a story about how they ended up in 
prison, with a strong emphasis on the moral explanation of why they acted the way they did. 
Other social scientists that have done studies on imprisoned offenders such as Patricia 
O’Conner (2003) and John P. McKendy (2008)13 have argued that prison populations are 
“silenced” in the sense that imprisonment not only involves physical confinement, but also 
discursive and ideological confinement. Thus the opportunities the offenders have to tell their 
stories are officially ratified and severely restricted. Hence, O’Conner (2003) and McKendy 
(2008 p. 496) argue that the open-ended qualitative interview provides an unusual opportunity 
for prisoners to report, reflect, and relate their stories. Parallel with O’Conner (2003) and 
McKendy, (2008) I would argue that the imprisoned heroin dealers and smugglers are 
“silenced,” and by interviewing them, I provided an opportunity for them to tell their story. 
However, all heroin smugglers and dealers might not be officially “silenced” in exactly the 
same way, in the sense that some of the narratives told by the offenders could be better known 
and accepted as truths than others, and, hence, I view it as an important scientific and ethical 
issue to point out this difference. In other words, if some off the offenders’ explanations are 
viewed as credible, and other offenders stories are viewed as unbelievable or illegitimate in 
court, and if there are systematical differences in how the offenders’ stories are given 
legitimacy which reproduces inequality, it is an important issue both scientifically and 
ethically. Being sensitive toward stories which are silenced in the public sphere also 
corresponds with the ethical guidelines (NESH 2006) which stipulate that the social scientist 
                                                 
13 I will return to more detailed presentation of these contributions in the theory chapter. 
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has a special obligation and loyalty toward marginal groups, by presenting members of such 
groups and their life in a non- stigmatizing way.     
 
Further, McKendy (2008) argues that a striking characteristic with his prison interviews was 
the offenders’ “joy in expression.” Quoting Pierre Bourdieu (1999 p. 615) McKendy (2008 p. 
497) states: 
 
It even happens that, far from being simple instruments in the hands of the 
investigator, the respondents take over themselves. The density and intensity 
of their speech, and the impression they often give of finding a sort of relief, 
even accomplishment, convey, along with everything else about them a joy 
in expression (Bourdieu in McKendy 2008 p. 497). 
 
Similarly I found the offenders in this study eager to tell their story in their own way, 
conveying a “joy in expression.” 
 
 How did we talk? The importance of humor 
 
A key issue in a successful interview is for the researcher to establish rapport with the 
research participants and create a good atmosphere. In my interviews humor was an essential 
part of how rapport was established, and often served the function of reducing the moral 
tension which was inherit in the subjects under study. Hence, the offenders “joy of 
expression” not only found an outlet in an eagerness to tell their story, but it was also 
expressed in the telling of jokes, the use of self-irony, and black humor.  
 
Despite its seemingly non-serious intent, humor is filled with social significance. Hence, most 
of the time the humorous twists of the offenders’ stories were not out of context, but a way of 
conveying meaning. Sometimes the offenders would use humor to take the edge of the serious 
issue at hand and create a distance to what was being discussed. At other times humor was 
used to sustain and create a light atmosphere in the interview. The following story told by an 
ethnic Norwegian retail dealer serving a long sentence, illustrates the first point: 
 
“You can say that my criminal career started when I was four years old, and my father 
pushed me through a ventilation hole, so that I could run around to the front and open 
the door for him… he, he, he. My father stole everything he could lay his hands on. But 
he is a clumsy thief, and he doesn’t manage much. The last thing I heard about my 
father was that he had taken a taxi to and from a burglary…he, he, he. And this I am 
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being told when I come in here (the prison) he, he, he. It was so embarrassing that I did 
not know what to say and do. My father doesn’t always succeed in his arrangements, but 
you can’t act very proud when you hear that your father has taken a taxi to and from a 
burglary…he, he, he.” 
 
 In this quote the offender is expressing a distance to his upbringing and his criminal father, 
by making fun of his father’s lack of success as a thief. I remember thinking when the 
offender told the story, what choices did he have if his father introduced him to breaking and 
entering when he was only four years old? However, instead of continuing a story about his 
upbringing and directly blaming his father for his own criminal activities by coming right out 
and saying so, the offender twisted the story in a humorous way, describing his father’s 
incompetence as a thief. Hence, the offender is presenting himself not primarily as victim of 
his upbringing, but as a more successful criminal than his father. By encouraging the use of 
humor in the interviews with eye contact, laughter, and smiles, I gave the offenders an 
opportunity to present themselves as entertaining storytellers. Hence, I gave recognition, not 
only to the issue of what was talked about, but also to the offenders as storytellers and as 
capable mediators.  
 
Humor provided the offenders with a wider repertoire in their storytelling and thus for 
presenting their social identities. Often the humor would refer to the buying and selling 
situation, where the offenders either portrayed themselves as smart by fooling or cheating 
someone else, or they portrayed themselves as the ones being cheated. At other times the 
humor was used to address power relationships, often with a sting toward the authorities, 
police, and the judicial system. Hence, the humor was a strategy in both presenting 
themselves and as a means to support their own arguments and accounts. The following 
quotation, from a non-ethnic Norwegian serving a long sentence, illustrated this:  
 
“I know of a case where an old X (Eastern European) called a friend to ask him to 
supply him with four car tires. And then the old fellow keeps nagging on and on about 
those car tires. What happened was that his friend was arrested with four kilos of 
heroin, the old fellow is jailed for nine years because he was nagging on and on about 
those car tires…he, he, he. He serves nine years without knowing anything about heroin 
or drugs. But he was convicted, that poor fellow, because the police claim that it’s highly 
probable that he was involved in the heroin deal. What do they (police) know really, 
when they tap phones and it is being said, “I want to have four car tires.” The police say 
they were talking in codes, and then you are being convicted no matter what.”    
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Similar stories to this one, were told by the heroin smugglers to illustrate, in a humorous way, 
the sensitivity and bias of the police investigation methods, and hence introduce the 
possibilities that the offenders could have been wrongly charged. In this respect, the 
humorous stories also brought attention to the offender’s previous police investigations and 
court cases.   
 
Although humor was welcomed in the interviews, I tried to keep focused and took the lead if I 
experienced that the interview was becoming too fleeting, too humorous, or straying too far 
from the issue. Either I would stop and say that I needed to sum up the interview so far, or I 
would say, “This was fun, but what I am really curious about is…” In this way I tried to stay 
in control of the interview, and, at the same time, recognize the importance of acknowledging 
the offenders as able and skillful storytellers.  
 
 The male offenders 
 
A central concern in 21 of the prison interviews is that they were meetings between a female 
researcher and male offenders, and 12 of these interviews were conducted with non-ethnic 
Norwegians males.  A central question became: How does the social distance between the 
male offenders and me influence the interview, and what type of options for self-presentation 
did this social distance create? In the method literature, the issue of social distance has been 
described as both good and bad. On one hand, Jody Miller and Barry Glassner (2004 p. 134) 
argue that social distance can be good in so far as it facilitates a situation in which the 
research participants feel like experts in their social worlds, and, hence, make an effort to 
make explicit knowledge which has been taken for granted, either by sustaining it or rejecting 
it. One the other hand Miller and Glassner (2004 p. 135) argue that social distance can led to 
suspicion, which might result in stereotyping, judgmental behavior and stigmatizing. 
Similarly I would argue that my “outside” position caused the offenders to make many of 
their arguments explicit and at the same time the social distance between the offenders and me 
also led to suspicion and hostility.  
 
First I will give an example of how the social distance between the offenders and me may 
have brought new information to light.  In the ethnographical literature on drug dealing, 
mostly concucted by male researchers with emphasis on street life and the subculture, the 
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violence (see Agar 1973, Katz 1988, Sandberg and Pedersen 2006), hustling (see Preble and 
Casey 1967, Agar 1973) and coping (Preble and Casey 1967, Agar 1973, Bourgois 1995, 
Lalander 2001, Sandberg and Pedersen 2006) of everyday life of a drug user/dealer is often 
given precedence to an understanding of the drug user/dealer’s other significant relationships 
(see also Stephens 1991 p. 95). It is, therefore, interesting to note that in my prison interviews 
all the offenders stressed the importance of their close relationships. The male offenders 
stressed their relationships to their parents, females (wives and girlfriends) and children. 
Some of the offenders talked intensely about their relationship to their parents, children, wives 
and mothers, and the meaning and influence these relationships had on their activities in the 
heroin trade. One example of this was the prisoners who used their breadwinner status as an 
explanation of why they became involved in the illegal activity. Another example was the 
offenders who dwelled on the moral dilemmas they faced when they were hiding their 
criminal activities from their wives or girlfriends, or trying to protect their closest relations 
from dangerous situations that followed their illegal activities. The point is that when these 
issues became apparent in the interview, it might have been a result that the offenders were 
talking with a female researcher, which gave them an opportunity to present themselves as 
good husbands, boyfriends, and fathers. 
 
Second, the social distance between the offenders and me also created problems of resentment 
and hostility. As mentioned earlier, qualitative interviews in prison can offer special 
opportunities to marginalized individuals to tell their stories. However, as Michael Schwalbe 
and Michelle Wolkomir (2001) argue, an interview with a female researcher and a male 
research participant can be construed as both an opportunity and a threat. It is an opportunity 
in that the participants get to present themselves however they wish; it is a treat because the 
researcher controls the interview and can ask questions, which validates the participant’s 
presentation of himself. By being very active in the interview, some men try to get a 
compensational control over the interview to assert their masculinity. 
 
I would argue that all the interviews with male prisoners carried with them this ambivalence 
between possibility and treat. Its clearest expression is found in the interviews with prisoners 
who claimed that they were wrongly committed. One way of interpreting this is that these 
interviews enhanced the issues of defense, stigma negotiations, and moral justifications. To 
illustrate this I will describe the opening of an interview. The man was in his late 40s and this 
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is how he described himself: “The police say that I am a big mafia boss, but I am a simple 
carpenter from X (Eastern Europe).” 
 
The prisoner is already sitting in the visiting room when I enter. He is sitting farthest out on 
the couch, with his elbows leaned against his knees and with a peering gaze that goes straight 
through me. The way he is sitting and looking at me gives me the feeling that he is ready to 
dive forward. His looks and posture make me nervous, and I turn away from him and toward 
the prison ward who has followed me into the room. The ward looks over my head at the 
offender and says: “You should have had an alarm, shouldn’t you?” I say “no thanks” to the 
alarm, because to ask for an alarm after I have seen who I was going to interview would be to 
admit that I was afraid of him. The interview could only work with trust, something a need for 
an alarm would not enhance. I watched as the prison ward closed and locked the door, with 
my back turned away from the offender. I took a deep breath before I turned around. I smiled 
and reached out my hand to say hello. The offender’s face was frozen, and he didn’t take my 
hand. I am thinking, dear God, this will be a tough interview. How are we going to find a 
common ground (Field notes 2006)? 
 
This was my toughest interview with the offender’s obvious resistance and suspicion. That 
which “saved” the interview was humor. The offender had a raw, but pertinent and intelligent 
humor. He would tell his story about how he got mixed up in a heroin case and sentenced on 
circumstantial evidence. The style he used was that he would tell his story, stop, and ask me 
questions like, “Do you believe me? Or “What do you believe of what I have told you?” The 
interview took form almost as a mental competition, where my position became to find holes 
in his story. My probing question was of this type: “Could it have happened in this way?” 
“How did you manage this concretely?” “If X, so Y?”  
 
According to Steinar Kvale, (1997) the researcher can build the analysis into the interview by 
clarifying the research participant’s different statements. In this style of interviewing the 
issues that are talked about are constantly evaluated and validated throughout the interview. 
Applied to this study, and in light of Kvales (1997) understanding, I challenge this offender’s 
story and others in similar interviews, by looking for logical flaws in the argument and 
confronted the offender with these. At the same time the offenders were evaluating how quick 
and sharp I was in finding holes in their stories and acknowledged good challenges to their 
stories with smiles and other gestures of approval. The point is that the position I took in these 
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interviews resembled that of a prosecution attorney. I will elaborate this position later in the 
text.  
 
When I situated myself in a prosecution position, I opened up for the anger and frustration 
these offenders felt toward the Norwegian police, court of law, and the Norwegian authorities 
in general. The point is that when I challenged the offenders’ stories, I enhanced their excuses 
and justification accounts; hence, it made their explanations for their illegal activities even 
more explicit.   
 
The female offenders 
 
Five female offenders (one courier and four retail dealers) were represented in the interview 
material. The interview with the female courier will be presented later in the method chapter. 
Similar to the male offenders, I experienced the female dealers as “on guard” at the beginning 
of the interview. In addition to the introduction round, we engaged in “small talk” about their 
life in prison and their conditions for serving their sentence. The female offenders were also 
curious as to who I was and what I did when I was not a researcher, and I answered their 
questions openly. Raply (2006 p. 23) defines the concept of reciprocity in the interview 
context as: “the exchange of personal-biographical-emotional experiences.” Further, Raply 
(2006 p. 23) argues that when the researcher engages in reciprocity by disclosing some aspect 
of herself, the research participants will feel more at ease and this will lead to rapport. I found 
that engaging in small talk with the female offenders made them relax, and we could start the 
interview.   
 
The female retail dealers told their stories in a similar fashion as the male retail dealers, where 
they integrated their dealing careers with their own drug consumption. Several studies have 
shown that female drug users often support their addiction through prostitution (File 1976, 
Rosenbaum 1981, Bretville-Jensen 2005) However, the female retail dealers, similar to the 
male retail dealers, stressed that they sold heroin to finance their own addiction. Further, the 
women emphasized that drug dealing was a better money making alternative than prostitution. 
Hence, the female dealers presented themselves in a similar way to the male drug dealers, by 
focusing on heroin dealing as a means of financing their addiction.  
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In her study of female gang members Jody Miller (2001) observed that the female research 
participants would use the interview to “talk back” at gender stereotypes. For example, the 
female gang members denied the occurrence of “sexing in,” a practice where the females are 
required to have sex with multiple male gang members to gain entry to the gang.  
 
Similarly, the female retail dealers in this study can be construed as “talking back” at the 
gender stereotype when they stressed that they were drug dealers who didn’t want to have 
anything to do with prostitution. Furthermore, the female drug dealers also “talked back” at 
the understanding of females in the drug subculture as subordinate to men and financially 
dependent upon them. For example, one of the female drug dealers said that she was dealing 
heroin together with her boyfriend, and she stressed that they had a good relationship and 
were equal partners in the heroin dealing. She emphasized that she had been dealing and using 
drugs for a longer time than he had. However, not all of the female retail dealers talked back 
at the gender stereotypes. For example, one of the female retail dealers spoke about her 
negative relationship to men both within and outside the drug subculture and told about 
physical, psychological, and sexual abuse. She did not use the interview to challenge gender 
specific roles of the heroin subculture.   
 
Confidentiality and anonymity 
 
A challenge in making the interviews anonymous is how detailed I can be in describing the 
offenders without giving away their identity.  In the following analysis, I will emphasize the 
offenders’ anonymity, which means that certain factors are kept out of the analysis to protect 
the offender’s real identity. To protect the prisoners, identity information about where they are 
serving their sentence is not given. Neither is detailed information about their court cases or 
their nationality and/or ethnic group.  By giving too much detailed information about the 
offenders, individuals who know the milieu might be able to identify the offenders, and 
people “who talk” are often met with negative reactions in the drug culture.   
  
One problem with the question of anonymity is addressed by Charles L. Bosk ((1979) , 2003). 
In Bosk’s study of an institution he had few informants, and he chose to make one of his 
female physicians into a male physician to protect her real identity. This resulted in the fact 
that Bosk overlooked important power structures in regard to the differences between males 
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and females in his analysis. Hence, Bosk did not discuss that this physician could have been a 
victim of gender discrimination in regard to not getting a leadership position. In his 2003 
version of the book, Bosk confronts his preliminary way of making the data material 
anonymous, and discusses its shortcomings.  
 
This example brings attention to the fact that the way the researcher makes the data material 
anonymous can have consequences for the analysis of the data material and the conclusions 
one draws. In the following analysis I will not trade the gender of the research participants; 
however, in relation to the question of anonymity, I will not refer to the real ethnicity of the 
offenders except to point out the categories ethnic Norwegians, and non-ethnic Norwegians. 
Further, all the offenders have been given new names. With the names that I have chosen, I 
make a distinction between ethnic Norwegian names and non-ethnic Norwegian names. 
However the non-ethnic Norwegian names refer to ethnicity because they are used by 
different ethnic groups. It is important to recognize that the chosen non-ethnic Norwegian 
names do not refer to the offenders’ real ethnicity, besides referring to the difference between 
ethnic and non-ethnic Norwegians. This way of categorizing the offenders can enhance the 
difference between the two categories, and simultaneously hide important differences within 
the categories. One such difference is that the category of non-ethnic Norwegian is made up 
of citizens of other countries as well as Norwegian citizens with an ethnic minority 
background. I will point out the relevance of this in my analysis.  
 
The issue of confidentiality becomes even more important in this study, because this thesis is 
built on prison interviews that have previously been used to discuss the organizational aspect 
of the heroin trade. According to NESH (2006 p. 18) Guideline 15, the reuse of data material, 
can only occur without consensus from the research participants if the material is made 
anonymous. Hence, I did not keep a list with the identity of the research participants 
throughout the whole research process. 
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Analysis Strategies: Pre-knowledge and reflexive method 
 
“The more the informal interview is controlled by the informant, the less the ethnographer 
knows how to deal with it.”  
(Agar and Hobbs 1982) 
 
Scholars have pointed out that qualitative researchers have a great deal of power in their 
sampling of stories without any formal system of accounting for how representative they are 
(see for example Presser 2008 p. 51). A central question in relation to this is whether or not 
the researcher only selects and reports those participants, observations, and stories that 
support the claims that she wants to make, and thus are informed by the researchers pre-
knowledge. A way of dealing with this problem is by reflecting on how one’s interpretations 
and concepts influence the analysis of the data material.  Hence, a key issue in the reflexive 
method is how to control the interpretive possibilities without letting them control the 
researcher. Alvesson and Sköldberg (2000 p.150-151) describe two different strategies that 
the researcher can use to control her interpretations. First, the researcher can strive to attain 
mental blankness (tabula rasa), and to approach the content of the data material in a “neutral” 
way. Second, the researcher can develop a wide repertoire of theories, allowing for creative 
interpretation of the data material. According to Alvesson & Sköldberg, (2000 p. 251) both of 
these strategies have their drawbacks which can be described as either “naïve ignorance or 
well-read scholasticism.”  
 
Whether the researcher has read extensively or not, one answer to the question of how to deal 
with pre-knowledge is given by the German philosopher Hans-George Gadamer`s (2007 
(1960)) principle of hermeneutics. According to this hermeneutical principle, the pre-
knowledge of the researcher should not only be seen in a negative light, and as the closing 
point for interpretation, but rather as that which opens us up to new possibilities of 
understanding. Further Gadamer (2007 (1960) p. 265) argues that there is no neutral position 
of interpretation and that all interpretation carries with it a prior understanding that is taken 
for granted14. All interpretation is partly about projecting meaning onto an object which the 
                                                 
14 Arne Johan Vetlesen (1999) claims that Gadamer expresses a dual understanding of language. On the one hand 
language is the unavoidable medium for understanding either oneself or the other. On the other hand it is an 
imperfect medium for the same understanding. It is imperfect because our understanding always contains 
something more than what we at any time can express in words, hence it is always a challenge to find the words 
that convey our understanding and express it to others. In my academic work I identify strongly with this 
hermeneutical experience of the reoccurring need to be explicit, to find the right words that convey the meaning 
of something I have already understood, and the always present feeling of not quite succeeding.    
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object itself does not intrinsically have. Drawing on Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, 
Gadamer (2007 (1960) pp. 247, 269) maintains that the projection of meaning is always 
rooted in our own situation, and, therefore, it goes beyond the observed facts. The example 
Husserl used to explain this projection was that nobody can see all sides of a three 
dimensional object, so we invent the third side out of the two sides we see.  In other words, 
we prejudge the object we are trying to understand before knowing all the facts. The total sum 
of our pre-knowledge (fore-structure) makes up our horizon.  
 
Thus, Gadamer (2007 (1960) p. 299) claims that even if the projection of meaning is rooted in 
the interpreter’s own situation, it does not mean that interpretation is a subjective process. On 
the contrary, our pre-knowledge is connected to the way in which the object has been 
understood and interpreted before us, and has its roots in how that object has been interpreted 
historically. The interpreter’s horizon is thus socially, culturally, and historically sited15.  
 
To interpret is required to enter into a hermeneutical dialogue with the data material (text). 
This is accomplished by actively playing out individual pre-knowledge by asking questions of 
the text. Hence, the hermeneutical dialogue is always a dialectic process between what is alien 
and familiar, between pre-understanding and understanding, and between parts of the text and 
the text in its entirety. In other words, my pre-knowledge forms a point of departure for the 
dialogue with the data material (text) and a starting point for reflecting interpretations, thereby 
establishing a starting point for the reflexive method. According to the hermeneutical 
principle, the researcher has to actively use his or her pre-knowledge, and take a risk to enable 
understanding. It is the presence of our pre-knowledge that makes us capable of a dialogue 
with the data material. Subsequently, as our pre-knowledge become apparent to us, often 
through a break with our expectations, it can also become the focus of our reflection. 
 
                                                 
15 Gadamer`s view of tradition has been questioned from two different angles. First, by Jürgen Habermas (in 
Krogh, 2006 p. 262) who argues that Gadamer`s hermeneutics does not give any guidelines to study 
systematically distorted information, because it does not teach us to separate between acceptable and 
unacceptable authorities/traditions. Habermas`s answer is to critically study different traditions and discuss 
which of these is legitimate. In other words, critical reflection is contrasted to acceptance of tradition. Second, 
Gadamer`s view of the collective held agreement of prejudices within a society or culture has been questioned by 
post-structuralists and post-modernists that stress diversity within culture.   
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Toward a narrative analytical framework  
 
Here I want to examine my pre-knowledge and how the early interpretations of the data 
material informed the narrative analytical framework that I am developing in this thesis.  An 
issue that occurred early in the interviews was how to deal with offenders who claimed that 
they did not know anything about the heroin trade, but who wanted to talk about their court 
case, often with a story about how they had been fooled or tricked into committing a crime 
and/or how they were wrongly convicted of a crime. One alternative, and my first idea, was to 
ignore these interviews, label them as unsuccessful, and remove them from the analysis16. 
However, upon further examination, these interviews became very useful, because they 
exposed the positions that I, as the researcher, took in the interviews and my pre-knowledge in 
the interpretation of the offenders` narratives. To illustrate this I will use an example.  
 
 Two interpretation positions: Defense and prosecution 
 
When the woman entered the visiting room, my first thought was that this must be a mistake. 
She was an elderly woman with grey hair and she looked like a “grandma type.” What on 
earth was her role in the heroin trade? 
Ivana`s story: 
 
“I am 58 years old and come from X (Eastern Europe). I am a dentist by profession and 
had my own private practice. I was married and had two children. I was politically 
active with a high position within a famous party. What happened was a tragedy. I had 
ordered a holiday trip to Norway, because I wanted to see your beautiful country. I had 
never been to any Scandinavian country, but I had heard that it was very lovely. Two 
days before my departure I had a patient—a man over seventy years old—and I told 
him about my planned trip to Norway. Casually, he asked if I would be kind enough to 
take a packet with me and give it to a relative of his in Norway. The relative would pick 
up the packet in my hotel in Oslo. He was a good patient and I agreed to bring the 
packet with me. I forgot the whole conversation until the patient showed up at the 
airport on departure day holding a bag. I was surprised when I saw the bag. I had 
agreed to take a little packet not a bag, but I eventually took the bag with me. At the 
airport in Oslo I was arrested by the police. The bag I was carrying was full of old 
clothes, but had a secret compartment containing a packet of five kg of heroin. Then the 
                                                 
16 In their study of the middle-market in England biased on prison interviews Pearson and Hobbs (2001), chose 
to remove two interviews from the analysis, when the offenders denied any knowledge of drug trafficking. But 
they did include three cases in which the individuals said they had been only marginally involved, such as 
couriers.   
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nightmare began, I was sentenced to X years for couriering heroin. I tried to commit 
suicide in prison, because I could not live with the shame.” 
 
Ivana cried through most of the interview. I was strongly affected by her story, and I 
experienced her sadness and despair as real. At the same time I sensed that she was “holding 
back” information. Her crying became stronger and she took her glasses off to dry her eyes on 
the few occasions when I challenged her story with questions like: “Did you look in the bag?” 
“Was the bag heavy?” “What happened to the old man that gave you the bag?” I felt uneasy 
putting pressure on Ivana, and said some clumsy, although intentionally comforting words to 
her instead. I was not there to play the role of the police or to investigate a crime, so I did not 
challenge her story further. My thoughts were that this was a problem for the analytical stage.  
  
As an analytical starting point in the context of the interview, there were two competing 
interpretations. The first interpretation lies close to Ivana`s narrative and self-presentation. 
She was kind and gullible and only wanted to help a good patient. Consequently, she was 
tricked and exploited in a brutal way. When I interpreted her story like this, I saw her as a 
victim. According to Gadamer`s hermeneutics, I did not start my interpretation of Ivana`s 
story from scratch, but I placed her in an already established category of victims. It is the 
concept of victim which was active in me when I interpreted her story in this way. There are 
attributes which Ivana possesses that make it easy to place her in the role of a victim, 
including the fact that she is a mature woman. If this interpretation is used to analyse the 
heroin trade, I might conclude that criminals in X (Eastern Europe) recruit their couriers by 
deceiving them into carrying heroin. They choose vulnerable and gullible people that run a 
small risk of being caught by customs officers. 
 
In the other interpretation, I challenged Ivana`s narrative. To follow the hermeneutical 
principle, I challenged Ivana`s story by actively asking the questions that her story raised for 
me. The same attributes that make Ivana a believable victim also make her an ideal courier. 
An older woman is not as suspicious as others when she passes through customs. On the other 
hand, if she is a professional courier, what is her relationship to the sender of the heroin? 
What was the motivation for her accepting the job? Was she forced? Did she or any other 
family member have a gambling debt or other kind of debt? These questions arise from my 
existing knowledge about organized crime and can be found in my perspectives on how 
illegal activities are organised. They can also be argued as arising from common sense: Is it 
possible that people who want to export large quantities of heroin would choose such a 
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random procedure? Would the sender of the heroin take such a risk with that amount of 
money? Is it possible that couriers are recruited with no prior contact and established 
relationships? If I use this kind of interpretation, this would mean that in X (Eastern Europe) 
professional couriers are recruited from high social positions. The reasons people accept this 
kind of proposal vary, but there is always a relationship to the criminal underworld. The grip 
that the sender of the heroin has on the couriers makes it impossible for them to speak, even if 
they are caught in the act. 
 
In both these interpretations Ivana is understood to be a courier. The key factor is her 
intention, and whether it is reasonable that she knew or did not know that the heroin was 
placed in the bag. Although I can argue that this is a sensible question, it is also a question 
that points to guilt and a legal perspective. To elaborate, these two interpretations can be seen 
as representing the perspectives of the defense and the prosecution; where the first 
interpretation will follow Ivana`s narrative (the defense perspective), and the second will be 
closer to the perspective of the police (the prosecution’s perspective). The question is: Is it 
possible to emancipate the narratives and the researcher as an interpreter from a defense or 
prosecution perspective, and thereby gain insight into the illicit drug trade? Or is it possible to 
develop a third position of interpretation? 
  
Figure 2. Interpretation positions 
 
In developing a third position of interpretation I recognise that the offenders’ stories have 
been tried and tested in court and they have had a long time to think about how to present 
their stories in a comprehensive and clear way. In other words, I stress that the context of the 
interview is not the context in which the crimes were committed, and the fact that the offender 
has been sanctioned does affect the offenders’ narratives. This is particularly evident in the 
Defense Third position? Prosecutor
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offenders’ explanations and motivations for participating in heroin smuggling and dealing. 
However, I do not try to neutralize or zero out this effect, but make it the focal point for 
analysis.  
 
My main argument is that qualitative interviews do not simply mirror social reality, but are 
constructed through the interpretations of the social scientist. It then becomes vital to make 
explicit how this construction is done. Hence, the analytical potential of the prison interviews 
is not to give descriptions of the organizational aspects of heroin smuggling and dealing, 
but to analyse how different perspectives on heroin crime are constructed and reconstructed. 
Within the judicial practices, it is the judges who occupy the position in the middle of the 
prosecution and the defense. In establishing a third interpreter position which differs from the 
judges’ position, I am inspired by Max Weber’s definition of a sociological approach to the 
legal practices, which is, as previously mentioned, an external, theoretically driven empirical 
approach that studies the characteristics of existing systems of law (See Deflem 2008 p. 1).  
 
To elaborate on Ivana’s story, my aim is not to discover whether Ivana is telling the truth or 
not, but to examine what characterises her story, in relation to her expressed motivation and 
expressions of personal responsibilities. Further I will compare Ivana’s story to the other 
heroin smugglers and dealers’ stories, to identify key narrative patterns within the offenders’ 
stories. Then I will turn my attention to the judicial practices and ask whether any of the 
offenders’ stories, such as Ivana’s story, are believed in court, and additionally if there are any 
patterns in the types of stories that are credited or discredited in court. Moreover I will ask, 
given the specific judicial logic in heroin felonies, what exists in Ivana’s story that could be 
interpreted as adjusted to this logic, and what consequences could this, in turn, lead to for 
Ivana’s rehabilitation potential? One way of studying how different perspectives on heroin 
crimes are constructed, then, is by focusing on the offenders` narratives about themselves and 
by studying how the judicial logic and rhetoric produce an understanding of heroin crimes. In 
addition, it facilitates the analysis of how these different perspectives produce and reproduce 
different understandings of crime, guilt, and power, and study the co-constitutive role that the 
judicial practices play in ratifying, justifying and legitimatising different understandings of 
heroin crimes. In the theory chapter I will elaborate on a narrative approach and its concepts; 
here I will give a description of how I arrived at the different narratives in the stories told by 
the offenders. 
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Getting to the story, four steps  
 
I transcribed all the interviews myself, and kept a notebook of field notes which I wrote in 
before and after the interviews. Some of the analyzing work started while I was conducting 
the interviews; therefore, it is impossible to draw a clear line between the analytical stage and 
the conducting of the interviews. However, I will put forward four different steps in the 
analytical process.  
 
First step—breaking up the stories 
Because my preliminary interest and research question were connected to the organizational 
aspects of the heroin trade, my first coding of the data material was according to my original 
interview guide. I organized the interviews after what the offenders had said about how they 
were recruited into drug smuggling and dealing, their networks and contacts, their testing and 
use of drugs, and so on. Coding the data material in this way made me feel very uneasy. My 
major concern was that by cutting up the offenders’ stories to address certain issues I was 
missing the point of the narratives. It was not that the offenders had not talked about the 
different subjects I was addressing; rather I felt that I was missing the real aim of their stories, 
which was to give explanations of why they ended up in prison. Although this preliminary 
coding of the data material was rather tentative, it started my reflection process of how to use 
the interviews in a more fruitful way, and it familiarised me with the interview material. 
 
Second step—finding coherency  
Acknowledging that I was cutting up the stories and destroying their central meanings, I laid 
out all of the 26 interviews and identified the narrative structure in all of them by applying the 
concepts of a narrative beginning, middle and end part. In this process I followed the 
chronological order of how the offender had told their stories. A striking characteristic of the 
offenders’ stories was their consistency. Not only were the offenders coherent storytellers, in 
many cases the stories were told in a monological form, so identifying these different parts 
was surprisingly easy. However some interviews were not that clearly structured, and I would 
use a time line to construct the beginning, middle and ending of the story.  For example, a 
retail dealer could start the interview by describing his or her introduction to drugs; then talk 
about his everyday life as a drug dealer; then talk about his first injection, and so on. In 
identifying the narrative structure in these interviews, I would organize the story according to 
how the events were described by the offenders to fall in time, and which events followed the 
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others. However, in these cases I did not follow the order in which the events were told in the 
interview. 
 
Third step—identifying four different narratives 
After having identified the narrative structure in all of the interviews, I compared them to see 
how many different narratives I could identify with a similar structure. I identified four 
different narrative structures, which had a similar beginning, middle and end part. In this 
comparison process it also became clear to me that some of the offenders told more than one 
narrative. I address this, and show what types of narratives are combined in the analysis.  
 
Fourth step—finding the plot  
After identifying the four narrative structures, I went back to the stories and applied the 
concepts of plot, motivation, agency-expression, and personal responsibilities to identify how 
the offenders addressed these issues within the different narratives. These concepts are driven 
from within a narrative theoretical approach, which gives a rich conceptual tool box for 
studying the interconnectedness between language and social identity17. By applying these 
concepts, I could delve deeper and in greater detail into the individual stories, looking for 
ambiguities and tensions within the different narratives. My main concern and motivation for 
doing this was that putting forward four narrative structures gave a rather frozen and stable 
picture of the offenders. By applying these concepts the connection between the offenders’ 
narratives, expressed motives, and the judicial practise understanding of intentions also 
became clear to me.  In analysing the prisoner narratives I used the following analytical 
schema.  
Schema  1. An organizing schema for the narrative analysis of the prison interviews 
Narrative Number 1 Number 2 Number 3 Number 4 
Beginning     
Middle     
Ending     
Plot and 
Motivation 
    
Agency- 
expression 
    
Personal 
responsibilities 
    
Collective 
representations 
    
                                                 
17 In the theory chapter I will elaborate a narrative approach.  
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I will return to a completed version of this organizing schema in the summary at the end of 
Chapter 9. 
 
 About the sample of Court Decisions 
 
To analyze the court decisions I have used a two-step process: production of statistics and 
document analyses. The statistics are used to address the question: What types of heroin cases 
are dealt with in the Norwegian legal system? Moreover the document analysis is used to 
address the questions: What are the central judicial logic and rhetoric in heroin cases? And In 
what way are the offenders’ narratives mirrored in the judges’ argumentation? In the 
following I will describe and evaluate the sample used to discuss these questions. In order to 
situate and evaluate the sample, I will first give a description of the Norwegian judicial 
procedures.  
 
The Norwegian judicial procedures 
According to the Norwegian Court of Justice (2007) a crime or a felony is initially judged by 
the districts courts. In the district court the presiding judge falls in two different categories. 
Either the case is heard by only one expert judge, or the case is heard by a court composed of 
two appointed lay judges (representatives of the people) and an expert judge. The single 
judge’s proceedings are often used in cases where the defendant has confessed to the crime. 
The single judge then decides the punishment. In the district courts the defendant may be 
considered guilty or not guilty, and if found guilty, he or she will be sentenced. If the first 
level verdict and sentencing is unsatisfactory for the defendant, he or she might appeal to a 
higher court.   
 
In Norway the courts of appeal are divided into six appellate districts. These are as follows: 
the Borgarting Court of Appeal in Oslo (hereafter LB), the Eidsivating Court of Appeal in 
Hamar (hereafter LE), the Agder Court of Appeal in Skien (hereafter LA), the Gulating Court 
of Appeal in Bergen (hereafter LG), the Frostating Court of Appeal in Trondheim (hereafter 
LF) and the Hålogaland Court of Appeal in Tromsø (hereafter LH) (see The Court of Justice 
2007). 
   
40 
 
The courts of appeal produce a new decision called the appellate decision. This decision 
maintains or alters partially or entirely the previous decisions. There are three different 
possible compositions of the courts of appeal. First and in the most severe cases, the case is 
judged by a jury consisting of five males, five females and three expert judges. Second, the 
court can be composed of three expert judges and four lay judges. The third composition 
consists only of three expert judges. This third composition is commonly used when the 
appeal is about the interpretation of the law, the proceedings and in cases where the maximum 
punishment that can be given is six years. In the sample of heroin cases the second type of 
composition is the most common; in other words, the court is typically composed of three 
expert judges and four lay judges. However, there are also examples in the sample of larger 
cases held in front of a jury, where the whole case is retried (see The Court of Justice 2007).    
 
The Supreme Court is the nation’s highest court of justice. The decisions made here are final 
verdicts and cannot be appealed (hereafter RT). The only exception is if the case can be tried 
at the Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg. The Norwegian courts system can be illustrated 
as following: 
 
Figure 3. The Norwegian courts of law  
 
The statistics 
 
The statistics of the Norwegian court system produced by SSB (Statistics Norway) gives an 
overview of the extensiveness of drug crimes within the judicial system. For example, in 2005 
the largest crime category in the criminal statistics in Norway was drug felonies (Stene 2008). 
Further, the Norwegian criminologist Reid Stene (2008) shows there has been a huge growth 
in drug felonies from the middle 1990s to the early 2000s. This increase in drug felonies has 
been described as the most radical change in the criminal statistics in the last 25 years. Hence, 
Supreme Court
Appellate Court
Districts Courts
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offenders in Norwegian prisons are often serving sentences for drug felonies. In 2005, 32 
percent of all inmates in Norwegian prisons had drug crimes as their prime felony (Stene 
2008).  
 
The Norwegian criminologist Cecilie Høigård (1996 p. 75) argues that criminal statistics 
should not be read as an indicator of the actual level of crime within a society, because of the 
hidden statistics of crime; rather the statistics should be read as a yearly report from judicial 
systems and their practices. Further Høigård (1996 p. 78) claims that if one wants to study 
how the judicial system reacts to certain crimes, or, for example, how female or male 
offenders are met with reactions within the judicial system, the researcher does not have to 
consider the question of hidden statistics.  Similarly to many criminologists, I read the 
criminal statistics as an indicator of the way the judicial system operates. Moreover my aim in 
producing the statistic is to find an indicator of how the judicial practices deal with heroin 
cases, not as a means of generating knowledge of the accurate level of heroin crimes.   
 
Although the criminal statistics give an overview of the extensiveness of drug felonies in the 
judicial system, the SSB’s statistics do not offer any insight into drug cases based on specific 
drug substances and do not answer questions regarding the type and the amount of drugs with 
which the offenders are charged. Neither do they answer if the offenders were convicted for 
possession of drugs, drug dealing, importing, and so on. My aim is to study the specifics of 
heroin smuggling and dealing cases in Norway, because I am interested in finding out the 
following:  1) What types of heroin cases are dealt with within the judicial system? 2) How 
much heroin is involved in these cases, and what type of punishment is meted out in different 
cases? 3) Are there any patterns in the cases, such as mostly ethnic Norwegians punished for 
possession/small scale heroin dealing and non-ethnic Norwegians punished for heroin 
smuggling and position/dealing of large quantities of heroin? 
    
To get an overview of the heroin cases in the judicial system, I have coded and organized all 
the court of appeal decisions in heroin cases from 1995 to 2005. There are two different 
reasons why I have chosen to focus on the appellate court decisions. First, appellate court 
decisions establish precedents for judicial practice. Second, appellate court decisions are 
available as judicial references through the electronically archived law database. I have 
located the heroin cases in the Norwegian “Law Data,” which is an electronic database that 
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organizes judicial precedents. Law Data gets its data material from the journals Norsk 
Rettstidene and Rettens Gang (See Lundberg 2008 p. 34).  
 
By using the search query “heroin,” I located all cases where heroin was mentioned in the 
electronic database. In the first selection process I wanted to draw a line between heroin cases 
and other drug cases. I did this by first filtering out cases which only referred to previous 
heroin cases but which actually involved charges for other drugs such as amphetamines, 
cocaine, hashish and so on. Second, I also removed cases which included small amounts of 
heroin and large amounts of other drugs, and where these other drugs laid the foundation for 
the judges’ argumentation and issuing of punishment. The main reason for this selection 
process was that I was interested in the specifics of heroin cases within the appellate court18.   
  
The total number of heroin cases found was 459. A central question then becomes: How 
representative are the statistics of appellate court decisions for the heroin cases in the judicial 
system within this time period? To specify, how would the statistics of the heroin cases 
change if I had used a sample of heroin cases from the district courts or the Supreme Court 
instead? If I had chosen to focus on the district courts decisions, the total number of cases 
would increase, because not all heroin cases get appealed to the appellate court. Therefore, 
using a sample from the district courts, I would have been able to give a total view of all the 
heroin dealing and smuggling cases in the time period. However the district court decisions 
are not easy to access because they are not available through a centralized archive. 
Furthermore, these decisions do not set a judicial precedent. 
 
Moreover one might ask: What type of cases get appealed to the appellate court, and are 
certain types of cases either overrepresented or underrepresented in the appellate court 
compared to the district courts? I would argue that there would have been more small cases, 
involving only one defendant in the district courts, because larger cases involving longer 
penalties often are appealed either by the prosecution or the defense. Hence, the large cases 
involving more than one defendant are overrepresented in the appellate court as compared to 
the district courts. 
 
                                                 
18 This does not mean that all the heroin cases only include heroin. Some of the cases include other drugs as well, 
but the sample is based on cases where heroin is the primary drug of concern in the judges’ argumentation.   
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If I, on the other hand, had created statistics out of the Supreme Court decisions I would have 
gotten a sample with very few cases. Although these decisions set the final judicial precedents 
and are the legal binding documents in the specific cases, the sample would have included too 
few cases to generate any knowledge about trends within judicial practices. Thus the Supreme 
Court decisions are important to illuminate the judicial rhetoric and logic, but too few to 
generate any trends. 
Coding the appellate court decisions 
 
I have organized the appellate court decisions along the following lines: case numbers, 
number of offenders, gender, ethnicity, amount of heroin, and length of the punishment. It is 
important to recognize that I have coded the decisions at a case level, and thus not at an 
individual level. One consequence of this is that the statistics are lacking information about 
some of the offenders. To specify, out of the total of 459 heroin cases, 372 involved only one 
offender; hence the cases and the individuals are identical. However, in 87 cases there is more 
than one offender. In these cases I coded the ethnicity and punishment of the boss (longest 
punishment). On an individual level, this means that the statistics are lacking information 
about the ethnicity and length of punishment for 160 offenders19. One consequence of coding 
the data material in this way is that it creates a more consistent image of the relationship 
between the amount of heroin and length of punishment than what exists in these cases. To 
elaborate, if I had included information about the missing 160 offenders, the variation 
between the amount of heroin and length of punishment would have been larger. For example, 
in a case where three offenders are convicted for smuggling two kilos of heroin, one person 
could get ten years, whereas the other two could get seven years in prison. In other words, by 
including this information the amount of heroin in each case would stay constant whereas the 
length of punishment would not.   
 
In coding ethnicity, I only used two categories, ethnic Norwegians and non-ethnic 
Norwegians. Ethnic Norwegians are Norwegian citizen and non-ethnic Norwegians are 
residents and citizens of other countries than Norway or Norwegian citizens with other ethnic 
                                                 
19 I know this number exactly because I made a note of how many offenders where in the 87 cases, and whether 
they were male or female. 
44 
 
origins. By using only two categories important similarities and differences among the 
offenders with different types of ethnical background are not included20.     
 
However determining the ethnic origins of the offenders was rather problematic. The court 
decisions generally inform us about the offender’s citizenship, especially if the offender is a 
non-Norwegian citizen. However, there is no standardized way in which the judicial decisions 
describe Norwegians citizens with an ethnic minority background. Moreover, all the court 
decisions were made anonymous by removing the offenders’ real names, so reading ethnicity 
through the offenders’ names was impossible. Although time consuming, I went through all 
the cases with Norwegian citizens looking for formulation in the text that would have given 
hints as to the minority status of the offenders. Sometimes the judges would state that the 
offender came to Norway as a refuge or immigrant and the year in which this happened. Other 
times the judge would use formulations such as association with or member of the Kosovo 
Albanian milieu. However sometimes the judges would use diffused formulations, such as the 
offender only speaks Spanish. Given the vagueness of formulations and information in the 
court decisions, I decided to only use two categories, ethnic Norwegians and non-ethnic 
Norwegians instead of trying to identify the offenders’ ethnicity any further. However, I could 
have overlooked some offenders with a Norwegian citizenship, but with a minority 
background; hence I may have underreported the non-ethnic Norwegians21. 
 
Document analysis 
 
The statistics that I made of the appellate court decisions could only provide an overview of 
the characteristics of the cases within the appellate court. Thus, the statistics do not provide a 
tool for investigating evaluations and rhetorical arguments made by the judges. I wanted to 
combine the statistics with a document analysis of a sample of appellate court decisions. My 
main purpose for choosing a sample for a document analysis was to find the central judicial 
logic and rhetoric in heroin cases, and hence, address the following questions: What do the 
judges consider to be mitigating and aggravating circumstances in heroin felonies? What type 
of motivation for heroin crimes are emphasized by the judges? Are certain types of 
                                                 
20 In comparison the statics of crime (SSB) use the following three categories in addressing ethnicity; Western 
immigrants, non-Western immigrants and unregistered foreigners. 
21 There is also a large possibility that there are mostly non-ethnic Norwegians among the 160 offenders that are 
not shown in the statistics, because the large cases involving more than one offender often were cases with only 
non-ethnic Norwegians.   
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explanation given by the defendants considered legitimate and others illegitimate? And how is 
an understanding of legitimate and illegitimate accounts interconnected with judicial logic and 
rhetoric?    
 
To answer these questions and based on the overview of the appellate court decisions, I have 
pulled a purposive sample of 100 cases for a document analysis. To obtain a wide selection of 
cases, I based my selection on the following principle: cases from all the different appellate 
courts, from every year, with variations in the amounts of heroin and length of punishment. 
Additionally, I have chosen cases that deal with almost the same amount of heroin, but vary 
largely in punishment given to the offenders.  
 
Moreover, I have followed these cases through to their final verdict in the Supreme Court. Out 
of the 100 cases in the sample, 55 cases were not appealed and the final verdict was set by the 
appellate court.  However, 45 cases were appealed to the Supreme Court where 32 cases were 
either refused or rejected. In only 13 cases were the appeals heard or the verdict changed. My 
main argument for following the cases through to their final verdict in the Supreme Court is 
that the appellate court’s verdict is not legally binding and holds no legal precedence if it is 
changed by the Supreme Court. Thus the Supreme Court decisions serve as a correctional 
practice, and hence are central references in understanding the judicial logic and rhetoric.  
   
In an evaluation of the sample it is important to ask the following questions: How 
representative are these 100 cases and their following Supreme Court decisions for the rest of 
the heroin cases within the judicial system in this time period? Are the samples large enough 
to find the central judicial logic and rhetoric, hence the central judicial representations of 
motive, intention and guilt in heroin cases? In other words, what is keeping me from only 
choosing the cases that support my argument and overlooking others that would have given 
another image of the judicial logic and rhetoric? I will answer these questions by describing a 
three-step process of how I arrived at the central judicial logic and rhetoric in the court cases. 
 
Getting to the judicial logic three steps 
 
First step – Finding the intertextual links  
The most salient feature of a structured legal text, such as the appellate court decisions, is that 
they are highly formulaic and/or stereotypical. Appellate court decisions tend to follow a 
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predetermined structure that changes little over time. Moreover, all appellate court decisions 
are introduced by giving the following information: case number, legal authority, date 
published, keywords, summary, proceedings, parties, and authors. To illustrate this I will give 
an example from one of the court cases: 
 
 
Figure 4. Example of the introduction of an appellate court decision LB- 2000-2347 
 
 
LEGAL AUTHORITY: Borgarting Appellate Court, decision 
DATE: 2001-01-18 
PUBLISHED: LB-2000-2347 
KEYWORDS:  Criminal law, Drugs, § 162 third section  
SUMMARY: A 44-year-old man was convicted to prison for 12 years for importing 4,399 
kilos of heroin from Sweden to Norway. It was found that he was only a courier. He was 
arrested with a routine check at Svinesund. 
 References: The general Civil Penal Code § 162 
PROCEEDINGS: Halden District Court Nr 00-00320M- Bogarting appellate court LB-2000-
2347 M/02. Appeal to the Supreme court. Appeal denied presented HR- 2001-00358 
PARTIES: The public prosecuting authority (Public prosecutor Kim Sundet) against A 
(Defense attorney Ole Petter Drevland)  
AUTHORS: Judge Anne Lise Rønneberg. Judge Jan Hein Eriksen. Four lay judges 
 
 
A common recognition in the method literature concerning document analysis is that no 
documents stand alone, but they are all interrelated. Therefore, it is important to understand 
how different documents interrelate in order to analyze them. Moreover, Paul Atkinson and 
Amanda Coffy (2004 p. 67) state that documents are linked through the elementary but 
significant principles of sequence and hierarchy. Appellate court decisions are like other 
documents, intertextually linked through both sequence and hierarchy. In the introduction to 
the appellate court both sequence and hierarchy are given by the placement of the cases. 
Hence, within the judicial practices, the hierarchy and sequences of a decision are pre-given. 
Further, the way it is organized in the electronic database makes it easy to follow the cases 
through to their final verdict.  After following the decisions through to their final verdict, I 
made a list of all the central judicial references within the heroin cases. The most common 
references in heroin cases are the § 162 of the Norwegian general Civil Penal Code22. 
 
                                                 
22 I will present § 162 of the Norwegian general Civil Penal Code in Chapter 10.  
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Second step—Finding the central judicial argumentation 
Appellate court decisions give explicit references to the judge’s argumentation, because they 
are evaluating and deciding cases which have already been tried in district courts. Further 
appellate decisions are relatively short texts. Many decisions in heroin felonies only include 
two to three pages, whereas others have eight to ten pages of texts. The average length of the 
documents in the sample was four to five pages, which gives a concise image of the judges’ 
evaluations. Hence, locating the different arguments in the cases was not difficult. I followed 
the simple process of first organizing the decisions in accordance to what section of paragraph 
162 they referred. Second I looked for similarities and differences in the way the judges 
argued in these cases, falling under the different sections of the law. I identified four general 
patterns in the judged argumentation.  
 
How representative are these four main arguments for the rest of the heroin cases within this 
time period? To specify, would there for example be cases where poverty or need for money 
were seen as legitimate motives for heroin felonies by the judges, or aggravated heroin 
felonies where the argument of “general deterrence” and “danger of spreading” was not used 
by the judges? Given the strict formality of the judges’ argumentation, I find it highly 
unlikely, and if these cases existed within the appellate court decisions in this time period, I 
would expect that these cases were appealed and later rectified by the Supreme Court, as 
some of the examples in my sample show. This also shows the importance of following the 
cases through to their final judicial verdict in the Supreme Court.  
 
However, it is important to recognize that aspects which could have influenced the judges to 
reach their verdicts might not be present in the written documents. For example, when the 
judges argue that personal factors of the offenders should not be given any weight in the 
decisions, I cannot rule out that personal factors were not relevant for the judges in their 
evaluation during the trials. These personal factors could have shifted the judges’ sympathies 
in one direction or another. Further, some of the judges’ evaluations could be based on values 
which are not legitimate within the judicial practices, and hence, would not be written up in 
the decisions, although they were important in the evaluation process. 
 
Third step—Locating the narratives in the judicial decisions 
According to the ethnographers of the legal discourse, John Conley and William O’Barr 
(1990 p. 197), the law historically has been unwilling or unable to incorporate the voice of 
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everyday language into its logic and rhetoric’. Hence, they claim that lawyers spend most of 
their time trying to understand problems that start in everyday language and transform it to 
meet the requirements of legal language. Legal documents, then, must include only material 
that is legally relevant. But, at the same time the best judicial arguments takes the form of 
persuasive stories that engage the reader, elicit sympathy and establish the moral rightness of 
the verdict, while appearing to do nothing other than dispassionately report the facts (see also 
Day Sclater 2007 p. 100) .   
 
The argument of Conely and O’Barr’s draws attention to the fact that legal documents, such 
as the appellate court decisions, are written in a style which differs from everyday language. 
Everyday language is, of course, what characterize the heroin smugglers and dealers’ 
narratives. Following this logic, one central question becomes: When the appellate court 
decisions represent the judges’ voices and their reasoning, how are the offenders’ voices and 
explanations mirrored in written appellate court decisions?  
 
I found the narratives of the offenders in the judicial decisions by identifying the judges’ 
understanding of motives, intention, and guilt, and how this understanding was interconnected 
with the judicial argumentation by studying the different arguments relevant for issuing 
punishment. Moreover, I compared this central understanding of motives, intention and guilt 
to those expressed in the offenders’ narratives. To elaborate, in some cases the defendants’ 
accounts were made relevant and given weight by the judges, whereas other explanations that 
the defendants gave were deemed irrelevant or not at all believed. Hence, what the accused 
claimed in court could be evaluated by the judges as irrelevant, mitigating or aggravating 
circumstances, and, therefore, mentioned in the written documents.  
 
Moreover, there was a tendency in the appellate court decisions that if the judges argued for a 
lenient punishment, the offenders’ explanations would be quoted and commented on by the 
judges, whereas when the judges were arguing for a harder punishment, less attention was 
given to the defendants’ accounts. For example, if the judges evaluated personal factors 
irrelevant to the case, the explanation of the accused was seldom referred to in the appellate 
court decisions, except for short references, such as, “The offender has claimed that he was in 
a difficult economical situation at the time of the crime.” The point is that the accused stories 
are mirrored in the written appellate court decisions, although most attention was given by the 
judges to the defendants’ accounts if the judges were arguing for a lenient sentence. In 
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analyzing how the offenders’ narratives are mirrored in the judges’ argumentation I used the 
following analytical schema: 
 
Schema  2.  An organizing schema for the analysis of the court decisions 
 
 Narrative 1 Narrative 2 Narrative 3 Narrative 4 
Use of § 162     
Judicial 
argumentation 
    
Relevance for 
issuing 
punishment: 
Mitigating and 
aggravating 
circumstances  
    
Motives     
Guilt     
 
This organizing schema will be presented in a completed version in the summary of Chapter 
10. 
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3. Previous studies: Introduction 
 
This theory section is divided into two different parts. In the first part I provide a short 
introduction to previous studies on drug smuggling and dealing. The national and 
international literature that contributes to understanding the specifics of heroin dealing and 
smuggling is rather limited, so I have chosen to focus on literature that deals with drug 
dealing and smuggling in general. As mentioned in the introduction, my main interest in these 
contributions is not to find out whether any of them are more fitting than others for analyzing 
the heroin smugglers and dealers in this study, but to demonstrate how the criminological and 
sociological perspectives are socially embedded. In the second part I elaborate on this study’s 
theoretical and conceptual framework, synthesizing and integrating general insights from 
narrative analysis and cultural studies. Finally, and in light of the previous two sections, I will 
address the question as a summary: What can narrative analysis contribute to the study of 
heroin smuggling and dealing? By elaborating on this question, I will position my study’s 
theoretical approach in regard to previous studies. 
 
A striking characteristic of the literature on drug dealing and smuggling is that it is divided 
between studies done on street-level dealing (Preble and Casey 1967, Agar 1973, Svensson 
1996, 1997, Bourgois 1995, Lalander 2001 and Sandberg and Pedersen 2006) and on upper-
level drug trafficking (Adler 1985, Reuter and Hagga 1989, Dorn et al. 1992, Dorn et al. 
1998, Pearson and Hobbs 2001, Zaitch 2002).  Hence, individuals from both levels of the drug 
market rarely appear in the same studies. Moreover, the studies on street-level drug dealing 
and the upper-level trafficking often use different methods, perspectives, and theoretical 
approaches. Thus, these studies generate quite different and rather oppositional images of the 
people involved at different levels in the drug market. Following this duality, I will first 
present central contributions from street-level drug using/dealing before I turn my attention to 
contributions to the upper-level drug dealers/traffickers. 
 
Street-level dealing: A subcultural approach 
 
Street-level research on drug dealing use is often conducted through ethnographic field work 
in the subculture of drug dealing and use. Here this approach is represented with contributions 
from Edward Preble and John Casey (1967), Michael Agar (1973, 2002), Bengt Svensson 
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(1996, 1997) , Phillippe Bourgois (1995), Philip Lalander (2001), and Sveinung Sandberg and 
Willy Pedersen (2006). This subcultural approach is very effective for gaining an 
understanding of patterns of thought and practice from the insider’s perspective and charting 
the spatial, social and economic factors that influence drug use/dealing. Moreover, I have 
identified three key research questions addressed in the literature, which are as follows: 1) 
What characterizes the drug dealer/user, 2) What characterizes the subcultures of drug 
dealing/use?, and 3) what are the necessary requirements for the deviant subculture to 
develop?     
 
What characterizes drug users/dealers? 
 
Michael Agar (2002) argues that most ethnographical research into crime and drug use 
undertaken from a subcultural perspective has been stimulated from a desire to counter 
professional and academic descriptions of drug users/dealers as psychological failures, 
characterized only as deflects. In their classical paper “Taking Care of Business” from 1967, 
Edward Preble and John Casey were two of the first academics to dispute the notions that 
heroin use/dealing is an escape from life. Moreover, Preble and Casey (1967) argue that the 
image of the heroin user/dealer as a failure does not address their ability to adapt to life on the 
street. Hence, Preble and Casey (1967) argue that drug users/dealers are highly skillful, 
knowledgeable and adaptable. The following quotation illustrates this point:   
 
The heroin user walks with a fast, purposeful stride, as if he is late for an 
important appointment--indeed he is. He is hustling (robbing or stealing), 
trying to sell stolen goods, avoiding the police, looking for a heroin dealer 
with a good bag (the street retail unit of heroin), coming back from copping 
(buying heroin) looking for a safe place to take the drug, or looking for 
someone who beat (cheated) him-- among other things. He is, in short, taking 
care of business (Preble and Casey 1967 p. 4).   
  
Far from characterizing them as social and psychological failures, subcultural ethnographic 
studies provide narratives that illuminate the skillful dexterity of heroin users/dealers. Since 
the days of Preble and Casey, there has been a substantial amount of research that has shown 
that the use/dealing of heroin can be viewed as a commitment by the user to a well-defined 
lifestyle of which drug use is only a part (Agar 1973, Hughes 1977, Rosenbaum 1981, 
Johnson et al 1985, Stephens 1991, Svensson 1996, 1997, Lalander 2001). A central question 
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then becomes, “With what types of skills and knowledge does the subculture provide its 
members?” 
 
In Sweden, Bengt Svensson (1997) argues that the competence achieved in the subculture of 
heroin use is not convertible to other social contexts. This is mainly because the knowledge of 
the drug user/dealer primarily is  knowledge about drugs; hence, this competence becomes an 
intensive which locks the drug user/dealer in the subculture where it is given credibility and 
acknowledgement. In Norway, drawing extensively on the work of Pierre Bourdiue and his 
concept of cultural capital, Sandberg and Pedersen (2006) introduce the concept of “street 
capital” to conceptualize the knowledge and competencies of cannabis dealers on the street in 
Oslo. Parallel to Svensson’s (1997) argument, Sandberg and Pedersen (2006) emphasize that 
although “street capital” is necessary to be a successful dealer, it is not easily convertible to 
other social contexts; rather, this form of capital would in other contexts, be viewed as 
stigmatizing. 
 
Applied to this study, and as mentioned in the method chapter, all the heroin dealers in this 
study have been sanctioned, and most of them were interviewed in prison. An important 
question then is what similarities exist between the stories told by the imprisoned offender 
and the image generated through the ethnographical literature.    
 
What characterizes the subculture of drug use/dealing? 
 
“Heroin users commonly say. I have no friends, only associates.” 
(Preble and Casey 1967 p. 8) 
 
A main argument in the subculture theories is that a subculture often develops norms and 
values that are opposed to conventional norms and values. Further, these are learnt through 
socialization with the other members of the subculture. To understand this process of 
socialization, subculture theorists draw on insight generally from cultural sociology and 
specifically from symbolic interactionists23. The classical contribution to the insight that drug 
use is learnt behavior, and hence contradictory to understanding drug use as a result of 
internal, individual predispositions — is described in Haward Becker’s (1953) paper 
                                                 
23 I will present central contributions from the symbolic interactionists later in the text when I elaborate the 
concept of “self.” 
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“Becoming a Marijuana User.” In this paper Becker (1953) explains the process of becoming 
a marijuana user as an unfolding sequence of steps that lead one to a commitment and 
participation in a deviant career. Moreover, Becker argues that such an identity occurs over 
time: 
 
No one becomes a user without (1) learning to smoke the drug in a way 
which will produce real effects; (2) learning to recognize the effect and 
connect them with drug use (learning in other word to get high): and (3) 
learning to enjoy the sensations he perceives (Becker 1953 p. 242). 
 
By stressing the socialization process as it occurs within the group, subculture studies of drug 
use/dealing often include analyses of group rituals in taking drugs (see Svensson 1996 and 
Lalander 2001). Moreover, Lalander (2001) argues that these rituals strengthen group 
solidarity and give the members a shared meaning. Hence, the rituals are held together by a 
common perspective, with a base of rejecting mainstream values. However, one critical point 
exists in defining a subculture in terms of shared oppositional values: How homogeneous is 
the subculture, and do the members share the same values and live by them?    
 
The solidarity among heroin users/dealers has been questioned by quite a few scholars. As far 
back as 1967, Preble and Casey stressed that the subculture of heroin use in New York was a 
rather loose association of individuals, not a socially coherent group. Hence, they state:  
 
The economical pressures on heroin users today are so great that they pray on 
each other as well as on their families and on society at large. An addict with 
money runs a good risk of being taken off (robbed by other addicts) (Preble 
and Casey 1967 p. 8).  
  
Similar trends have been reported from the Norwegian subculture of heroin use. Nikolay 
Johansen (2002) describes the subculture of heroin use on the streets of Oslo as a culture with 
the distinctive features of deception, disloyalty and betrayal. In this context it is hard for 
individuals to show their vulnerability, because they believe they might get taken advantage 
of.  As an example of the weak loyalty among drug users, Johansen (2002) describes what he 
calls buddy-theft. Although there are norms in the subculture that stipulate that it is wrong to 
steal drugs or money from each other, it happens regularly that drug users either steal from 
each other or trick each other in the dealing situation.   
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In Sweden, Bengt Svensson (1997 p. 222) describes the aspects of the heroin subculture as 
“sociality without solidarity.” Sociability is expressed through a ritual use of heroin and the 
intensive “here and now” attention of the drug users. However, Svensson (1997) stresses that 
although there exists some type of solidarity among the heroin users, by a common suspicion 
and hatred toward mainstream values and norms, there is no internal solidarity among the 
drug users, because they cannot trust one another.  
 
Applied to this study, in what way do the imprisoned heroin dealers and smugglers express 
their values? Do they express conventional or subcultural values? And in what way might 
their expressed values be connected with their previous experience of being sanctioned? 
 
What are the required opportunities in order for a subculture to develop? 
 
In the classical sociological explanation of crime and the development of subculture, this 
development is viewed as a collective response to a low position within the social structure 
(Merton 1957, Cohen 1966, Cloward & Ohlin, 1969). The status frustration which labour-
class youth feel when the legal means to meet their ends are not available is resolved through 
the prestige gained within the deviant subculture (Cohen, 1966). Similarly, Preble and Casey 
stress the poverty of the slums and the lack of legitimate means of earning money as a 
background for entry into a deviant subculture:  
 
Given the social conditions of the slum and their effects on family and 
individual development, the odds are strong against the development of a 
legitimate, non deviant career that is challenging and rewarding (Preble and 
Casey 1967 p. 22).  
 
In more recent years the legacy of the early subcultural theories has been further developed by 
scholars such as Philippe Bourgois (1995). Bourgois (1995) did an outstanding ethnographic 
study of social life in inner-city America, where he studied street-level drug dealers in one of 
the toughest neighborhoods in East Harlem. The main argument that Bourgois makes is that 
the number of drug dealers or crack houses is an indirect result of the lost jobs in Harlem. 
Thus, Bourgois states that many of the unemployed in the inner-city are not successful in 
finding work because they lack the skills of working efficiently with people with whom they 
do not already have an everyday relationship, something that factory jobs provided. Hence, 
the factory jobs that moved out of the inner cities left large minority groups without a 
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collective workplace where everyone knew their tasks and how to complete them. The current 
availability of jobs within the inner city is mostly within the service sector. These jobs are 
individualized jobs where independence is required rather than a group effort. The jobs pay 
little and are not generally respected. This tends to lead many people within this community 
to become involved in the drug economy.  
 
Hence, from this perspective an explanation for the development of the subculture is found 
within a social system that excludes marginalized groups. Similarly, Richard Stephens (1991 
p. 40) argues that subculture theories emphasize the social context of heroin use/dealing; 
however, they do not utilize individualistic explanations for heroin use/dealing. Moreover, 
Stephens claims that an ethnographical approach stresses a nonjudgmental attitude toward 
heroin use and does not rely analytically on concepts generated by the judicial practices and 
discourse or the medical practices. Similarly, Agars (2002) argues that ethnographical studies 
on drugs have had no policy implications. This raises the question of what type of policy 
implications it is possible to draw from an approach that does not utilize individualistic 
explanations for heroin use/dealing; hence, incorporating conceptualization of individual 
motivations and personal responsibilities is not central within this approach.  
 
However valuable these structural explanations undoubtedly are, they raise some interesting 
and important questions for my study: What happens if these cultural/structural explanations 
are used on an individual level by offenders to explain themselves and their actions? How, 
then, should these accounts be understood? What types of expressions of agency and personal 
responsibility would they involve? Moreover, are there any sociological ways to 
conceptualize motives which do not rely on a biological understanding of individualistic 
predispositions? On a macro level, is the judicial and medical discourse not central in 
understanding how heroin smuggling and dealing are conceptualized and co-constituted and 
for understanding how the heroin dealers and smugglers describe themselves? If these frames 
of reference are not central when the offenders are out on the street, what happen when they 
are arrested and sanctioned? 
 
Subculture theory and the labeling theory link 
 
Although the mentioned subculture approaches often distance themselves from the judicial 
and medical perspectives on drug use and dealing, there is a connection between the 
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subculture approach and the judicial practices found within the labeling theory. The classical 
sociological contribution to the labeling theory is represented in Howard Becker’s book 
(1963) Outsiders, which was inspired by Lemert’s Social Pathology (1951). Becker describes 
a three-step labeling theory. The first step is the primary deviation: the breaking of the law. 
Second, the act is labelled “deviant” by an authoritarian figure, the agents of social control. 
This labeling influences the person’s identity, and, in turn, pushes the individual further down 
the path of a deviant career. The third step happens when the individual enters a subculture. A 
key point in Becker’s theory is that the deviant, when reaching the third step, has accepted his 
or her label, and made the deviant status his/hers master status. One of the greatest 
contributions of the labeling theory is that it further explains how subculture development is 
possible. An elegant description of the connection between subculture and labeling theory is 
given in the following quotation from John Braithwaite:  
 
We need control theory to bring young offenders to the doorstep of the 
criminal subculture (primary deviance); stigmatization (labeling theory) to 
open the door, subcultural and learning theory to maintain the lair as a 
rewarding place for secondary deviants to stay in; and opportunity theory to 
explain how such criminal subcultures come to exist in the first place  
(Braithwaite 1989 p. 16).    
 
The point Braithwaite is making is that labeling could lead to stigmatization which fosters 
subculture development, because the labelled individual could search for, or at least be drawn 
to others who have similarly been rejected by the wider culture. Applied to this study, I will 
raise the following questions: Are all heroin smugglers and dealers labelled in the same way? 
In other words, are they given the same master status? Do any of the stories told by the 
offenders reveal a stigmatization process which could further exclusion, foster subculture 
development and hinder integration?   
 
Upper-level drug trafficking: An organized crime perspective 
 
I have identified two common features in the literature on upper-level drug dealing, here 
represented by contributions from Peter Reuter and Hagga (1989), Nicholas Dorn et al. 
(1992), Patricia Adler (1985), Geoffery Pearson and Dick Hobbs (2001), and Damián Zaitch 
(2002). First, most studies on upper-level drug dealing/trafficking are driven by an incentive 
to understand how this activity is organized (Reuter and Hagga 1989, Adler 1985, Dorn et al. 
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1992, Pearson and Hobbs 2001, Zaitch 2002). Second, these studies often rely on the 
perspective of the law enforcement agencies, police, judicial sources or interviews with 
imprisoned offenders (Reuter and Hagga 1989, Dorn et al. 1992, Pearson and Hobbs 2001). 
Hence, these studies are often also done in cooperation with these law enforcement agencies 
(Reuter and Hagga 1989, Dorn et al. 1992, Pearson and Hobbs 2001). Moreover, when these 
studies are based on interviews with imprisoned offenders, the stories that the offenders tell 
are not primarily used to illuminate the offenders’ social identities or labeling effects; rather,  
the information gathered, is used to discuss how the upper-level drug dealing and trafficking 
is organized (Reuter and Hagga 1989, Pearson and Hobbs 2001).  
 
To illustrate the difference in the perspectives, in the “organized crime perspective” the prison 
experience is described as a key generator for individuals to form new networks (Reuter & 
Haage, 1989 p. 38; Pearson and Hobbs, 2001 p. 30). Serving sentences may help individuals 
to locate new opportunities and business contacts. Within the labeling theory the prison 
experience is understood as a lengthy, degrading process of labeling, during which the 
prisoners internalize the label of “deviant” placed upon them by the agents of social control 
(Lemerts 1951 and Becker 1963). 
 
As mentioned in the method chapter, there are very few ethnographical studies based on 
upper-level drug dealing/trafficking. I have found no ethnographical studies based specifically 
on upper-level heroin dealing and trafficking. However, I will present two ethnographical 
studies. The first was made by Patricia Alders (1985) and based on field work among 
marijuana and cocaine traffickers in the U.S., and the second is Damian Zaitch’s (2002) 
fieldwork among Colombian drug entrepreneurs in the Netherlands. It is important to 
recognize that these contributions primarily focus on how the upper-level drug 
dealing/trafficking is organized; however, they also address the following two questions 
which are relevant for my study: (1) What characterizes upper-level drug dealers?, and (2) 
What is the connection between upper-level drug dealers/traffickers and ethnic minorities?        
 
What characterizes upper-level drug dealers/traffickers?   
 
Whereas the subculture theories borrow their framework from general sociology (symbolic 
interaction and cultural theory), upper-level drug dealing and trafficking borrow theirs from 
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economics. Moreover, economic logic stipulates that illegal business is based upon the same 
principles as legitimate business, and hence should primarily be studied as economic 
phenomena. Conceptualizing upper-level drug trafficking/dealing through economic concepts 
often leads to an understanding of the drug dealers/traffickers as “business criminals” driven 
by a search for profit.  
 
Based on a review of upper-level drug dealing/trafficking literature, Nicholas Dorn et al. 
(2005 p. 35) describe three different types of drug dealers/traffickers. First, there is the 
“politico-military,” who is characterized by having an aim of restructuring the political field, 
or achieving and maintaining a dominate position in the existing political structure. Second, 
there are the “business criminals,” who are not motivated by ideology or politics but, on the 
contrary, only seek profit. Often these criminals are described as entrepreneurs with an 
innovative quality in their economic operations, elements of rational calculations and an 
irrational, aggressive aspect which finds expression in the “animal spirit” of accumulation of 
wealth. These business criminals often constitute the “core group” operating through the 
years24.  The third category is described as “adventurers,” who are individuals involved in the 
drug trade at various positions and “drift” around looking for opportunities to earn money.   
 
In comparison to the subculture theories which stress the lifestyle aspects of drug dealing/use, 
hence generating an understanding of the drug dealers as individuals in search of meaning and 
respect, organized crime studies generate an understanding of upper-level drug dealers/ 
smugglers as motivated by profit. Moreover, whereas the subculture theories generate 
explanations of drug dealing at a contextual/structural level, the organized crime perspective 
generates explanations at an individual level where the profit motive is understood as the 
driving force. However, one important question is raised: Is the drug traffickers’/dealers’ 
desire for money in any way understood as connected to blocked legal opportunities to earn 
money? 
 
One answer to this question is given by Patricia Adler (1985), who has given a vivid account 
of the world of wholesale dealers and smugglers, based on six years of fieldwork and 
                                                 
24 The differences in characters one and two are connected to another important discussion within the organized 
crime perspective, which is whether this type of organization should be understood as a monopolistic family 
organization (character one) or as a network of competing entrepreneurs (character two). The most influential 
exponent of the network/entrepreneur perspective is Peter Reuter (1983). Reuter (1983) argues that although it is 
a widespread myth that organized crime is run by monopolistic family hierarchies, the best way to understand 
organized crime is as a network of competing entrepreneurs.   
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interviews in an elite Southern California community of dealers. Adler argues that entry into a 
life of deviance is not the result of blocked legitimate opportunity structures or the result of 
failures within conventional communities. Rather, Adler argues that the attraction and 
subsequent commitment to careers as illicit entrepreneurs are motivated by the pleasure of 
hedonistic indulgence fostering alienation and the turn to dealing/trafficking. The following 
quotation illustrates this argument:  
 
While these dealers and smugglers are businesslike in their occupational 
orientation, profit motivated, and rationally organized work behavior, they 
are fundamentally committed to drug trafficking because of their uninhibited 
lifestyle it permits them to lead. They therefore act rationally for the ultimate 
end of living irrationally. This then is a study of a subculture of hedonism 
whose members have revolted against conventional society’s rationalism and 
repression in order to induce the impulses of their brute being (Adler 1985 p. 
3).  
 
The lifestyle Adler describes consists of jet-setting, private planes to Las Vegas to gamble, 
flashy clothes and jewelry, heavy spending and partying. However, the upper-level 
dealers/traffickers in Adler’s (1985 p. 84) study are a homogeneous group consisting of 
mostly white, middle-class males with a low degree of prior criminality. One central question 
then is how fitting is this image driven from white middle-class, jet-set subculture for 
understanding upper-level drug dealers and smugglers with an ethnic minority background. 
To rephrase the question, “What is the connection between upper-level drug dealers and 
traffickers and ethnic minorities?”  
 
Upper-level dealing/trafficking and the ethnic minority link 
 
In Western Europe and the U.S., organized crime has for decades been synonymous with 
minorities and immigrants, such as the Sicilian mafia, Colombian and Mexican cartels, 
Chinese tongs and triads, and so on (see Zaitch 2002 p. 19). Given this fact, Franck 
Bovenkerk (2001 p110-111) raised the question whether the connection between organized 
crime and ethnic minorities is socially relevant and ethically acceptable to study. In answering 
this question, Bovenkerk gives three theoretical reasons for further researching this link. First, 
he stresses that there are political and geographical factors that make such a link possible. For 
example, he states that weak states have often fostered organized crime. Second, Bovenkerk 
stresses the relevance of the classical sociological explanations of deviant subcultures as 
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blocked opportunities; hence, ethnic minorities often have fewer available opportunities than 
the ethnic majority. Third, he argues that organized crime thrives within the seclusion of 
ethnic minorities.  
 
One way of construing this is that interest in the connection between ethnic minorities and 
organized crime has fostered a renascence of Merton’s (1957) “strain theory” also within an 
economic perspective where cultural/social expiations by large are deemed irrelevant. Given 
an economic perspective, it would be the market (price and availability) that determines the 
nature and dimensions of the criminal activity, not the individual’s ethnicity or other social 
factors. However, it is important to recognize that Bovenkerk (2001) is discussing organized 
crime in general; one important question then is how the relationship between ethnic 
minorities and upper-level drug dealing/trafficking is described in contemporary Western 
Europe. 
 
One answer to this question is given by Reuter and Paoli (2008), who argues that the 
relationship between ethnic minorities and drug trafficking is a “touchy subject” which is 
avoided by social scientists out of fear of reinforcing cheap and distorted stereotypes 
popularized by media. Moreover, drawing extensively on Bovenkerk’s (2001) framework, 
Reuter and Paoli (2008) state: 
 
Many academic researchers accept the view of law enforcements agencies 
that Turkish and Albanian groups dominate the import and wholesale of 
heroin and Colombians dominate the import and wholesale trade of cocaine25 
(Reuter 2008 p. 20). 
 
Further, Reuter and Paoli conclude: 
 
Consistent with popular assumptions, we find that some ethnic groups are 
disproportional present in some segments of the drug markets. In particular, 
they dominate the import and high-level wholesale trade of heroin and 
cocaine (Reuter 2008 p. 31). 
 
                                                 
25 I find it problematic that Reuter and Paoli (2008) under-communicate that the researchers to whom they are 
referring (for example, Fijnaute et al. 1998, Pearson and Hobbs 2001 and Blickman et al. 2003) and the law 
enforcement agencies are basing their conclusions on the same sources (criminal statistics, court transcribes, 
legal documents, imprisoned offenders, and so on). In other words, given their similar sources, it would have 
been strange if they did not agree on the conclusion.    
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However, Reuter and Paoli (2008 p. 20) give two modifications to the image that some ethnic 
groups dominate the wholesale and trafficking of cocaine and heroin in Western Europe. First, 
there are examples of drug importing occurring in groups that consist of individuals with 
diverse ethnic backgrounds and of groups from different minorities working together. Second, 
Reuter and Paoli (2008 p. 20) claim that some intra-European importation of drugs is carried 
out by individuals not belonging to the mentioned groups. 
 
In regard to Colombians dominating the cocaine supply in Western Europe, Zaitch’s (2002) 
ethnographical study is of relevance.  Zaitch (2002 p. 290-291) found that Colombians were 
engaged in all levels of the cocaine business: transport, import, wholesale distribution, and 
retail dealing. Moreover, Zaitch argues that his findings cannot support an understanding of 
Colombians’ involvement as “ethnic mafias” or “transnational cartels.” The main reason 
Zaitch gives for this is that the Colombians have no enclave economy where illegal and legal 
ethnic business coexist. However, in explaining the Colombians’ involvement in the cocaine 
trade, Zaitch stresses their immigrant status and their blocked opportunities to earn money 
legally. 
  
Applied to this study, my point of departure regarding the prison interviews, as elaborated in 
the method chapter, is not to view the offenders’ stories as mirroring the social reality of 
heroin smuggling and dealing. Hence, my main interest is not to test the validity of the 
statement that certain ethnic minorities dominate the upper levels of heroin 
dealing/trafficking, but to find out what types of narratives are told by different offenders, 
what these different stories say about the offenders’ identity formation, and moreover how 
these stories are ratified in court. To elaborate on an individual level, will the heroin 
smugglers and wholesale dealers explain their involvement in terms of a profit motive, or will 
they stress their problematic minority status? And how are these accounts to be understood? 
What types of expressions of agency and personal responsibilities do they involve?  
 
Similarly, on a macro level, my interest in producing statistics of the court decision is not to 
prove that certain ethnic groups dominate different levels of the heroin market, but rather to 
study how the judicial practices produce and reproduce certain understandings of heroin 
crimes and how this is connected to the types of cases that are represented within judicial 
practices. 
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4. Narrative analysis: Introduction 
 
“What does a grand theory have to do with qualitative research? At the epistemological 
level, a grand theory of substance use calls for an alternative approach, one that is less 
about testing hypotheses and measuring things and more about modeling discovered 
patterns at multiple levels and showing their interconnections.” 
(Agar 2002 p. 256) 
 
In this section I elaborate this study’s theoretical framework.  First, I address key assumptions 
in narrative analysis to illuminate how language constitutes, that is imposes form upon, that 
which it intends to give meaning. Moreover I raise specific question of how this could affect 
the stories of the heroin smugglers and dealers. Second, I elaborate some central concepts in 
narrative theory, and show how these concepts are relevant in this study. Thirdly, and to 
further explore the potential of narrative theory, I investigate how narrative theory has been 
applied empirically in studies of illness, crime and addiction. Here I argue that narrative 
analysis gives a rich conceptual toolbox for studying the interconnectedness between 
language and social identity, and gives comprehension to collective and/ or cultural 
components of identity constructions. Fourthly, I investigate the potential of connecting a 
narrative theory to the judicial practices through the concepts of plot and motivation.        
 
Key assumptions in narrative analysis: The importance of language 
 
Narrative analysis is a form of content analysis developed in literary studies. In social science 
it is commonly applied to the study of how humans construct and maintain meaning and 
understanding in their lives. Over the last decade, there has been growing interest in narrative 
analysis within studies of both crime and addiction. A central assumption in narrative analysis 
is that human existence is shaped by, and takes place in, a “linguistic milieu,” where the 
narrative form gives meaning to people’s lives and comprehension and order to the “flux of 
experience” (Polkinghorne 1988 p. 155). Drawing extensively on hermeneutical and 
phenomenological insights, the American psychologist Donald E. Polkinghorne (1988 p. 14) 
argues that narratives perform significant functions in our lives. At the micro level, people 
develop a narrative of their own lives, which enables them to understand who they are and 
where they are heading. Thus, the narratives serve as a lens through which the apparently 
independent and disconnected elements of life are seen as related parts of a whole.  
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A related argument has been made in the sociology of culture by Paul DiMaggio (1997 p. 
263), who argues that there have been parallel developments in sociology and psychology 
which demonstrate that we have mental structures and that these structures mould the way we 
interpret, remember, and respond emotionally. The question is whether the presence of these 
mental structures or lenses suggests that we do not perceive the material world or ourselves in 
a direct way.   
 
The sociologists Eviatar Zerubavel (2002 p. 230) and Wendy Griswold (2004 p. 27) both use 
Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave” to illustrate the relationship between perception and the 
material world. In Plato’s allegory, men are shackled and can only see the shadows cast on the 
cave’s wall by fire. These shadows are their reality. The argument Zerubavel (2002) and 
Griswold (2004) make is that being a member of a society means seeing the world through a 
special mental lens, which is not naturally given but which is learnt through socialization. If 
one accepts that we do not perceive the material world, or ourselves, directly but that our 
perceptions are mediated through signs, symbols, and texts (representations), the question 
arises: What are the implications of this insight for empirical studies? In Plato’s allegory one 
of the prisoners escapes into the sunlight, and he sees that the shadows are not reality but 
illusion. The escaped prisoner becomes the model for a philosopher, one who has had the 
truth revealed to him. Is the role of the social scientist similar to the mission of philosophers, 
to uncover truths and point out the illusions of perception?  
 
 Representations and power 
 
“Social problem exists primarily in terms of how it is defined and conceived in society.” 
(Blumer 1971 p. 300) 
 
The Norwegian social scientist Iver B. Neumann (2002 p. 34) argues that by acknowledging 
that people’s perception of the world is mediated through representations, two sets of social 
data become available to the social scientist: the representations themselves and the power 
relationships that shape them. When I try to understand at the individual level how heroin 
dealers and smugglers perceive themselves, it then follows that there are no aspects of self-
understanding that are not mediated through representations. The most influential exponent of 
this view is the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1991), who consistently rejects any claim 
for a direct transparency of the self to itself that would make self-understanding independent 
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of any kind of representations and pre-knowledge of the world. Further, Ricoeur (1991 p. 15) 
claims that in the final analysis, self-understanding coincides with the interpretation given to 
these mediating terms.  
 
When I try to understand, at a macro level, how a category like “heroin smugglers and 
dealers” is defined, this perspective implies that this definition is always a social process 
involving power. In addition, the way a category is defined affects the members of that 
category’s self-concept and their moral standing within society. Zerubavel (2002) argues that 
social classifications are social constructions learnt through socialisation; they differ from 
culture to culture and from one time period to another. The point is that social classifications 
always express power relationships and generate debate. Moreover, Zerubavel uses the public 
debate on drugs to illustrate that the social boundary between illegal and legal drugs is a result 
of different political and social interests. Drawing extensively on the work of Herbert Blumer 
(1971) a similar point is made by Stephen Hilgartner and Charles Bosk (1988), who argue that 
there is competition and selection in the public discourse over which social problems should 
be given attention. Their basic argument is that social problems exist in terms of the way they 
are defined and conceptualised in society. Consequently, any declaration about a social 
problem is based on a specific interpretation, or view of reality, chosen from among different 
possibilities.  
 
In relation to this study, a central question is whether there has been a shift in the public 
debate and in the practices of policy making regarding heroin in Norway. In line with the 
ideology of zero tolerance and the war on drugs, it was formerly common to view heroin users 
and dealers only as criminals who deserved punishment. However, today the ideology of harm 
reduction is winning ground and is becoming an established paradigm for policies and 
programmes aimed at reducing the health-related, social, and economic damage caused by 
drug use without insisting on total abstinence (Skretting 2007). Harm reduction initiatives in 
relation to opiate addiction cover programmes such as needle exchanges, supervised injection 
techniques, establishment of needle rooms and so on (Andersen & Järvinen 2007). According 
to The International Harm Reduction Association (IHRA) (2008), harm reduction is based on 
a pragmatic public health approach, which is principally aimed at preventing infectious 
diseases and other serious health hazards associated with drug use (see Tammi 2005 p. 386). 
In all national contexts where harm reduction approaches have been adopted, the trigger event 
was the HIV epidemic and related public fears (Tammi 2005, Olsen and Skretting 2006). In 
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Norway, a needle exchange program was established in 1988, in which free needles where 
distributed to the injecting users. This was directly related to the HIV epidemic, and the fear 
of the HIV virus spreading throughout the drug population (St. Meld. 16 (1996-97)).  
Moreover, a trial project with methadone to HIV-positive injecting drug users was started in 
1992, and in 1994 methadone supported treatment for established intravenous drug users 
became available. Further, in 2004 the first supervised injecting site was established in Oslo 
(Ot.prp. nr 59 (2008-2009)).  
 
Harm-reduction measures are based on the universalistic ethos of human rights, which 
stipulates that changing human behaviours must be a cooperative process that takes into 
consideration the dignity of the individual. Therefore, harm reduction avoids moralistic, 
stigmatized and judgmental statements about the “substance users and use.26” The latest 
addition to the programs inspired by harm reduction in Norway is Drug Courts, a system by 
which drug addicts, if they approve, can be sentenced to treatment rather than prison. The 
Drug Courts started in 2006 as a three-year pilot project in Oslo and Bergen. Moreover, the 
Drug Courts model is intended for people with severe drug abuse; hence, the offenders’ 
motivation, wish to participate, willingness to cooperate, and clear understanding of their 
situation are important elements in order for the courts to function (Ot.prp. nr 81, 2005 and 
Inst.o. nr 128, 2004-2005).  
 
As mentioned in the method chapter, there has been an enormous growth in drug felonies in 
the period from 1990 to 2000, indicating that a criminal control approach to the drug problem 
is still active and expanding. In other words, has there been a shift in the view of heroin 
addicts from criminals in need of punishment to ill individuals in need of treatment? 
Moreover, the heroin dealers and smugglers in this study have all been sentenced to prison; 
consequently, a central question then is what types of representations of deviance, normality, 
sickness, and health are found in their narratives.    
 
The arguments made by the cultural sociologists, Polkinghorne (1988 p. 153) claims that, at a 
macro level narratives give cohesion to beliefs and transmit values. Thus, cultures do provide 
                                                 
26 The sociologists Grazyna Zajdow (2005:186), Ditte Andersen and Margaretha Järvinen (2007:237), and Astrid 
Skretting (2007:277) have all questioned “the self-evidently correct” notions of harm reduction, where harm 
reduction is presented as the humanistic and sensible alternative to a moralistic, abstinence-oriented zero-
tolerance policy, without crucial reflection about the paradigm itself. 
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specific types of narratives for adoption by their members in their meaning-making process. 
These narrative schemas are carried and transmitted in the culture by ideologies, myths, and 
drama. Notwithstanding the complexity of the influence of a biographical story (self-
narrative), there are striking similarities in the way in which heroin addiction has been 
described in ethnographical research and in semi-biographical fiction and the way in which 
Norwegian heroin dealers talk about their lifestyle and addiction.  
 
One of the classic books in the semi-biographical genre is William Burroughs’ Junky, which 
was first published in 1953 under the pseudonym of William Lee27. Jill Jonnes (2001 p. 227, 
230) analyses the image of heroin use in both the American media and semi-biographical 
books and points out that the Beat Generation, and in particular Burroughs’ Junky, moved 
heroin addiction out of the black jazz scene and into the white world. Junky can be read as a 
manual for heroin use. It gives detailed instructions on how to use heroin and describes the 
life of an addict. As Burroughs ((1953) 2002 p. XVI) proclaims, “Junk is not, like alcohol or 
weed, a means to increased enjoyment of life. Junk is not a kick. It is a way of life.” Further, 
Burroughs ((1953) 2002, pp. 153-158) even included a glossary, or rather an English-addict 
dictionary, for “jive talk.” In the glossary he introduces phrases also used by Norwegian 
heroin dealers, such as “cold turkey,” “hooked,” “shot,” and “fix.” It is important to recognize 
that this does not mean that ethnic Norwegian heroin dealers have read Junky and adopted the 
lifestyle described in the book, but rather that Burroughs’ descriptions and phrases have 
entered the social rhetoric of heroin addiction.  
 
It seems clear, therefore, that narratives of heroin smuggling and dealing can be interpreted as 
cultural objects. Griswold (2004 p. 13) defines a cultural object “as shared significance 
embodied in form.” Moreover, Griswold (2004, p 14, 24) argues that cultural objects are 
created by individuals, but it is not until they enter the “circuit of human discourse” and are 
given a shared meaning that they become cultural objects. By viewing the narratives of the 
heroin dealers and smugglers as cultural objects, the structural and/or collective elements of 
the narrative are brought into focus, and subsequently the following questions become 
relevant: What are the collective representations of heroin smugglers and dealers? How do the 
heroin smugglers and dealers use these representations in their self-narratives?  
 
                                                 
27 Junky was published 14 years prior to Preble and Casey’s (1967) contribution; the similarities between them 
are striking.   
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The sociologists Nina Eliasoph and Paul Lichterman (2003 p. 736) claim that collective 
representations exercise a strong social force. At the same time, collective representations can 
be ambiguous and have diverse meanings in different contexts. Similarly, while emphasizing 
how people use collective representations, Polkinghorne (1988 p. 153) claims that although 
the content of each person’s life narrative is unique, it often shares the features of a general 
plot outline. By applying a narrative analysis, this general plot outline can be identified and 
studied.   
 
Central concepts: Narrative, story and plot 
 
In the book Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences, Polkinghorne (1988 p. 13) defines 
narratives as “a kind of organizational scheme expressed in story form.” The narrative form 
describes a sequence of events divided by temporal markers: a beginning, a middle, and an 
ending. In many cases the chronological order of events is referred to as the story28 of the 
narrative, whereas that which gives meaning to, and binds the elements of the story together, 
is referred to as the story’s plot.  
 
When the narrative being told is a biographical story (self-narrative), the analytical distinction 
between story and plot draws attention to the fact that the meaning of different events is 
created in hindsight. Similarly, Ricoeur (1984) argues that we do not experience time at all 
directly or consistently. Hence, the temporal markers on which narratives rely are second-
order constructions that impose order on something which, at the time it was lived, was 
experienced as elusive and vague. Furthermore, the sequence in which events occur can often 
make a stronger impression on the listener than the events themselves. In this case, the 
sequence determines the listener’s emotional and psychological reactions to a plot.  
 
When this is applied to the narratives of the heroin smugglers and dealers, it becomes 
apparent that their stories do not simply reflect their prior actions or their “genuine” 
experience of these actions, but rather the stories are told in hindsight, where the meaning of 
different events is created and different events are given preference to other events. I will use 
an example to clarify the distinction between story and plot and to highlight the importance of 
the chronological order of events. In this example, a heroin courier tells a story in which event 
                                                 
28 I will use the concept of story and the concept of narrative synonymously in this text.    
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“A” (meeting of acquaintance) is followed by event “B” (smuggling heroin across a border). 
The concept of the story refers to the chronological order of events A and B, whereas the 
concept of the plot refers to why A led to B. In this case, the plot could be given numerous 
meanings: helping a friend or a family member, being manipulated, being tricked, and so on. 
If the chronological order of events A and B were switched so that the heroin was smuggled 
across the border and then the courier met up with his acquaintance, the meaning ascribed to 
the event would be quite different. Maybe the courier had brought the heroin across the border 
on his or her own initiative and would try to distribute the drug among his or her 
acquaintances. 
 
How is narrative analysis applied in empirical studies? 
 Making sense and “identity talks” 
 
The American sociologist Arthur Frank (1997) combines classical sociological insights with 
narrative analysis to study different ways of talking about illness. Frank (1997) makes the 
basic argument that people tell stories about their illness in order to make sense of their 
suffering and their lives, and that through the act of storytelling they find healing29. Moreover, 
Frank (1997) emphasizes the social elements in self-narratives. First, stories of illness are 
social because they are being addressed to an individual, and the reactions of that listener 
shape the stories that are being told. Even when the stories are created through an internal 
reflective process, where we reflect about how we appear to others, how we are, and the 
choices that we make, Frank (1997) argues that the thought process is directed toward a 
listener. Sometimes we have a specific person in mind, and other times the “listener” is a 
“generalized other”30. Drawing on insights, generally from symbolic interactionists, and 
specifically from Erving Goffman ((1959) 1992 pp. 252-253), Frank (1997 p. 55) views the 
self as an effect of the storytelling. It is the story that constructs and changes the self. From 
this it follows “that the stories of illness are not the illness itself, but can become the 
experience of illness” (Frank 1997 p. 22).    
 
                                                 
29 It is difficult to do justice to the depth and complexity of Frank’s (1997) insight into different aspects of 
healing in a short summary. 
30 The “generalized other” is a concept developed by Georg Herbert Mead ((1934) 1962) and refers to the 
attitudes of the group or society to which individual belongs. The ability to take the perspective of the 
generalized other is essential in developing a self in Mead’s perspective.     
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The self is a concept of great significance in both narrative analysis and symbolic 
interactionism. The primary insight of symbolic interactionists is that the human self is a 
construction built on the reactions of others toward an individual, not the discovery or release 
of some innate “I” (Conf. Griswold 2004 pp. 61-63). Consequently, the self is subject to 
change as these responses, inherently variable and inconsistent, change in character. To 
develop a stable self, a person needs to synthesize and integrate somewhat diverse social 
responses. One central and highly influential contribution to the symbolic interactionist’s 
understanding of the self is Charles Horton Cooley’s ((1904) 1964) concept of “the looking-
glass-self.” Cooley argues that we learn to see ourselves as others see us, through a three-step 
process. First, we think of how we appear to others. Second, we imagine how others might 
react toward us. Third, we develop some self-awareness, feelings of pride or shame31, as a 
result of others’ judgments.   
 
To elaborate on the interconnectedness between the concept of self and narratives, 
Polkinghorne (1988) claims that humans recognize their own selves when they speak about 
themselves and when they hear others talk about them. Thus, Polkinghorne (1988 p. 151) 
proposes that “the self is a concept defined as the expressive process of human existence, 
whose form is narratives.” The use of the narrative form then integrates individual human 
existence into a collective whole by considering it as an expression of a single unfolding and 
developing story. 
  
Second, Frank (1997) argues that self-narratives are social in nature because the storyteller 
always uses a culturally acquired repertoire in his or her storytelling. Hence, Frank (1997) 
identifies three basic narratives: restitution, chaos, and quest narratives. These narratives vary 
in regard to plot, self-story and moral responsibility. Although Frank (1997) identifies these 
three different narratives, he argues that only the restitution and quest stories qualify as “real” 
narratives. In the chaos narrative, the storytellers drown themselves in their own pain and 
suffering and consequently do not manage to give the stories a narrative form with a 
beginning, middle, and ending. Further, he argues that the most common narrative is the 
restitution narrative, with the simple plot of “Yesterday I was healthy, today I’m sick, but 
tomorrow I’ll be healthy again” (Frank 1997 p. 77). However common this narrative is, Frank 
(1997) is critical toward its widespread use because “the wounded storyteller” has adapted the 
                                                 
31 Goffman ((1963) 1990) developed Cooley’s understanding of the social emotions and added embarrassment 
and humiliation as shames variations to the list of social emotions.  
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technical expertise, for example, physicians’ concepts and perspectives about themselves. 
This might lead to what he calls the “colonization” of medical practices and discourses on the 
stories of illness. The quest narrative takes the form of a journey, where the storytellers use 
suffering in order to gain new insight into their lives by overcoming the challenges that the 
illness brings and finding healing. In this narrative the storytellers present themselves as 
heroes in their own stories.  
 
Applied to my study, the concept of self as it is construed from a symbolic interaction 
perspective and also by Frank (1997) draws attention to the rather obvious fact that the 
narratives of the heroin dealer and the smugglers were told to me as a researcher. Hence, as 
elaborated in the method chapter, the framing of the interview, the contact, rapport, and 
dialogue between the offenders and me inform the stories being told. Second, it is not the first 
time the offenders have told their stories. The offenders have previously tried out their 
narratives on inmates, prosecutors, defense attorneys and social workers, and thereby 
integrated or rejected the prior responses into their storytelling. Furthermore, parts of their 
stories have been tested in court. Inspired by Frank’s (1997) study, I am interested in how 
different rhetoric, in particular legal rhetoric, shapes and moulds the narratives of the heroin 
dealers and smugglers. Moreover, I find Frank’s (1997) insights inspiring and profound, but I 
am left wondering what makes a person choose one narrative over the other. Is it coincidental 
that one person tells a restitution story and another tells a quest story? Are there certain social 
factors, such as gender, age, ethnicity or class that make an individual more prone to tell one 
story over the other? Or is the choice of narrative related to the context in which the story has 
been told, so that, for example, one person tells a quest narrative in one context and a 
restitution narrative in another context?    
 
This point is important because I am interested in what makes the heroin smugglers and 
dealers tell one of the four narratives. I have already implied that this might vary with the 
ethnicity, but it might also vary with other social factors. An interesting study that elaborates 
on how narratives are embedded in the social situation is Snow and Anderson’s (1987) 
fieldwork in Texas among the homeless. By applying a symbolic interaction perspective with 
a focus on how the homeless create meaning in their lives, the researchers identified three 
different narratives related to how they adapted to their lives on the street: distancing, 
embracement, and fictive stories. Distancing involves the homeless’ removing themselves 
from the rest of the people on the street by pointing out that being homeless was only 
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temporary and did not represent their real selves. This narrative was commonly told among 
those who had been homeless for a relatively short period of time. Contrary to the distancing 
narrative, the embracement narrative involved acceptance and attachment to the social 
identity of being homeless. These stories were commonly told by people who had lived for a 
long time on the streets. Fictive storytelling accounts for fantasizing about the past, present, 
and future.  
 
In addition to being a central reference on the issue of how self-narratives change with social 
factors (e.g., time spent on the street), Snow and Anderson’s (1987) research is relevant 
because they emphasize the importance of “identity talks.” Before this study, social scientists 
had assumed that the homeless were preoccupied with basic survival. However, it was found 
that even though the homeless have a low social ranking and might not even know from 
where their next meal is coming, a big part of their activity involves “identity talks” (conf. 
Griswold 2004, p 64).  This point also applies to the heroin smugglers and dealers. They are 
imprisoned and have a low social ranking, and the stories about themselves may be the only 
resource over which they have control. At the same time, the offenders have had a long time, 
some of them in isolation, to reflect on their choices and actions.          
 
Narratives of crime 
 
“Only the weakest willed take on the self suggested by the state, the clever wear it only as a 
veil and the stubborn resist as best they can.” 
(Duguid, 2000 p. 200) 
 
Narrative analyses of crimes are often based on qualitative interviews with imprisoned 
“violent” or “dangerous” individuals (Green, South and Smith 2006; Patricia O`Connor 1995, 
2000; and McKendy 2006; Presser 2008)32. Two central questions in these studies are the 
following: 1) How do the offenders respond to the majority culture’s evaluating, judging, and 
stigmatizing their actions and their lifestyle? 2) Have the offenders internalized two sets of 
oppositional moral values, one belonging to a subculture and the other belonging to 
                                                 
32 I will return to these contributions later in the text. Moreover these studies are influenced by the symbolic 
interactionists’ view of the self and the labeling theory. As mentioned earlier the concept of labeling refers to the 
linguistic tendency of the authorities to negatively label others deviants or criminals, which further creates and 
maintains stigmatization. 
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mainstream culture? If this is so, how do the offenders neutralize or justify their criminal 
actions?  
 
Applied to this study I will discuss how the heroin smugglers and dealers respond to the labels 
placed upon them. Moreover, I investigate whether the heroin smugglers and dealers’ 
narratives refer to both conventional and/or drug culture values. Additionally, I explore 
whether the heroin smugglers and dealers neutralize their criminal actions, and in what way 
this neutralization might be embedded in the offenders’ narratives.  
 
Neutralization techniques 
 
Volkan Topalli (2005), Gill Green, Nigel South and Rose Smith (2006), and Loise Presser 
(2008) draw on general insights from labeling theory, and Gresham Sykes and David Matza’s 
(1957) “techniques of neutralization” state that offenders have internalized mainstream 
values. Further, this theory stipulates that the offenders understand that breaking the law is 
wrong, and consequently they perform “self-talk” to reduce feelings of guilt before they break 
the law. Green, South and Smith (2006) identify a vocabulary of motives that is part of the 
“techniques of neutralization.” In this vocabulary there are two key narratives: 1) “Not my 
fault” (for example, I have done these actions because of bad influence from friends, a 
troubled youth, and a difficult childhood) and 2) “Good at heart” (for example, although I 
have done bad things, I am a good person; I have been good to a brother, sister, and a friend). 
A central argument for Green, South and Smith (2006) is that neither of these narratives 
articulates a form of personal responsibility or agency, but is rather an expression of a self that 
only responds to others’ actions and evaluations.  
 
Topalli (2005) bases his study on offenders “on the street” and argues that these offenders 
project a self-image consistent with the norms of the subculture. Moreover, he argues that the 
“techniques of neutralization” also should include strategies for breaking the subculture’s 
norms and values. To clarify, if in fact, the offenders have internalized two conflicting sets of 
values, and are expected to break with the subculture’s norms and values, do they then need to 
use “neutralization techniques” to avoid feeling shame and embarrassment when breaking the 
subculture norms? Topalli analyses narratives about “ratting” and “showing mercy” and 
shows that offenders do feel shame and guilt if they break the norms of the subculture. 
 
73 
 
Loise Presser’s study (2008) is based on interviews with men who have been sanctioned for 
committing murder, rape, or assaults and hence have been labelled “dangerous men.” Presser 
identified three key narratives in her data material: the reformist narrative, stability narrative 
and elastic narrative. In the reform narrative the storyteller portrays a change in regard to his 
previous criminal activity. However, the stability narrative does not include references to any 
type of reform; on the contrary, the protagonist expresses that he acted with regard to moral 
principal, either because he has behaved mostly decently, because he follows subculture 
norms, or both. The elastic narrative is the most common in Presser’s (2008) study and is 
characterised as a combination of the reform narrative and the stability narrative.   
 
Coherent or fragmented view of culture 
 
A parallel debate as to whether criminal offenders have internalised two sets of values and the 
connections between these values and the individuals actions are found within the general 
literature of the sociology of culture. In the sociology of culture, the connection between 
values and action has been debated for years. It was formerly common to view culture as a 
coherent set of values and norms that the members of society internalised through 
socialisation and which guided their actions. Ann Swidler (1986 p. 274) and Griswold (2004 
p. 42) apply Max Weber’s switchman metaphor to illustrate this view of culture. In the 
switchman metaphor, Weber describes the individual’s interest as the engine of action and the 
individual’s values as those which define the destination and the means of getting there. In 
recent decades, sociologists of culture have adopted a view of culture as fragmented, 
consisting of more than one set of coherent values and norms (Swidler 1986, Schudson 1989, 
Sewell 1992, Griswold 2004). The point of relevance here is that when the culture within a 
society is viewed as fragmented, it allows for a view of the strategic use of culture to serve an 
individual’s own ends. Culture is then viewed as “a set of skills or tool kit” (Swidler 1986 p. 
257), as “complex rule-like structures” (Sewell 1992 p. 18), or “an ambiguous set of symbols 
applicable for knowledgeable actors seeking their own ends” (Schudson 1989 p. 153).  
 
In relation to my study, the question arises: Do the heroin dealers and smugglers express 
deeply internalised values in their narratives, or do they choose explanations and motives 
from the tool kit of culture? On one hand, I find it plausible that the heroin smugglers and 
dealers have internalised different and oppositional moral values and that breaking these 
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norms leads to emotional responses, for example, embarrassment, shame, and guilt. The 
reason for this is the amount of time, intensity and emotional involvement that the heroin 
dealers and smugglers display when they dwell on the moral aspects of their lives. In addition, 
I find it sterile and almost dehumanizing to view the offenders as making purely rational 
choices without the influence of emotions such as love, happiness, embarrassment, guilt, 
humiliation, anxiety, obsession, prejudice, and hatred. After all, it is these emotions which 
make us human.  
 
On the other hand, the motivations and explanations which the heroin dealers and smugglers 
give for their own illegal actions could be interpreted as motives that have been chosen from 
the tool kit of culture. However, it is important to recognize that the heroin dealers and 
smugglers do not choose the social situation into which they are born. As the Norwegian 
anthropologist Thomas Hylland Eriksen (2006 p. 31) pointed out, “nobody chooses their 
parents or their mother tongue.” Further, Hylland Eriksen argues that a dedicated emphasis on 
cultural diversity often involves overlooking or downplaying the importance of class-related 
issues.  
Cognition and the expression of agency 
 
Interrelated with the debate of the connection between values and actions lays a similar debate 
about whether culture enable or restrain individuals’ actions and thoughts. Paul DiMaggio 
(1997) elaborates on this issue, and he describes two different types of cognition: automatic 
and deliberate. Automatic cognition is characterised as being “implicit, unverbalized, rapid, 
and automatic” (DiMaggio 1997 p. 269), whereas deliberative cognition is “explicit, 
verbalized, slow, and deliberate” (DiMaggio 1997 p. 271). Moreover, DiMaggio argues that 
when humans use automatic cognition, they rely heavily on culturally available schemas in 
their interpretation. Hence, in automatic cognition there is a strong element of how culture 
moulds thought and actions. Further, he argues that people shift into deliberative modes of 
cognition when they solve problems or are strongly motivated to find new ways of dealing 
with their experiences. A related concept to DiMaggio’s automatic cognition is found in the 
Hungarian philosopher Michael Polanyi’s ((1966) 2000 p. 4) reference to “the tacit 
dimension.” Polanyi wrote that we should acknowledge that “We know more than we tell.” 
Tacit knowledge refers to pre-linguistic knowledge composed of sensory information and 
images that can be applied in an attempt to make sense of something. To translate this into 
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language and categories is problematic. It is like seeking to render something which, for the 
most part, is enacted outside of the realm of awareness and which is ambiguous and 
subconscious.  
 
In relation to my study, at one level of interpretation all the narratives of the heroin dealers 
and smugglers can be construed as expressions of deliberate cognition. This is because the 
narratives are the result of a story-making process, where some events have been edited out 
and other events given importance. Hence, the meaning of the different events has been added 
in hindsight. At another level of interpretation, I would argue that the offenders often 
displayed automatic cognition in the interviews. Due to the absence of frequent pauses or a 
slow reflective approach, I sometimes got the feeling that the offenders were retelling a story 
which they had told many times before. The point is that a narrative can be interpreted as 
deliberate cognition, because it is verbally expressed and has been thought through. Some 
narratives have been told so many times by the same person that they become automatic in 
expression. At the same time, I would argue that deliberate cognition also involves the use of 
schematic knowledge in the form of established vocabularies of motives.           
 
Another related question which is addressed in narrative analyses of crime is how agency is 
expressed verbally and in what way the offenders express personal responsibility for their 
illegal actions. Patricia O’Connor (1995, 2000) and Johan P. McKendy (2006) analysed the 
language structure of offenders’ self-narratives to elaborate different degrees of personal 
responsibility. Both researchers assessed that to claim personal responsibility for one’s actions 
is the first step toward a different lifestyle and also the starting point for a therapeutic dialog. 
O`Connor (1995, 2000) focused on expressions such as, “I do not know what made me kill 
him.” She saw the placement of the verb and the breaking of the story frame as identifying the 
different grammatical and linguistic constructions of agency and personal responsibility in the 
offenders’ narratives. Influenced by the American philosopher Charles Taylor, these studies 
define agency as:  
 
An agent not only as partly responsible for what he does, for the degree to 
which he acts in line with his evaluations, but also as responsible in some 
sense for these evaluations (Taylor 1985 p. 28).   
 
There is a distinction in the use of the concept of agency in narrative studies of crime and in 
the sociology of culture. In narrative studies of crime, the concept of agency draws attention 
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to the personal responsibility that is inherent in the human ability to reflect on our own 
actions. In the sociology of culture, for example, in Sewell’s (1992 p. 21) work, the concept of 
agency draws attention to people’s knowledge and creative use of cultural schemas. Applying 
this perspective, heroin dealers and smugglers are not only responsible for how they act but 
also for the way in which they evaluate their own actions. At the same time, the question is 
how creatively can they use different motives and explanations for their illegal actions.    
 
O’Connor (1995, pp. 430-431) analysed the reflexive nature of the different utterances of 
offenders. From these different utterances, she developed a continuum of personal 
responsibilities that run from claiming agency (“I killed him”), to problematizing agency (“It 
might be my instinct that made me kill him”), to deflecting agency (“I had no choice; I had to 
kill him”). Additionally, O’Connor argues that when the offenders place themselves in this 
continuum, they establish themselves as humans expressing different degrees of agency. 
Thus, claiming agency is a position that permits a therapeutic dialog and acts as the starting 
point for rehabilitation. McKendy (2006) studied what he calls “narrative debris”: pauses, 
false sentences, and switches between different story frames. He used this to show how 
difficult it is for the offenders to present themselves as victims and while simultaneously 
expressing their agency and taking responsibility for their actions. 
 
Applied to this study, these questions arise: What type of agency expressions are found within 
the heroin smugglers and dealers different narratives? Do different types of agency 
expressions reveal different types of personal responsibilities? Additionally, what can 
different personal responsibilities reveal about the heroin smugglers and dealers’ reform 
potential?  
 
Narratives of addiction 
 
“Junk takes everything and gives nothing but insurance against junk sickness.” 
Burroughs ((1953) 2002 p. 125) 
 
The social scientists Dorte Hecksher (2006), James McIntosh and Neil McKeganey (2000), 
and Vilma Hänninen and Anja Koski-Jännes (1999) all apply narrative analysis to study 
changes in social identity, from addiction to non-addiction. An important assumption in these 
studies is that for treatment and rehabilitation to be successful, a person with an addiction 
needs to reconstruct his or her view of self. These constructions of new identities are analyzed 
77 
 
through a narrative approach to their stories of recovery from addiction. Hänninen and Koski-
Jännes (1999) were strongly influenced by Frank’s (1997) study of illness, and they 
constructed five different key narratives that describe the different roads out of addiction: “the 
AA story,” “the growth story,” “the co-dependence story,” “the love story” and “the mastery 
story.” Further, Hänninen and Koski-Jännes (1999 p. 1847) argue that the different narratives 
identified in the data show that there are a variety of problems that lead to addiction. 
Similarly, there are many different roads to recovery. Hecksher (2006) is influenced by 
Hänninen and Koski-Jännes (1999), nonetheless, she identifies four alternative narratives of 
recovery. Moreover, Hecksher (2006) is, to a larger extent than Hänninen and Koski-Jännes 
(1999), concerned with which narrative will prove stable over time. In other words, which 
narrative will lead to continued non-addictive behaviour? Oddly enough, considering the 
inspiration of Frank’s (1997) studies, neither Hecksher (2006) nor McIntosh and McKeganey 
(2000), nor Hänninen and Koski-Jännes (1999) initiate a critical discussion of the medical 
discourse and practices which influence the different narratives.    
 
Applied to this study, some interesting question can be raised: How do the heroin dealers 
express their agency in relation to their experience of their own addiction? Do they express 
themselves as rational and responsible individuals, or do they express themselves as 
controlled by their hunger for heroin? And in what way are their experiences of their 
addiction connected to the issue of dealing drugs? 
 
The offenders narratives and the judicial practices link:  Plot and 
motivation 
 
“The different reasons men give for their actions are not themselves without reasons.” 
(C. Wright Mills 1940 p. 904) 
The aforementioned narrative framework gives a rich conceptual toolbox for studying the 
interconnectedness between language and social identity, but how can a narrative approach 
help to investigate the feedback loop between the offenders’ narratives and the judicial 
practices? I will elaborate on this question by bringing attention to the concepts of plot and 
motivation.   
 
In narrative theory, as mentioned earlier, plots are construed as the intention of a narrative 
(Polkinghorne 1988 p. 13). In other words, a plot is that which shapes and gives a story its 
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central meaning. Similarly, Paul Ricoeur (1991 p. 167) defines the plot as “the intelligible 
whole that governs a successions of event in any story.” A central point for Ricoeur (1991) is 
that the plot’s function is to connect the different events being told into an integrated story. A 
parallel argument is made by social psychologist, Jerome Bruner (2003 p. 41), who argues 
that the drive behind telling a biographical narrative is to express some type of agency, in the 
sense that the storyteller describes how autonomous events are created and bound together 
through his or her intent. In this case it is the storyteller’s motivation and intentions that cause 
different actions. The opposition to an agency-driven narrative is what Bruner (2003 p.41) 
labels “victimicy.” This is a narrative in which the storyteller constructs a victim self, a self 
which only responds to the agency of someone else or to the circumstances in which they are 
compelled to live. Applied to this study, and parallel to the mentioned neutralization 
techniques, the offenders tell victim narratives, where forces beyond the storytellers’ control 
drive the story forward. The question is raised: If the plot of the offenders narrative constructs 
a victim self, can it be said to contain a motivation or intent for criminal activities? 
 
In his classic contribution to sociology, Max Weber defined motives as a “complex of 
meaning which appears to the actor himself or to the observer to be an adequate ground for 
conduct” (Weber 1964 p. 98-9). Applying Weber’s definition of motives, what would be the 
adequate ground for conduct seen from both the offender’s and the observer’s point of view? 
Would their views be similar, and are the offenders not viewing themselves from an 
observer’s point of view when they are retelling a story about their past? Weber’s definition 
of motives has met substantial criticism. One of the most influential criticisms came from 
Alfred Schutz ((1932) 1967). Embedding his most basic sociological concepts in a 
phenomenological understanding of consciousness, Schutz’s main project was to get to the 
temporal process by which actors build up the meaning of their actions. Thus, Schutz ((1932) 
1967 p. 86) argues that Weber does not adequately differentiate between the context of 
meaning which the actor subjectively feels is the ground for his or her actions and that context 
of meaning which the observer supposes is the ground of the actor’s behavior.  
 
To deal with the temporal issues of motives, Schutz ((1932) 1967 p. 89) introduces two 
different concepts: “in-order-to motives” and “because-of motives.” In planning a future 
action, Schutz argues that a person relies on the reflective act of projection. Through such 
reflectivity, the person imagines a project as completed in the future. This establishes the in-
order-to motive of that person’s action. By contrast, a person’s because-of motives consist of 
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social and historical factors that influence the decision to embark upon the project. These 
social factors can only be discovered by hindsight through the act of investigating those past 
factors that preceded the past decision. To illustrate the difference in because-of motives and 
in-order-to motives, Schutz uses an example drawn from the study of deviance:    
 
But suppose I say that a murderer perpetrated his crime for money. This is an 
in-order-to statement. But suppose I say that the man became a murderer 
because of the influence of bad companions. This statement is of an order 
quite different from the first. What our second statement does is to take a past 
event- namely, the murder --and connect this with an event still further back 
in the past, namely, the influence of bad companions.[…]The difference, 
then, between the two kinds of motives as expressed in our two statements is 
that the in-order-to motive explains the act in terms of the project, while the 
genuine because-motive explains the project in terms of the actor’s past 
experiences (Schutz (1932) 1967 p. 91). 
 
Schutz’s distinction between two different motives draws attention to the temporal aspects of 
motives. Moreover, Schutz’s work on motives has been criticized for containing some 
“crucial ambiguity” (see Bernstein 1976 and Campbell 1996). The sociologist, Colin 
Campbell (1996 p. 105) questions whether actors need to be aware of their because-of 
motives before they can be construed as motives. Further, Campbell (1996) points out that 
Schutz might confuse intentions with in-order-to-motives. Applied to this study, it is 
important to recognize that all of the offenders’ stories are constructed in hindsight, so that 
their in-order-to motives are difficult to access. This does not imply that offenders, in 
everyday life situations, do not have in-order-to motives or intentions, only that these are 
challenging to access. One way to access in-order-to motives or intentions would be to ask 
people their intentions before or during the process of the act. Another way to access these 
motives would be to ask people to draw distinctions between what they think at different 
times. In the latter case, the individual would still be answering from a retrospective point of 
view. In other words, what happened in the minds of the offenders at the time of their illegal 
actions is interpreted from the point of view of the here and now. Notwithstanding the many 
fine distinctions that could be drawn between the concept of in-order-to motives and the 
concept of intention, I put forward that in narratives of drug crimes, they are referring to the 
same issue: What was going on in the mind of the offender at the time of the alleged crime?  
 
The main point is that when the offenders see themselves in light of their because-of motives, 
they see themselves through a result of their socio-economic determents and downplay the in-
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order-to motives. This is important because in a court of law, the establishment of the 
offender’s intent is crucial.  
 
Johannes Andenæs (1965 p. 192) argues that a fundamental principle in judicial logic is that a 
crime needs to have both a mental and a physical element. The concept of  mens rea, which is 
the Latin term for “guilty mind,” refers to a person’s awareness of the fact that his or her 
conduct is criminal; hence, there is a mental element. The concept actus reus refers to the act 
itself; hence, there is a physical element. In other words, to be guilty of most crimes, a 
defendant must have committed the criminal act (actus reus) in a certain mental state (mens 
rea). For example, the mens rea of transporting heroin would be to knowingly carry the 
heroin across the border, whereas carrying heroin unknowingly across the border would not 
constitute a crime.   
 
Lyman and Scott (1989 p. 149) argue that that there are two specific problems when a 
successful prosecution rests on showing that the deviant actors intended to commit the crime 
and foresaw the consequences of that act. First, with reference to Schutz’s ((1932) 1967) 
understanding of motives, the problem is the establishment of the intent of the defendant at 
the time of the act. The problem here is that the courts must detach the act’s purpose and its 
consequences. Failure to recognize temporality often leads to misinterpretations of action, as 
when a court assumes that the outcome of an act may have been its motive without 
considering the actor’s in-order-to motive. Due to unforeseen events, the motive may have 
been adjusted or may have led to results contrary to those intended. Second, there is a span of 
consequences for which the defendant should be held responsible. Hence, Lyman and Scott 
(1987 p 145) argue that the courts must deal with the “mind-reading problem of intent.” 
Judicial logic, by insisting on mens rea, opens its practices to the problematic situation of 
ascertaining and evaluating the defendant’s motives and intention. The judicial rhetoric (law) 
can be construed as an inventory of intentions, which are in fact excuses or justifications for 
alleged crimes (Lyman and Scott 1987 p. 154). 
 
Applied to this study some central question become: What types of motives do the heroin 
dealers and smugglers express? Do they express in-order-to motives or because-of motives for 
their illegal activities? Are different motives embedded in different ways, in different 
narratives? How are different types of motivations related to different types of agency 
expressions in the offenders’ narratives? And are any of the offenders’ motives, manifest in 
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the judicial practices and viewed as legitimate, whereas others are evaluated as illegitimate by 
the judges?   
 
Summary: What can narrative analysis contribute to the study of heroin 
smuggling and dealing? 
 
In light of the two previous sections and as a summary, I will elaborate here on the following 
question: What can narrative analysis contribute to the study of heroin smuggling and 
dealing? I will base my argument on the following five points: (1) Narrative analysis brings 
the construction of identity to the center of the study. (2) Narrative analysis provides a rich 
conceptual “toolbox” for studying the interconnectedness between language and social 
identity. (3) Narrative analysis gives comprehension to collective and/or cultural components 
of identity constructions. (4) Narrative analysis in combination with a conceptualization of 
motives provides a base to study the interconnectedness between the offenders’ narratives and 
the judicial practices.  (5) Narrative analysis offers a limited understanding of social practices. 
 
 
Narrative analysis brings the construction of social identity to the center of the study.  
By applying narrative theory, I take for granted that identities are socially constructed and do 
not aim at proving this point; however, I seek to clarify in what way this construction is 
achieved. A central assumption in narrative studies of crime is that offenders’ identities (for 
example, heroin dealers and smugglers) promote illegal behavior, and similarly offenders’ 
narratives endorse offending behavior. The process of sanctioning is here viewed as a central 
element in this process. A narrative approach shares an understanding of social identities as 
constructed with a street-level ethnographical approach to drug dealing, and it draws upon the 
same classical sociological theories to understand this process. However, where the 
aforementioned street-level drug studies often understand this identity formation within the 
frames of the subculture, these narrative studies on crime, illness, and addiction seek wider 
frames of references for this process, such as subculture and conventional norms and values, 
institutionalized practices, and ideologies. Compared to previous studies conducted on upper-
level drug dealing/trafficking, which primarily focus on how this activity is organized, a 
narrative approach gives a totally new contribution, because issues of identity formation are 
not explicitly addressed in relation to upper-level drug dealers/traffickers. 
 
82 
 
Narrative analysis provides a rich conceptual “toolbox” for studying the 
interconnectedness between language and social identity.  
By applying concepts such as “story,” “plot” and “temporal markers” to the stories told by 
heroin smugglers and dealers, different narrative types can be identified, which might vary in 
regard to expressions of agency and personal responsibilities. Thus, the narratives that the 
heroin dealers and smugglers tell can be interpreted as negotiation of identity and as 
management techniques that minimize stigma, disavow deviance and stress the inherent 
normality of the offenders as individuals. A narrative approach shares a focus on the symbolic 
aspects of interaction with the street-level drug-dealing studies mentioned above; however, 
the subculture theories emphasize structural explanations for the development of subcultures 
and hence do not provide conceptualizations of motives and personal responsibilities.  
 
Compared to the studies done on upper-level dealing/trafficking, a narrative approach 
represents an epistemological rupture because the stories told by the offenders and the other 
judicial sources such as criminal statistics and judicial decisions are not viewed as mirroring 
the social reality of dealing/trafficking, but used to study identity formations and how 
different “thrusts” about heroin dealing and smuggling are created and recreated.       
 
Narrative analysis gives comprehension to collective and/or cultural components of 
identity constructions.  
Although individuals create their own stories, they do so on the basis of a culturally available 
and established repertoire for storytelling. Thus, when heroin smugglers and dealers give 
explanations for their illegal activities, they draw on a culturally established “vocabulary of 
motives.” Hence, a narrative approach is useful in addressing the question of how individuals 
use this repertoire in their storytelling and moreover how this “vocabulary of motives” gets 
established through institutional practices. Compared to a traditional ethnographical approach, 
which commonly aims at understanding drug use/dealing in the light of subcultural values and 
norms, a narrative approach aims at grasping wider frames of reference, collective 
representations, and a broader institutionalization of different narratives.  
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Narrative analysis in combination with a conceptualization of motives provides a base to 
study the interconnectedness between the offenders’ narratives and the judicial 
practices. 
By conceptualizing motives and drawing on contributions from narrative theory, general 
sociology and the internal perspective of the law, I can further investigate how the judicial 
definition of motives leads to various consequences for the defendants in heroin felonies, and 
explore in what ways the selective functions of the courts are connected to the types of stories 
and motives which are viewed as legitimate by the judges.  
 
Compared to the previously mentioned ethnographical studies, which often stress a distance 
from the judicial perspective, this narrative study aims at understanding the interplay between 
the offenders’ narratives and the judicial practices. In the ethnographical approaches the 
judicial practices are often taken for granted, as the framework, which surrounds the field of 
drug dealing, make the activity illegal, and hence could further stigmatize the drug dealers. 
However, the mentioned ethnographical studies does not offer any detailed studies of the 
specifics of the judicial logic and rhetoric’ in drug felonies, or how judicial logic could 
differentiate between different drug dealers and smugglers’ stories. Moreover, this could 
affect the punishment issued in drug felonies and the possible stigmatization process of 
various sanctions placed upon drug dealers and smugglers. Hence, the ethnographical studies, 
based on the drug dealers’ lives on the street, do not contribute to the knowledge of what 
happens when the drug dealer gets arrested and sanctioned, which are of essence in this 
study’s narrative approach.   
 
Compared to the mentioned studies done on upper level drug dealing/trafficking, which rely 
on judicial sources to study the organizational aspects of drug crime, this narrative approach 
focus on how the judicial practices establish “thrust” and “knowledge” about drug crime, 
hence, how the judicial practices’ knowledge generating is connected to the type of stories 
that are told by the offenders in drug felonies, and how these stories are ratified by the judges. 
Moreover, the sanctions placed on the offenders could affect their narratives and social 
identities.  
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Narrative analysis offers a limited understanding of social practices of heroin dealing 
and smuggling.      
If one seeks to give a detailed and broad analysis of how heroin dealing and smuggling are 
done in practice, a narrative approach does not offer much support, because it exaggerates the 
symbolic and communicative aspects of human actions and interaction at the expense of 
understanding the social practices of heroin dealing and smuggling. Although a narrative 
approach can bring attention to the process of strategically used narratives by heroin 
smugglers and dealers and the processes of stigmatization as a result of sanctions placed on 
the offenders, it does not aim to provide evidence as to how heroin smuggling and dealing is 
done in practice. Thus, narrative analysis is often based on qualitative face-to-face interviews, 
written/spoken biographical stories, and/or documents/texts. Describing in breadth and detail 
how drug use and dealing is done in practice is the supreme strength of the aforementioned 
ethnographical approaches. Paradoxically, the upper-level dealing/trafficking studies 
discussed above, which seek to understand the organizational aspect, seldom use an 
ethnographical approach; instead, they base their knowledge on sources generated from 
within the judicial discourse.     
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5. The offenders narratives: Introduction 
 
I have identified four key narratives in the data that vary in regard to structure, agency-
expression and personal responsibilities. The narratives fall into the following categories: 
victims of social injustice, victims of organized crime, victims of addiction and entrepreneurs. 
I plan to first present each narrative type in four different chapters, beginning with their 
narrative form. Secondly, I will discuss the different motives and plots found in each 
narrative. Thirdly, I will elaborate on how different expressions of self found in these 
narratives relate to personal responsibilities.  
 
By labelling the stories as victim’s narratives, I want to draw attention to the different ways in 
which the offenders discuss their deviant identities. When they offer explanations for their 
illegal activities, they are trying to ease their situation, with the goal of maintaining or 
restoring their own sense of personal worth (see also Mills 1940, Lyman and Scott 1989). 
According to the Oxford Dictionary the concept of “victim” is given three central meanings. 
First, it refers to a person who is acted upon by a force or agent outside of him or herself. 
Second, the concept of victim refers to persons who have been treated unjustly, subjected to 
hardship and oppression. Third, the concept refers to persons who have been tricked or duped. 
These three definitions correspond to the central meaning and self- constructions expressed in 
the three victim’s narratives. By highlighting the victim self constructions found in these 
narratives, the context of the interviews is also brought into focus: the prison and prior police 
investigations, court cases and sentencing. 
 
The moral confrontations, police interrogations and long court cases that the offenders have 
experienced are the events that constitute the stories being told. Moreover, these sanctions and 
moral confrontations might “force” the offenders to tell coherent stories about themselves that 
are adapted to the logic and rhetoric of the legal system. In developing a general narrative 
theory, Polkinghorne (1988 p. 153) argues, “People strive to organize their temporal 
experiences into meaningful wholes and to use the narrative form as a pattern for uniting the 
events of their lives.” This general notion of people wanting to create meaningful, coherent 
stories about themselves might be amplified when the storyteller meets the judicial discourse 
and practices. Obviously, when one`s creditability is being judged, it becomes important to 
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keep one`s story straight. This is even a demand in most court cases. A similar point has been 
made by the sociologists Stanford M. Lyman and Marvin B. Scott (1989 p. 150) who argue: 
“The language of law -- like a magical incantation -- creates the illusion of consistency and 
coherence.”  
 
A striking characteristic of the offenders’ stories, as mentioned in the method chapter, is their 
consistency.  Not only were the offenders coherent storytellers, in many cases the stories were 
told in monologue form. The transcripts of the interviews are a good illustration of this. The 
offender`s words would often fill up a whole page, and I would only get in small follow-up 
questions like: “Yes?” “No?” or “And then what happened?” One question then becomes: 
Does this expressed coherency imply that the offenders only told one out of the four 
narratives? Or did they combine elements out of the four different narratives? It is important 
to recognize that all the stories of the offenders are unique. Moreover, in most cases the 
offenders only used one style of narrative, but, at other times, the offenders would switch 
between two different accounts. For example, the narrative of the victim of social injustice 
was told in combination with that of the victim of organized crime.  
 
One might ask why then, at the risk of downplaying the uniqueness of the individual’s story, 
do I put forward these four key narratives and suggest that individual stories will somehow fit 
one type or another? I would argue that the benefit is two –fold. First, by elaborating the 
forms of the different accounts, four new generalist narrative structures are put forward. 
Second, identifying four different narratives makes it possible to address the questions of why 
and how the narratives have been constructed.  
 
To clarify, if the offenders have told stories of excuses and justifications in court, they 
continue to retell these stories while they are serving their sentence. On an individual level the 
three victim narratives identified in the data material can be interpreted as stories, which is 
part of the offenders’ negotiations to restore their spoiled identities and reduce their feelings 
of guilt. These narratives can also be construed as strategic arguments constructed from the 
culturally established “vocabulary of motives” with the aim of reducing one’s own 
culpability. It is not in itself problematic that the offenders tell stories of justifications and 
excuses. However, seen from a governmental point of view, relating victims’ narratives 
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makes rehabilitation difficult, because it is argued that the first step toward a different lifestyle 
and the starting point for the therapeutic dialog is claiming personal responsibility. Seen from 
a governmental viewpoint, telling victim narratives is problematic, because they obscure 
personal responsibilities and hence, the offender’s rehabilitation potential. Additionally, it is 
problematic if the reason offenders give victim accounts is partly found within the judicial 
system itself, its logic, rhetoric and the way the offenders have been sanctioned. Interpreted 
from this point of view, the judicial system creates its own subjects, who are not capable of 
rehabilitation. This, of course, is contradictory to the purpose of the judicial system.   
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6. Victims of social injustice 
 
I have labelled the first style of narrative “victims of social injustice.” These offenders tell of 
how they ended up in jail as a result of their immigrant backgrounds and difficult integration 
history. Furthermore, this is a story about how the Norwegian government has failed the 
immigrant population, and how the police have made the situation worse by targeting and 
investigating, specific groups of Eastern European immigrants. Additionally, immigrants 
living in other Western European countries tell a similar story, where their immigrant status 
has made it difficult for them to integrate and to find good jobs. Generally speaking the 
couriers, receivers and holders tell “victims of social injustice” narratives. In the following I 
will elaborate on the structure of the narrative; its beginning, middle, and end by using parts 
of the interviews with Nizam, Mario, Fazal and Ivo. In the presentation of the narratives, I 
will follow the chronological order in which the stories were told in the interview. All four 
offenders are serving sentences of more than eight years. Both Nizam and Fazal are in their 
forties and serving sentences for transporting heroin. Nizam came to Norway as a refugee 
from an Eastern-European country; Fazal originally came from the same geographical area, 
but went as an immigrant to another Western-European country. Thus, Nizam is a Norwegian 
based courier, whereas Fazal claims he had never been to Norway before he was arrested at 
the border. Ivo and Mario are in their thirties and serving sentences for possession of large 
quantities of heroin. Both Ivo and Mario came to Norway as Eastern-European immigrants.  
The structure of the narrative can be illustrated in the following way:  
 
Figure 5. The beginning, middle and end part of the victim of social injustice narrative 
 
 
 
Outsider
Increased 
monetary 
demands
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The structure of the narrative 
 Beginning: Outsider 
 
The beginning of the narrative of social injustice is marked by the event of coming to Norway 
or another Western country as an immigrant or refugee. The offenders describe this as a 
difficult situation because, they did not know the language, did not know other people and did 
not have jobs. This is how Nizam starts his story:  
 
“I was a refugee, and if the state had made a priority of me when I came, I would not be 
sitting here today.  I came to Norway in 1989, so I am a Norwegian citizen. In the 
beginning we were two people that sheared an apartment. But I was really young then, 
only nineteen years old […]. You site and drink coffee or you workout, and then you go 
home. And outside of that you do not have contact with others. And out in the streets 
you do not have much contact with others either; maybe saying hello. I have never had 
much contact with Norwegians, only other immigrants. It means that you become 
outside of society, and when you are outside society, you start to reflect around 
integration. But if the society does not want you, you will not end up integrated. I did not 
manage this because I was young, naïve and did not know how to make contact with 
others. Of course, everybody thinks it’s nice the first time they speak with you, 
especially when you talk English, but when you tell people that you are from the East, a 
distance develops, and people pull away from you. In the beginning I did not find this so 
difficult, but when you experience it again and again, it becomes really difficult. You are 
being blocked by society, and when that happens, well, you find other friends. And those 
other friends or that network, well you go (down) stupid and bad roads.” 
 
A central issue in the victim of social injustice narrative is to establish the storyteller as an 
“outsider.” This topic is stressed from the beginning of the narrative, and the offenders 
emphasized the role of the government, which they claim is not taking its full responsibility 
for the immigrants or refugees. Because the immigrants and refugees were not given adequate 
help from the government, it made it even harder for them to find a decent job. Whether they 
have recently arrived or not, many members of ethnic minorities have a low social and 
economic position within their Western- European host societies and are often not well 
integrated. When the offenders telling the victim of social injustice narrative describe their 
problematic integration, this problem is not only connect to blocked opportunities to earn 
money, such as it is expressed in the classical sociological explanations of development of 
deviant subcultures (See Merton 1957, Cohen 1966, Cloward & Ohlin 1969), but also as a 
problematic integration into the Norwegian or Western-European “way of life.” Thus, the 
offenders are expressing that they felt exclude culturally and socially. The offenders also 
stress that they feel isolated from the rest of the population, because they do not speak the 
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local language, and often felt ostracized in social situations. The same subject is found in the 
opening of Ivo`s story:  
 
“Well I came to Norway in 1999 and started working in 2000. And in the beginning it 
was real hard work because,….because I did not get much help from the government. I 
started with construction work, and I did not know many people. The Norwegians were 
not really friendly or easy to come in contact with. I worked Monday through to Friday. 
At the same time, I had a Norwegian course Monday to Thursday, and, well, I only 
manage to grab something to eat before I went to school after work. But the job was not 
very well paid so I started working in a security company as a doorman at a nightclub, 
because it was hard to live off the wage from the construction work.”  
 
Both Ivo and Nizam describe how difficult it was to establish contacts with Norwegians in the 
beginning. Fazal, who was an immigrant in another Western-European country, starts his 
storytelling in a similar manner:   
 
“I was sent to my fifteen years older sister in X to get a better life. She and her husband 
could not have children. It was difficult. The family was isolated and had little contact 
with the local people in X. But it got better after a while and I got a job in a factory. I 
liked the job.”  
    
The central purpose of the opening events of the narrative is to launch the storyteller as agents 
struggling to integrate and find jobs. This situation is made difficult by a lack of support from 
the government and the local people. Compared to the classical sociological explanations of 
development of subcultures, the victim of social injustice, in addition to emphasizing blocked 
legal means to earn money, also stresses cultural and social exclusion. Nizam voices this 
argument clearly when he claims that the state had a responsibility toward him as a refugee, 
not only to help him economically and materialistic, but also to socialize him into Norwegian 
culture. 
 
Middle: Increased monetary demands   
 
The middle part of the narrative of social injustice is marked by an event that makes a difficult 
situation even worse. It is an event or set of events which increases the monetary demands on 
the storyteller. Nizam continues his story:    
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“When I got married my problems became bigger and bigger, especially the economical 
situation. The first seven or eight years in this country, I did not do anything wrong. It 
was only politics and studying. But when I got married and we had our first child, the 
thought about alternative ways of supporting the family occurred. And to be honest, you 
have to help the people at home with money too. They have paid for you coming to 
Europe, so then you have to pay back. That is only reasonable. You have to pay your 
debt-; it is not a traditional debt, but you owe your family something. So they expect that 
you pay them. It is no specific way that you pay, but because it is family, you have to pay 
more. They might have sold a house or a car to send you to Europe, so you have to pay 
them. So in a sense you get an unnecessary responsibility for them sending you here. All 
the time it is about money. And if you get a job here, it is not a good paid job. It is a 
cleaning job, a job at the take-a-way shop, or a restaurant job or a job in the commune. 
And if you work, it is hard to study, and then you will never get a better paid job. You 
are stuck. And on the top of that, you do not speak the language well enough either. You 
end up using one hour on something that demand two hours. And it is difficult to 
combine work and school. You need money both for your family here and the family 
down there.” 
 
Nizam describes the difficult spiral of monetary demands coupled with the lack of 
opportunities to earn money, which peaked when he got married. Hence, Nizam uses his 
breadwinner responsibility as an explanation for why the pressure for money increased. One 
way of interpreting this, following Merton’s strain theory (1957), is that ethnic minorities, 
sometimes even before reaching Norwegian or Western European ground, are wanting the 
same status symbols as native Norwegians or Western Europeans of the same generation, but 
they are lacking the means to fulfill their dreams. However the need for money expressed by 
the offender is far from the excessive need for money and status symbols describe in Adler’s 
(1985) ethnographical study of wholesale drug dealers and traffickers. The offenders express 
a need of money which is connected to making ends meet. Hence, the monetary demands 
from the family both in Norway and abroad is also a central issue in Ivo`s story:  
 
“It was not a real job, only a temporary job, until I could find something better. And 
then it happened; the security company I was working for went bankrupt. And I went to 
the employment exchange to apply for unemployment benefits. But there they inform 
me that my boss has only paid tax for me for two months, but he has taken it (taxes) off 
my wages the whole period. As an immigrant, what can I say? As an immigrant, you just 
have to sit there and shut up. I tried all that I could, but I could not find a job and live a 
normal life. It took many months before the process of bankruptcy ended, and I could 
prove that he (the boss) had pulled tax off my wages the whole time that I had worked 
for him. But in those months it was hard to survive. I easily help others, but for me it is 
hard to ask for help. So that is when things started to move in the wrong direction. So I 
was a bit desperate. But I did meet my girlfriend that I am planning to marry. It is true 
love. We did not have problems in our relationship but we had problems with the 
economy. It was hard for us. At the same time my parents in (X) were also struggling 
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with economical problems. That was also hard. When I visited my parents I realized 
that something tragic had happened. Everything was okay with my father and brother, 
but my mother was lying in bed, and I could hardly recognize her. Yes, she was a 
different person; she was that sick. I know that my mother is sick and need medication, 
and, of course, I do not tell them about my problems in Norway. My father has a job, so 
they can manage everyday life, but not anything extra like medicines for my mother. 
They did not have money […].”   
 
Similar to Ivo, who talks about the experience of having monetary demands from his family 
and getting laid off from work and, thereby, having acute economical problems, Fazal 
continues his story:  
 
“My real problems started when I got laid off from the factory. I tried and tried to get 
other jobs. But I was refused everywhere. At the same time I meet my new wife and she 
is ten years younger than me. We wanted to start our family. My wife became pregnant, 
and we got a new baby. But I had no way of supporting us.”    
 
The central meaning of the middle part of the narrative is to establish how a situation went 
from bad to worse, when monetary demands increased. However this need for money is not 
expressed as an exaggerated need for status symbols or excessive spending, but as being able 
to pay ones bills and provide for the family.   
 
Ending: Taking the offer to earn money illegally 
 
The ending of the narrative of social injustice is marked by the event of getting and taking the 
offer to earn money illegally.     
 
Nizam: “Of course you can say that the immigrants that are involved with politics are 
not involved with drugs, but there are people that are in politics, that think about profit, 
because they need money for their organizations. And they have contacts down there 
(where the drugs come from). And, of course, you are picked out because you live in 
Norway. And you do not have contact with others or friends so you do not know what 
other people do. That is how I got the offer.”  
 
Nizam claims the offer to earn money illegally came through contacts in his country of origin 
and through his political activities. He points out that he accepted this offer, because he was in 
acute need of money. Although Nizam does not came right out and say it, he is portraying a 
heroin import that has parallels to the earlier mentioned politico-military type, which is 
characterized by having an aim of restructuring the political field (see Dorn et al. 2005).  
However, Nizam does not deny the knowledge of the heroin. He explains his role in the 
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heroin trade as a courier who invested money and owned part of the heroin consignment. Ivo 
claims that the offer to get involved in drugs came through an acquaintance: 
“And then the offer came. It was from one that I know from before; he was a (X) too. I 
had met him a few times at X (the local club) and he had given me some cocaine. When I 
met him, I told him that A (his girlfriend) and I were looking for a smaller and cheaper 
apartment, because we did not have much money. And I asked if he either knew about a 
cheaper apartment or somebody that could live with me and A to cover owner expenses. 
And then he came with the offer, if I could keep some amphetamine for him. Of course, I 
did not want to keep it in the apartment, but I had a garage. So I said yes to keep a 
deposit of amphetamines. But it was really bad drugs, as he said. It needs to be dried, 
and repacked. So I thought for a while, and then I said yes. I was supposed to get 10, 000 
kr (Norwegian crowns) for the job.”  
 
A central point in Ivo`s story is that he only said “yes” to amphetamine. He explains later that 
he agreed to store hashish, but he did not agree to store heroin. The denial of the knowledge 
of heroin is also central in Fazal`s story: 
 
“I took contact with everybody I know and told them about my difficult economical 
situation, friend and friend’s friend, and through the local club for X. Through an 
acquaintance I got the offer of transporting a packet of hashish through from Germany 
to Demark in my own car. I accepted. So I brought my wife and two-month-old child. 
My wife did not know anything. I only told her that we were going on vacation.” 
 
 
The ending events of the narrative explain how the storyteller got involved in the drug trade. 
In all of the offenders telling victims of social injustice narrative, the offer to earn money 
illegally came through contacts within the offenders’ own ethnic groups. However the image 
they create of how this is “organized” is different. Ivo and Fazal stress that the organizer was 
business oriented, whereas Nizam claims that the organizers were connected to political 
activity. In the case of Fazal and Ivo, the offer to transport and hold drugs does not mark the 
end of their stories. However, it marks the point in which, they switch to another telling 
frame; they start telling the narrative of a victim of organized crime. In other words, the end 
point of the narrative of social injustice marks the starting point of telling the narrative victim 
of organized crime for both of them. It can be illustrated in this manner: 
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Figure 6. Relationship between two narratives  
 
In the next chapter I will return to the victim of organized crime narrative, and the rest of Ivo 
and Fazal`s stories. 
 
Plot and Motivation: Failed integration 
 
“The different reasons men give for their actions are not themselves without reasons.” 
(C. Wright Mills 1940 p. 904) 
 
In narrative theory, and as mentioned in the theory chapter, plots are construed as the 
intention of a narrative (Polkinghorne 1988 p. 13). Moreover, plots that are not agency driven 
can be construed as a narrative where the storyteller constructs a victim self. This is a self 
which only responds to the agency of somebody else or to the circumstances in which they are 
compelled to live (Bruner 2003 p. 41). As expressed in the story told by Nizam, Mario, Fazal 
and Ivo, the plot of the narrative of victim of social injustice can be construed in that the 
failed integration and exclusion from the legal labor market led to criminal activity. In other 
words, there were forces beyond the storytellers’ control that drove the story forward. One 
question then remains: If the plot of the victims of social injustice narrative constructs a 
victim self, can it be said to contain a motivation or intent for the criminal activities? 
 
Following Schutz’s ((1932) 1967) concepts as introduced in the theory chapter, the question 
becomes: Are there any because-of motives or in-order-to motives expressed in the narrative?  
In the narrative of social injustice, the offenders are underlining their because-of motives, i.e. 
their problematic integration history. Hence, the offenders are using their because-of motives 
consciously in constructing a retrospective story. But what about the acute need for money 
that the offenders expressed? Can this be interpreted as an in-order-to motive? I would argue 
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that the acute need for money gets its meaning from the previous events told in the narrative. 
As mentioned in the theory chapter, the sequence in which events occur in a narrative can 
often make a stronger impression on the listener than the events themselves. Hence, the acute 
need for money draws its meaning from the previous events that described the offenders’ 
difficult situations as immigrants. The main point is that, when the offenders see themselves 
in light of their because-of motives, they see themselves as a result of their socio-economic 
determents and downplay the in-order-to motives. This is important, because in a court of law, 
the establishment of the offender’s intent is crucial.  
 
As mentioned in the theory chapter, the establishment of the defendant’s intention at the time 
of the act is of great importance, in deciding whether or not he or she acted with a criminal 
intent (mens rea-“guilty mind”) (See Andenæs 1965). The court must establish what was 
going on in the mind of the offender at the time of the crime, and show that the defendant 
intended to commit the crime and foresaw the consequences of that act. In the victim of social 
injustice narrative, the offenders, by focusing on their because-of motives, highlight their 
explanations or the reasons for their deviant actions, and downplay their criminal intent at the 
time of the act. However, as C. Wright Mills (1940) has pointed out, to offer reasons or 
accounts for one activity requires a vocabulary of motive to guide one’s self-presentation. 
 
Agency-expressions: Responding and respectable self 
 
As previously mentioned, the main self-expression found in the narrative of social injustice is 
a responding self. This was a common feature in the stories told by Nizam, Fazal, Mario and 
Ivo. The following quote from Mario elaborates this concept:  
“A hungry stomach thinks about food; that it needs to be fed. And if you are hungry, 
and somebody gives you food, you accept and are happy for the offer. This is only a 
metaphor that I use. It does not mean that we were hungry; everybody in Norway can 
eat, and we got a welfare system. But we see that there are so big differences between 
people. Of course it is important with differences, but the differences are between 
Norwegians and immigrants, and that is way it is so easy for the immigrants to get 
involved in these things and not only drugs. The problem is that the immigrants don`t 
have contact with Norwegians.” 
 
Mario explicitly blames his lack of integration and, thereby, his status as an immigrant for his 
involvement in the heroin trade. Mario, then, stresses his social and cultural exclusion, 
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alongside an economical disadvantage. A similar self-expression is found in Nizam`s story, 
but he develops the argument even further by arguing that he did not get a fair trial because of 
his immigrant status. 
 
“Here in Norway you have the heaviest punishments in Europe. And yet people are lined 
up to serve their sentence. But it is not much crime in Norway, because you are only 
four million people. But if you play it guilty and say that you have done something 
wrong, they help you, at least the first time. But if you are serving a ten-years sentence, 
you only get problems and you get hatred. We are human; we have feelings, no matter 
what stupid thing we have done. But here in Norway, immigrants do not get a chance. 
There is no immigrant in the juries, so they (the jury) do not understand who I am. All 
they know is that they (the police) have taken heroin from me, and they think I am the 
worst. But if it had been an immigrant on the jury, he might have thought about what 
kind of life I have had here in Norway, and he can talk about that and I might get a 
lower punishment. For Norwegians it is different. Then they (the jury) just know more 
about that person. That they are sick, because they are addicts; that they have had a 
problematic childhood, and all that.” 
  
 
In this quote Nizam express a high awareness of the important role that the judicial system 
plays in legitimizing some narratives and discrediting others. Hence, he makes the connection 
between the account given by the offenders for their deviant behavior and the judicial 
practices influenced on them. Later in the interview, when I challenged Nizam’s 
understanding of his immigrant status, he moved his explanation from his ethnicity to an 
argument of marginalization that cut across ethnical lines.   
 
I: “When I hear you talk, I am thinking that the group you describe is without ethnic 
Norwegians, but where are the Norwegians?”  
Nizam: “Yes, of course, the Norwegians are important. Norwegians are our main 
customers. The people that invest money in the heroin import are also Norwegians, but 
what Norwegians are we talking about? It is Norwegians in the same situation as us; it is 
the Norwegians with problems. It is not only that they use heroin; we are talking about 
the real explanations of the problems now.”  
I: “Maybe you think this is a dumb or naive question, but I ask anyway. Why is it easier 
to establish contact and integrate yourself with criminal Norwegians than with law-
abiding Norwegians?”   
Nizam: “I do not think it is a dumb question but an interesting one, and it is because 
criminal Norwegians are outcasts. They have experienced problems maybe from 
childhood, with abusive parents or growing up in foster homes. They are in the same 
situation as us immigrants. The only advantage they have is the colour of their skin. But 
when you look at standards of living, the way they talk, dress and act, we are similar. 
They are on the same level as us. We have our different playing fields in the heroin 
trade, but it is easy for us to cooperate. As the French philosopher Bourdieu said: It is 
our habitus that makes it easy for us to cooperate and communicate. I know at once if a 
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person is bourgeois or not, and if it’s going to be easy or difficult for me to connect with 
him. We are in the same boat, immigrants and criminal Norwegians.” 
 
Nizam had studied sociology prior to his arrest, and was studying criminology in prison. His 
argument maintains a clear parallel to the classical sociological explanations of crime and 
deviant sub cultures, as a collective response to low position within the social structure (eg, 
Merton 1957, Cohen 1966, Cloward & Ohlin 1969). However, there is an obvious 
contradiction when Nizam uses the victim of social injustice narrative. On the one hand he 
projects himself as a victim of circumstances, but on the other hand, Nizam presents himself 
as a well-educated man who builds a sophisticated argument drawing on sociological 
explanations of crime. He also has the cultural capital to quote Bourdieu in an interview with 
a social scientist. Doesn’t this make it possible for him to connect with individuals from a 
wide range of social backgrounds? The point being that when processes of marginalization 
and exclusion, based on either class or ethnicity, are used on an individual level, they generate 
victim selves. When the offenders express a self which only responds to their social 
circumstances, their individual choices and moral responsibilities either vanish or are reduced.  
 
The type of argument that this is can be questioned. Does it imply that offenders are only 
responsible for their crimes if they, themselves, are self-made? Did they cause themselves to 
be the kind of persons that they are? Obviously, the offenders did not make themselves; are 
they, therefore not responsible for their deviant acts? I would argue that all humans are a 
product of their culture and environment. So does this mean that no one is ever responsible for 
anything? Does this mean that to be truly responsible in a way that allows justified 
punishment for actions, humans must be the ultimate sources or the first causes for the 
choices they make? But how can we be? How does judicial logic understand, intentions, 
motives and guilt? Does the judicial logic invite, from the offenders, a limited understanding 
of responsibility which stipulates that humans are responsible for their choices only if they 
cause their choices, and nothing or no one else contributes to the causes? The point here is 
that the judicial logic, through its focus on mens rea (guilty minds) opens up negotiations of 
valid /invalid intentions and mitigating circumstances when deciding on one’s culpability and 
punishment, which strongly affects the stories the offenders tell.  
 
Parallel to expressing a responding self, the offenders who tell the victim of social injustice 
narrative also express a responsible self.  Primarily, this is expressed as a responsibility 
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toward family members. As expressed in the comments of Fazal, Ivo and Nizam there was 
additional stress placed on them by their families’ expectations for money. Additionally, both 
Fazal and Ivo used a lot of time in the interview to project themselves as a good husband and / 
or boyfriend. Similarly, they both expressed different ways in which they tried to shelter their 
wife/ girlfriend from their illegal activities. In the following quote Ivo is talking about how, 
right before he got arrested, he had to balance the demands from his girlfriend, and the others 
in his network while the police were on his heels: 
“In the meantime A (his girlfriend) had left her job in a kindergarten and was in a shop 
where there was some meat on sale. And she wanted to shop some more meat if I could 
come and get her in the car. So I say yes. I need to get to the garage because I have 
already said that I was going to meet that other man there.  I do not like it; I had to 
deliver two packets (of drugs) and meet this man that I do not know at all, and I felt that 
I was been pulled into something I did not know anything about. But I thought it was 
better to get rid of the one packet, one less packet on my back. And there was a lot of 
thoughts, “buzz.” What should I do? Well, I pick up A, and, of course, I helped to carry 
all her shopping bags into our apartment and help her put the groceries away. At the 
same time, I know that the man had come (to pick up the drugs), and that time was 
running out. And then A asked: “What are you doing later? Can you drive me to town, 
to visit my mother?” (claps his hand and grins) I am fucked. Outside sits a man that I do 
not know, waiting for a drug delivery, and she asks if I can drive her to her mother! But 
we cannot go to the garage. How do I get out of this one? Of course I say, “Yes I can 
drive you!” Because, otherwise, I have to answer why I cannot drive her to her mother. 
Fuck, fuck.” 
 
Labelling offenders as criminals, as court cases and presiding punishment does, casts the 
offenders into deviant identities. One way of interpreting the self expressions found in the 
victim of social injustice is as part of the process of identity negotiations which the labelled 
criminal initiates. Hence, in the offenders’ narratives, they are trying to reestablish a socially 
acceptable identity by referring to themselves as either victims of social circumstances or 
good husbands, boyfriends and sons.   
 
In sociology the concept of “vocabularies of motives” was first introduced by C. Wright Mills 
(1940) to capture the language used by people to describe their motivation and their “account” 
of their actions. According to the sociologists, Austin Sarat and William Felstiner (1988 p. 
737), Mills’ examination of the vocabularies of motives “link the study of linguistic behavior 
with social structure; it related the attribution of motives to the interests, patterns of power 
and social positions that give rise to particular ways of talking about social relations and 
planning human action” (Sarat and Felstiner 1988 p.737). The concept of “accounts,” then, 
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refers to a culturally established process by which the labelled deviant can be removed or 
avoided.  
 
Mills’ ideas have been further developed by Lyman and Scott (1989 p. 134), who argue that 
there are two types of accounts: excuses and justifications. These two concepts are defined as 
follows: 
 
Excuse is an admission that the act in question was bad, wrong, or inept, 
coupled with a denial of full responsibility. A justification is an admission of 
full responsibility for the act in question, coupled with a denial that it was 
wrongful (Lyman and Scott 1989 p. 135).  
 
 
Further, Lyman and Scott (1989 p. 155) point out that accounts not only restore the 
individual’s ego, but also restore that set of social identities that humans present in everyday 
life. Similarly, Pogrebin et al. (2006 p. 498) have argued that negotiations of accounts are 
really negotiations of identity, management techniques that minimize stigma. Accounts, then, 
serve as a management technique, which minimizes the threat to identity. 
 
Applied to the narrative of social injustices, this technique can be interpreted as an excuse 
account. The offenders do not dispute that the act of dealing in large quantities of heroin is 
wrong; rather, they offer explanations as to how and why they ended up in such a position in 
their previous experiences-- their status as immigrants. The victim of social injustice narrative 
eases their situation, and restores dignity by pointing out the injustice of their situation. The 
main point is that the narrative disavows deviance, and stresses the inherent normality of the 
offenders as individuals.  
 
Personal responsibilities: Not guilty 
A central point for Mills’ (1940) was to capture the ways in which people talk about their 
motives, particularly in social contexts. Motivational talk is usually part of a wider ideology. 
So that, for example, certain stated motives will be much more successful in some contexts 
than in others. Hence, motivational statements are relative. A parallel argument is found in 
Lyman and Scott’s (1989 p. 153) contribution, where they argue that individuals who come 
from marginalized groups needs to express their presentations in front of the holders of 
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power. Further, they claim that punishments are most likely in those situations where they 
cannot successfully negotiate their accounts. As mentioned, a central context of the offender’s 
stories is the prison and their previous court cases. Their emphasis on excuses can be 
construed as a means of negotiating their culpability. Broadly speaking, it is as if they are still 
in the court room delivering their defense. There is, however, a distinction to be drawn 
between guilt as a legal concept and guilt as a moral concept. Andenæs (1965) has argued that 
the two concepts usually follow one another, but not in all cases. For example a person can act 
in line with his/her conscience, but still break the law.  
 
A central question then becomes: Is the offering of an excuse account an indicator that the 
offenders do, or do not experience moral guilt? One on hand, the victim of social injustice 
narrative places the responsibility of the crime on the social structure and away from himself. 
This could be interpreted as dissolution of personal responsibility. On the other hand, the need 
for expressing an excuse account could be interpreted as an expression of guilt. Sigmund 
Freud ((1930) 1962) argues that guilt serves to effectively regulate social behavior. If people 
did not feel guilty, they would be much less likely to care about hurting other`s feelings or 
damaging their property. Regardless of whether guilt or shame is consciously felt by the 
offenders, they may offer accounts in the hope of lessening what could be the attributes of a 
deviant identity. 
 
The question of guilt is further important because a central question with labeling theory 
(shame theory) is whether shaming provokes offending, hinders it or has no effect at all (see 
Presser 2008 p. 146). Seen from this perspective, the expression of guilt is interconnected 
with the offenders’ potential for being reformed. On the one side John Braithwaite (1989) 
extended the labeling theory by arguing that labeling/shaming increases crime in some 
circumstances and reduces it in others. Moreover, he argues that shaming increases crime 
when no effort is made to reintegrate the offender back into conventional society, hence, 
when the offenders are rejected or informally labelled on a long term basis. However labeling 
can reduce reoffending if efforts are made to reintegrate punished offenders back into society. 
This requires a type of labeling which makes the offenders feel a sense of shame or guilt for 
what they have done, but are eventually forgiven and reintegrated into society. On the other 
side, James Gillian (1997) believes that labeling/shaming offenders can lead to violence, 
because the shamed person seeks to get rid of shame and attain justice; hence shaming might 
lead to reoffending.   
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One important question then become: Are there any signs as to a reformed offender expressed 
within the victim of social injustice narrative? Following Presser’s (2008) concepts as 
introduced in the theory chapter, of reform, stability or elastic narrative. I would argue that the 
victim of social injustice narrative can be construed as a stability narrative, because it does not 
include references to any type of reform. On the contrary, the storytellers express that they 
acted with regard to moral principal, because for the most part, they behaved decently, and 
when they did not it was because of an unjust social and economical situation.   
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7. Victims of organized crime 
 
“I am gonna make him an offer he can`t refuse.” 
(The Godfather, Francis Ford Coppola) 
 
I have labelled the second type of narrative as victims of organized crime. This narrative 
describes accounts of how the offenders ended up in jail, because they were tricked, lured or 
manipulated into the heroin trade. The concept of organized crime, as elaborated in the theory 
chapter, often refers to criminal activity of some duration with a type of organization that has 
the capacity to exert violence and /or corruption (Dorn et al. 2005). Hence, this is a story 
about how the heroin trade is controlled by people outside of Norway, people associated with 
liberation struggles and guerrilla warfare, who also control different governments and the 
police through bribes and force. Moreover, there are some striking parallels between the 
victim of organized crime narrative and the organized crime perspective described in the 
theory chapter.  Broadly speaking this narrative is told by the bosses, couriers, receivers, and 
holders, and can be told in combination with the narrative of social injustice. In the following 
I will elaborate the beginning, middle part and ending of the narrative by using part of the 
interviews with Boris, Kamil, Adrian, Fazal and Ivo. Additionally, Ivana, whom I introduced 
in the method chapter, also told a victim of organized crime narrative. Boris, Kamil and 
Adrian are based in Norway, and they are all serving sentences of more than eight years for 
possession of large quantities of heroin. Boris and Adrian came to Norway as immigrants 
from Eastern-Europe and are both in their forties, whereas Kamil came as an immigrant to 
Norway from the Middle-East and is in his early twenties.     
 
The structure of the narrative 
 
Boris, like Ivana, told a condensed story, which I will use to elaborate the different parts of 
the narrative. This was his story: 
 
“I had a guest, a boy, staying with me, and one day he asked me to drive him to 
Drammen. I came to Norway in 1995, but that boy only arrived two months prior to us 
getting caught. He came through a friend of a friend of a friend. That is how it is 
arranged. It is like this when you live in Norway; some come unannounced because they 
are friends or relatives. So he asked me if I would drive him to X, where he was meeting 
a woman. Well, I drove him there and waited for him, and we both got arrested without 
knowing anything about what happened. He had gone into a hotel to pick up a bag with 
five kilos of heroin. […] But when we got to court, he (the young boy) claimed that I 
103 
 
knew that he was supposed to pick up a bag, but not that it was drugs in the bag. But he 
did not say anything about a bag. All he said was that he was supposed to meet a 
woman. He also claimed that the bag was supposed to be full of gold, and that I knew 
about that gold, and that this was the reason he was staying with me,-- to sell that gold. 
He probably thought that I would confirm his story about that gold, but I did not. I did 
not know anything. I believe that this has happened many times. I had no clue about 
anything; I did not even have a mobile phone or nothing. But I got convicted and got X 
years.”  
 
The structure of the victim of organized crime narrative can be illustrated as follows: Event A: 
doing a favor or getting an offer-- Event B: going along with the offer or requested favor; and 
-- Event C; discovering the truth of the situation. 
 
 
Figure 7. The beginning, middle and ending of the victims of organized crime narrative
 
One can compare this narrative structure to the structure of the victim of social injustice 
narrative, which emphasized the beginning of the narrative, whereas this narrative structure 
introduces an altering event as an ending. When Event C is introduced it changes the meaning 
of the previous events. The following elaborates further on this narrative structure. 
 
Beginning: Doing a favor /getting an offer 
 
The beginning of the narrative of victims of organized crime is marked by the event of being 
confronted by a contact to do a favor. In Ivana’s story, she was requested to do a favor for a 
patient; in Boris’s story, it was a request from a young boy who had come to stay with him. A 
similar story is told by Kamil that explains that he got involved in the heroin trade by an act of 
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friendship, and that he became part of the operation because he trusted the man in charge, a 
guerrilla-leader from his country of origin.  
 
“I was contacted by a man I know well. He was a guerrilla-leader. When he was a leader 
he did not have any money, because he lived out in the mountains. We liked him a lot 
because he was a central man in our party. But when he came to Norway, he started to 
import heroin. He used his honor, and people trusted him so when he asked me, I let him 
store eight kilos of heroin in my house. He is so good at what he does, and he has so 
many contacts, and he knows almost all X (ethnical group) here in Norway.”  
 
When the victim of organized crime narrative is told in combination with the victim of social 
injustice narrative, the event of being given the offer is not marked with doing a favor, but a 
need for money. As expressed in Ivo’s and Fazal’s stories, they asked for help from people 
they knew, because they had an acute need of money. That is how they claim that they got the 
offer to earn money illegally.   
 
 Middle: Going along with the request  
 
The middle part of the narrative of victims of organized crime is marked with the event of 
going along with the mission, but on false premises. In the case of Boris and Ivana, they 
claimed that they had no knowledge of the heroin or any other drug. In other words, they were 
completely unaware of being involved in a heroin deal. Kamile, on the other hand, knew 
about the heroin, but claims that he had no financial interest in the heroin. Further, he claims 
that he did not get paid for the storage of the heroin. Similarly, Fazal continues his story about 
how he was going along with the offer made to him in Germany to transport hashish:  
 
“[…] In Germany I am given a packet, with instructions on where it is to be delivered in 
Denmark. The packet was flat, and taped over. I could feel that the packet smelled so I 
taped over the packet with my own tape. Then I put the packet in a shoebox and make a 
bed for my son over the shoebox. When we arrived in Denmark, I got new instructions. 
It was from the same man that had met me in Germany. The new instruction is that the 
packet is going to Norway, and that the receiver is going to meet me at the central 
station in Oslo. I only get one phone number to call.” 
 
The man giving instructions in Fazal’s story is a character of mystery. He shows up, and gives 
new instructions so that Fazal is kept in the dark about the real aim of the mission. The 
unknown man serves the function in Fazal`s story as a support to his claim of having limited 
or misguided information. (This is similar to Ivana’s story, when the patient turned up at the 
airport holding a bag). A similar point is made by Ivo when he relates the story of how the 
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man in charge made him the offer to store amphetamines, and later contacted him again with 
an offer to store hashish:    
 
“And he called me when I was out, so I say okay, only if you stop nagging me. And then 
I meet him at X. It is not far to drive from Y. And then he says that a consignment of 
hashish has arrived, and that the person that was supposed to keep it is not answering 
his phone, so can I please take it to my garage? “No, sorry,” I say. I don`t want to 
change my garage into a storeroom for you and your drugs. I already have too much 
drugs there already. Maybe it is better to look after hashish than amphetamines, but I 
already have the amphetamines, so, no. But anyway, we agreed. We went and got the 
drugs right out of the arriving car that came from Sweden. The drugs were transported 
in by a specially built car-seat, and packed in with tape in a flat packet. I thought it was 
hashish, it looked like hashish slabs.”   
 
Both Fazal and Ivo claimed to have thought that they were in possession of hashish, not 
heroin. Both claim to have been misled to believe so by the man in charge.  
 
Ending: Discovering the truth  
 
The ending of the narrative is marked by the event of reliving the horrible truths about the 
others involved. In the case of Boris’s and Ivana’s stories, this meant discovering that they 
had been manipulated to get involved with drugs. In the case of Kamil, it meant that the man 
he had trusted and believed in would not step forward and take the fall with him when he was 
arrested. Instead, the man in charge would claim that he knew nothing. In the case of Ivo and 
Fazal the ending is when they realize that they were in position of heroin, not hashish.      
 
Ivo:  “[…] And then I realized that they (police) were after him and that is how the 
investigation developed. And I understood what a big fish he was. And then I talk about 
the amphetamines, and the police ask what was in the other bag, and I answer hashish. 
So, I told the police everything about the hashish, like I have just told you, how it all 
happened. But then the police say, in that bag there were no hashish; it was heroin. 
“What do you have to say about that?” My legs like this (he stands up and shows that he 
falls down). I got a shock; I had to go out for ten minutes. And I was so afraid, what 
should I think? When a person can trick me like that, he might be able to do other stuff 
to me too. I was so afraid, and I realized that this meant a heavy punishment. I was 
fooled. There were so many thoughts. It went buzz in my head. Ten, fifteen minutes, I 
could not come to my senses. I was afraid for my life, my future, for everything. Do you 
understand?” 
I: “Uh huh.” 
Ivo: “Afraid, tricked, it really hurts; afraid and in shock. The police tried to talk to me, 
but I felt that we were through. They showed me a picture of the man, but I said that it 
was not him and stuff like that. I was sitting thirteen weeks in isolation thinking: Shit, 
fuck, I was fooled. Shall I give up? I do not know what the police are thinking. Accept 
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everything? Keep my mouth shut? I am not a big fish, and all of a sudden I am in a 
situation where I might get sentenced twelve to fifteen years. […] I should not have been 
convicted of heroin. I should have been sentenced for hashish, but how could I prove 
that? He (the boss) denied everything. I was convicted on circumstantial evidence. I am 
angry at that man, and I become more and more angry with him. He tricked me. But he 
denied everything.”    
 
The ending of the victim of organized crime narrative, is told with great emotional display. 
One way of interpreting this emotional display is that the offenders are still negotiating their 
culpability, and by expressing their shock and amazement they underline the effect of the 
event in their narrative which changes the previous events. Similar emotional display is found 
in the ending of Fazal’s story:  
  
“We get stopped at the border by customs, and they find five kg of heroin in my car. I 
am in shock. Heroin! I had no idea. (hitting his head) It was so stupid. That is when I 
understand that I have been fooled, and I lay all the cards on the table and cooperate 
with the police. I called that person in Oslo, like it was decided in Denmark, but when 
the police came to the central station, he did not show up. It is no wonder. I was ten 
hours late, and they are not stupid either.”   
 
The central meaning of the ending event of the narrative is to launch the event that alters the 
previous events, so that the storyteller shows how he or she was manipulated or mislead into 
the heroin deal.    
 
 Plot and motivation: Tricked and fooled 
 
As expressed in the stories of Boris, Ivana, Kamil, Ivo and Fazal the plot of the victims of 
organized crime narrative can be interpreted as: I was tricked or manipulated into the heroin 
trade. Similarly to the victim of social injustice narrative, this plot also constructs a victim 
self, but one who only reacts to other people’s actions, not primarily to the social 
circumstances. A significant question remains: Are there any motivations expressed in the 
victim of organized crime narrative? Or to follow Schutz’s ((1932) 1967) concepts, are there 
any because-of motives or in-order-to motives expressed in the narrative?  
 
Boris, Ivana and Kamil all expressed an in-order-to motivation, which has nothing to do with 
a criminal act in their story. Hence, they claim that they acted in a gullible sense and thought 
that they were performing acts of friendship. This understanding is completely altered in light 
of the last events of the narrative, when it turns out that each had been fooled by a very 
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manipulative person. Additionally, this can also be interpreted as accounts which totally deny 
any form of criminal intent or “mens rea.” However, in the case of Fazal and Ivo, they do not 
claim total innocence, but that they where tricked into transporting and receiving heroin 
which they had not agreed to do. It seems clear, therefore, that the offenders are negotiating 
their culpability, right down to the length of their punishment, which would have been 
dramatically reduced if the court had believed their stories; in other words, had they been 
sentenced on the grounds of hashish instead of heroin.  
 
Agency- expressions: Responding self 
 
Similar to that of the victim of social injustice narrative, the central self expression found in 
the narrative of victims of organized crimes is a responding self. It is a self which denies the 
knowledge of a crime. As it is expressed in the following quote from Boris: 
 
 “I had no clue about anything; I did not even have a mobile phone. I got convicted on 
that and got ten years.” 
 
Parallel, and somewhat contradictory, to the denial of the criminal act in question, the victims 
of organized crime narrative endorse a traditional understanding of how drug crime is 
organized: a mafia like organization with one central boss who controls everything. 
Furthermore, this is an organization, which, for the most part, is controlled from outside of 
Norway. As previously mentioned, both “politico-military” oriented and business oriented 
organizers are mirrored in the offenders’ accounts. The main point is that the victims of 
organized crime draw on a common understanding that drug crimes are organized in mafia- 
like structure. At the same time, the storyteller denies any involvement with that organization. 
This is expressed in the following quote from Boris:  
“Yes, yes, they convict you because you are an X (ethnic group). It is not that I am 
completely innocent, that I have never done anything wrong. And I have been in contact 
with people that are not so good people. But that is the way X (ethnic group) are. We 
know a lot of different people. The mistake is not here; it is down there. The police 
should be more concerned with the people down there; it is they who send the drugs. 
Sometimes the police know who the senders are, but they do nothing. They claim they 
don`t have any authority, but they do. […]: Yes the X (ethnic group) refuse to talk. But 
sometimes they talk too, and especially if it is drug case, like heroin; then they often give 
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the police a hint. They say that the main problem is in X but they do not dare to name 
names. That is mortal danger, and do you know why?” 
I: “No.” 
Boris: “Because the police do not do anything about it. If the police had arrested down 
there, the people would have been willing to talk. But they feel so uncertain; if they talk, 
it is an open road. I have an example. If you name a person down there, and then he 
knows, he will not institute a search, for he will turn up here, and he can do what he 
wants with people.”  
I: “Concretely, what does he do then?” 
Boris: “Violence, killing, or whatever. If the person that has talked is from X, he will 
most likely be killed. So that is the reason why people do not dare to talk. The police can 
do nothing. They do not have that power.” 
 
There is a contradiction in Boris`s story; on the one hand, he claims that he does not know 
anything about the heroin trade, but on the other hand, he gives accounts as to how the heroin 
import is organized. This leads to the paradox that the victim of organized crime narrative, 
draws on the common understanding of organized crime, which also, to a certain degree, 
denies its existence33. Moreover, and parallel to the victim of social injustice, the victim of 
organized crime offers accounts that can be interpreted as excuse accounts (see Lyman and 
Scott 1989 p. 135). This is because the offenders do not deny that being in possession of large 
quantities of heroin is wrong, but they do deny their own responsibility in the alleged criminal 
acts. In other words, they are negotiating their deviant identities with a narrative that denies 
any knowledge of heroin.  
 
Personal responsibilities: Not guilty- The others did it 
It might seem like a contraction to ask about the expression of guilt in a narrative that 
primarily is a story about an innocent offender. However, the offenders are in prison, and 
claiming their innocence still leaves the question as to how they ended up there and who was 
to blame. As mentioned previously, the basic argument that the offenders use is that they were 
fooled or manipulated by the others involved. A central issue in the narrative of organized 
crime is how and in what way the offenders talk about their cooperation with the police. 
Kamil, Boris and Ivana are all vague about their cooperation with the police. However, both 
Fazal and Ivo claim that “they laid all the cards on the table” when they got arrested.  
 
                                                 
33 This is further important because similar narratives to this one are used as sources to gather knowledge about 
the upper levels of drug crime by the law enforcement agencies and many scholars working within an organized 
crime perspective. 
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The question of whether or not to cooperate with the police can be illuminated through the 
prisoner‘s dilemma. The economist, Robert Axelrod (1984), argues that this puzzle illustrates 
a conflict between individual and group rationality. Hence, a group whose members pursue 
rational self-interest may end up worse off than a group whose members act contrary to 
rational self-interest. The puzzle can be described like this: Two offenders have been arrested 
and are placed in separate cells. They are both given the same offer by the police. They may 
choose to remain silent or confess. If one confesses and the other accomplice remains silent 
the police will drop all charges against the one who talked, and the accomplice will do serious 
time, and vice versa. If both confess, the police get two convictions, and the offenders will 
have early parole. If both remain silent, the police will have to settle for shorter sentences.  
 
The problem with the prisoner’s dilemma is that if both offenders where purely rational, they 
would never cooperate, and both would lose. My main interest in the prisoner`s dilemma is 
not whether or not the offenders acted with pure self-interest, but rather in what ways 
cooperating with the police influences the narratives being told. First, by cooperating with the 
police, the offenders are expecting a reduced punishment, which might be a reason why some 
of the offenders feel betrayed by the police, when they receive heavier sentences. Second, 
cooperation with the police opens the offender to blaming the others involved and 
marginalizes their own involvement. In other words, the judicial practices directly influence 
the stories being told. Third, and parallel to the victim of addiction narrative, whether or not 
the offenders constantly feel guilty or not, they offer excuses that mitigate their spoiled 
identities.  
 
Following Presser’s (2008) concepts of reform, stability or elastic narrative, one can ask if 
there are any indicators and- /or expressions of a reformed offender within the victim of 
organized crime narrative. On the one hand, I would argue that if the stories the offender tell 
are interpreted as “true,” they were actually fooled, tricked or manipulated into the heroin 
trade. This narrative suggest that this will never happen again in the future. Hence, that they 
have learnt their lesson never to be that stupid again. On the other hand, if the narrative victim 
of organized crime is construed as a way for the offender to reduce his/her own culpability, 
the narrative gives no clues to a reformed offender. Contrary, it suggests, that the offenders 
are capable players of the “judicial game.” Hence, the victim of organized crime narrative can 
be construed as an elastic narrative, giving hint to both a reformed offender and a stable one. 
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8. Victims of addiction 
 
“If as a judge of rarities, I were asked what I should consider the greasiest literary 
curiosity, I am inclined to think that I should respond: The man who can furnish a new 
idea on the subject of Temperance.” 
(P.T. Barnum 1850, in Levine 2000) 
 
 
I have labelled the third narrative as victims of addiction. This narrative describes accounts of 
how the offenders ended up in jail because of their own drug addiction. As mentioned in the 
theory chapter, there is a substantial amount of literature on the subculture of drug use and 
dealing. Similarly, the notion that heroin addicts deal heroin to finance their own addiction is 
well documented within the ethnographical literature on street drug dealing (for example, 
Agar 1973, Bourgois 1995, Hanson 1985, Reuter, MacCoun & Murphy 1990, Lalander 2001 
and Hoffer 2006). However, the ethnographic literature primarily portrays the heroin user 
/dealer as knowledgeable, skillful and resourceful individuals. The story told by the 
imprisoned offenders shares these characteristics, but it also stresses the offenders as addicted 
to heroin and this addiction’s importance for the offenders’ involvement in drug dealing.  
 
Furthermore, and as mentioned in the theory chapter, there is a substantial amount of narrative 
analysis on addiction (see Hecksher 2006, McIntosh and McKeganey 2000, Hänninen and 
Koski-Jännes 1999). The main focus in these studies has been on different roads out of 
addiction and how prior addicts reconstruct their social identities through storytelling. 
However, the victims of addiction narrative do not focus on recovery from addiction; rather 
the narrative establish what it is like to live with a heroin addiction and how drug dealing is an 
integrated part of this lifestyle.  
 
The victim of addiction narrative is, hence, a story about regularly and frequently buying 
quantities of heroin ranging from ten to fifteen grams, and selling in smaller quantities of one 
to five grams and user-doses. Broadly speaking, this narrative is told by the ethnic Norwegian 
retail dealers. Most of the offenders, telling either the victim of social injustice narrative and / 
or victims of organized crime narrative, used drugs regularly, including smoking opium daily. 
Ivana and Kamil were the exceptions, both claiming that they had never taken any drugs. 
Although the offenders talked about substantial drug use, none of them told the narrative of 
victims of addiction. I will elaborate on the structure of the narrative by using part of the 
interviews with the following ethnic Norwegians: Henrik, Johannes, Rakel, Andrine, Magne, 
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Vinsten, Gard and Emil. They are all serving sentences ranging from eight months to two 
years for heroin dealing. All of the offenders were also previously sentenced to prison for 
drug dealing.  The structure of the victim of addiction narrative can be illustrated as follows.  
Figure. 8. The beginning, middle and ending of the victim of addiction narrative  
 
The structure of the narrative 
 
Beginning: Drug debut  
 
The beginning of the victim of addiction is marked with onset of drug use. All of the 
offenders telling the victim of addiction narrative embedded their careers as dealers in their 
own drug use. Therefore, the beginning of the narrative is about how and why they initially 
became involved in drug use. This is how Henrik, a 38 year-old drug dealer and debt 
collector, begins his story:      
 
”I had no friend or real friends before I turned seventeen. Because we came from the 
same type of upbringing, mine was very turbulent, while his mother was very religious, 
very religious, to the extreme, and my mother had liked a lot of alcohol and that 
neglecting stuff that comes with that. If you are only concerned with you and yourself; it 
was a real common denominator between us. The cry that we both had for love, caring, 
and empathy when we first met was a basis of a very good friendship. And we clicked at 
once, and we had been drinking some years, before we started smoking some joints. And 
it was all very innocent in the beginning, but then it became problematic to drink every 
day. And I remember that we started to sniff some glue, but that was, by no means, my 
thing. But you notice quickly if your friend is injured by solvent or not. So I told him off 
a couple of times, and he started to drink the glue. He was standing in the bathroom 
with hallucinations, and he with that religious background, he saw the devil himself in 
his own face and he tried to tear off his face. I heard those horrible screams from the 
bathroom, and found him trying to tear his face off, and we had a longer conversation 
after that, then. “What the fuck do we do now?” We cannot drink, because then we 
cannot behave ourselves. We cannot sniff glue, because then you will die, so we smoked 
joints for a couple of more years until he showed up with amphetamines. […] That is 
Drug debut First injection
A spiral of drug 
use, dealing and 
being 
institutionalized
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when we started to use and deal amphetamines. It was still a couple of years before we 
tried heroin.”  
 
 
The quote from Henrik illustrates how the offenders talked about their entrance into the world 
of drugs. In most cases they tell that it all started “innocently” with smoking hashish, which 
escalated to harder drug use and dealing. Like Henrik, eight other offenders stressed their 
problematic upbringing in the beginning of their stories. It is common knowledge that 
problematic drug use is associated with a difficult upbringing and a problematic life situation 
(see Skretting and Skog 1989 and Lauritzen et al. 1997). I would argue that this is such a well 
established “fact,” that five of the offenders made a point of their “normal” middleclass 
upbringing. Similar to the female dealers whom I argued, in the method chapter, used the 
interview to “talk back” at gender stereotypes, these five dealers can be construed as “talking 
back” at the well established fact that low social status and heroin use and dealing belong 
together.  An example of this is how Visten opens his story: 
 
“I did not come from a troubled home with parents drinking, hitting and all that. I came 
from a normal home. They have been good to me all the time. They have been really 
supportive, especially my mother. We were a group of friends that started using hashish. 
I started to deal it after a while. I just wanted to try everything, and it was fun in the 
beginning.”    
  
 
Whether or not the offender stresses a problematic childhood, the central meaning of the 
beginning of the narrative is to institute the storyteller as somebody with a long history of 
drug use and dealing, starting with hashish and moving on to harder drugs.   
 
Middle: First injection  
 
The middle part of the victim of addiction narrative is marked by the event of injecting heroin 
for the first time and becoming a fulltime junkie. This is how Johannes describes this episode.  
 
 
”I shoot my first injection long after I had started with heroin. I used heroin for three 
years without shooting up. I smoked it and sniffed it; it was much easier to stay in 
control then. Until that day, when I did not have a choice. If I wanted it, I had to shoot 
it, because I had traveled some kilometers to get hold of it, and when I got there, it was 
only leftovers left, cotton cleaners that junkies use to clean with and it is pretty strong. 
He offered me a dose of it and sat the first hit on me. And I thought, it is awful to admit 
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it, but I thought, why I have not done this before. And after that I was more or less a 
full-time junkie.”    
 
 
A similar story was told by Vinsten: 
 
“It all started with us (some friends) trying to get over our hangovers, and we tried 
hashish but it did not help much. We liked to lie on the coach getting high on Sundays 
after a long weekend of drinking. Well, I had seen people hooked on heroin, street 
people, but I thought that that could never be me. And I have tried to inject 
amphetamines and liked it, so I thought I could try injecting heroin too. And I have to 
admit it was the best thing I ever did.”  
 
Johannes and Vinsten did not start to deal heroin until after their first injection; until then they 
claim that they had only been dealing amphetamines. In most cases the offenders stressed that 
they did not deal heroin until they were injecting it themselves. However, there is a strong 
ambivalence in the offender’s relationship to the virgin injection of heroin. First, all of the 
offenders, telling a victim of addiction narrative, used strong emotional expressions when 
they talked about the virgin injection. They claimed, similar to Johannes and Vinsten, that it 
was so good that they did not know why they had not tried injecting heroin before. Second, 
they all claimed that it was taboo to inject somebody for the first time. It was such a taboo in 
the drug use culture that people could be met with heavy sanctions if they gave somebody that 
first injection. This is Johannes’ reflections on the subject of the virgin injection: 
 
“To give someone their virgin shot is a mortal sin, and that is not very understandable. I 
certainly do not understand it, but you can be killed for doing that.” 
I: “To inject somebody?” 
Johannes: “Yes, for example my girlfriend; it was one of my mates that gave her the 
virgin shot because he did not know, and then she told him afterwards. He became so 
frightened that he went into hiding, because he believed that I would take him. But 
eventually I got hold of him and told him that he could relax, and I said that she had to 
take responsibility for it herself. This is just an example. It is completely unintelligible 
for people on the outside. I do not know why it is like this, but it could have something to 
do with the fact that we know what a hell it is to live like a junkie and to give somebody 
their first shot is like inviting them in to hell, you know? But then there is other things 
that kills those assumptions, so I do not know.” 
I: “What is it that points in the other direction; what is it that kills the assumption?” 
Johannes: ”Yes, well our environment is so brutal, it is so cynical; there are nothing 
called friendships. Friendship only follows the dope. If I as a dealer have a lot of good 
dope, then I have plenty of friends. But in the second that I run out, they are gone. It is 
that cynical. It is so cynical that if people do well, then we do not like it. It is as we are 
reminded about what we, our selves, do not manage to do. When people are in 
institutions, we talk a lot about rumors that people have fallen back out, even though 
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that is not very interesting. It is like we want to drag them back. So it is strange that 
shooting the virgin shot is the cardinal sin, when we do not really care about each other 
at all.” 
I: “This is so interesting, because it seems like there is a border there then, but how is 
this for the person that injected oneself? Does one blame that person that gave oneself 
the first injection?” 
Johannes: “No I have never heard that, and that is a bit strange, because you would 
think so. But it is not like that, I have never heard anybody blame the person that 
injected them the first time. Following logical thought, you would end up there. So it 
might be the reason why I do not get this at all. […]But I understand it well enough so I 
have never injected anybody.”    
  
If the heroin dealers only wanted to project an image of themselves as cynical businessmen, 
why would they have scruples about the first injection? Wouldn’t injecting somebody for the 
first time be a perfect way of recruiting new customers? I would argue that the virgin injection 
taboo, like the rest of the victim of addiction narrative, downplays the economical aspects of 
heroin dealing and focuses on the lifestyle aspect of being addicted to heroin. However 
compared to the image created through the street level ethnographical studies, the addiction to 
heroin is stressed in the victim of addiction narrative, whereas in the “street” ethnographical 
studies, the addiction itself is not that strongly emphasized.   
 
Moreover, the offenders do not portray their involvement in the drug subculture as motivated 
by a search for respect or for money, but as a means to financing their addiction (illness). One 
interpretation of why the offenders stress the importance of their addiction is the context in 
which the story is being told (prison). Hence, claiming one’s addiction can be construed as a 
way of negotiating  one’s deviant identity, which might be more noticeable when interviewing 
offenders in jail than out on the street. Furthermore, the offenders’ ambivalent relationship to 
the first injection is mirrored in their ambivalent expression of their own heroin addiction. 
This ambivalence is clearly expressed in the following quote from Emile:    
 
“It is a love / hate relationship. I love it (heroin) because it means more than everything, 
my kids, my girlfriend, everything; and I hate it, because it means more than 
everything.”  
  
The central meaning of the middle part of the narrative is to launch the point of no return after 
the first injection of heroin, and how interconnected one’s own addiction was to dealing 
heroin. 
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Ending: A spiral of drug use, dealing and being institutionalized  
 
The ending of the narrative is not marked by one singular event, but rather a cluster of events 
which can be described as the beginning of a never-ending story: a spiral of drug use, 
struggling to avoid abstinences, dealing heroin, and being institutionalized (treatment and 
prison). In the following quote Magne describes what it is like to deal heroin from his 
apartment:   
 
Magne: ”It is hell; a lot of stress and bother all night. No, it is not okay! People stay to 
test the goods and they overdose. Well, it is not many that die, but I often have to pull 
people back (to life), to say it like that. It went well, but it is not cool, not at all. Yes, it is 
really bad when people show up hysterical and only want to get in, but now I do not 
accept that kind of bullshit. I can`t stand it, as a matter of fact. But I had it like that 
before, and then people were invited in to shoot up before they left again. And people 
are so greedy, especially the ones that live on the street, and they are afraid of not 
getting enough. And perhaps they are accustomed to using a quarter or two quarters, 
but my drugs are much stronger than what they are used to, and then it ends badly.”  
I: ”Yes, that sounds like a very stressful life.”   
Magne: ”Yes it is; 24-hours services with a lot of nerves, to say it like that, a lot off stress 
and a high intake off drugs. At the same time you need to keep your head leveled and 
that is not easy. To be sick is not an option. You have to start early in the morning, so 
that you can shoot up, and you become so numb from that, that you need to sit on the 
couch and drift for an hour or so. And then people start to come, and then you don`t 
have time to sit there and relax if you are going to run your store. And then you stress 
around until night. It goes in fits and starts: in the morning, it is a rush, and in the 
evening there is a rush. During the day they are out getting money. You have to try to 
divide your day after that.” 
 
 
It is not only heroin dealing that is expressed as stressful for the offenders. It is also the 
situation of buying drugs. In the following quote Johannes describes the stressful event of 
going to another town to buy heroin to take back to his hometown for dealing:  
 
”If I travel to Oslo and buy heroin and get rat poison, then I have been fooled and lose. 
The consequences are huge. The whole deal has gone to hell. I do not have any dope for 
myself. I have used up all the money I had for this. The consequences are enormous. If 
you go to the shop and buy a commodity and it is not like it should be, then you have a 
lot of options, and it has limited consequences for you. Therefore, we always test the 
drugs on our self when we buy; we also want a hit, though. In that test setting, it is very 
important that you don`t inject too much, because if you do, in the worst case you will 
wake up naked and broke. It has never happened to me, but to a friend. For my part, I 
have been so intoxicated on my way home that I have no idea where my drugs are when 
I am one the train back to X. And then you try to shoot up on the train, and you are 
really stressing out with enormous veins, and then it is easy to inject too much.  And 
then the drugs do not want to stay in the spoon, because the train is shaking so much. 
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And you end up shooting too much. And that has happened to me, and I have returned 
home without any money or drugs. Very funny!”   
 
A central issue, in the end part of the narrative, is to clarify the economical aspects of dealing 
heroin when one is addicted to the drug. This is expressed as the problem of how to “get the 
shop to go around” without ending in debt or being tempted to use too much of the “goods” 
oneself. This is how Rakel expressed this problem: 
 
”People are so sick, and they beg for drugs, but it is impossible to give away to everyone, 
because then you will land on your ass. I used to divide the heroin like this: This I can 
use, and this I cannot use. I tried to get the money for more drugs, before I used up what 
I had, so that I was always in advance.”   
 
 
The offenders’ claim heroin dealing is made even more problematic because the dealers know 
themselves what heroin abstinence is. In ethnographical studies this has been interpreted as an 
indicator of solidarity among the heroin users/dealers. One the street of Denver Lee Hoffer 
(2006 p. 29) describes a heroin dealer this way: “A real heroin dealer used the drug and knew 
what it meant to be dope sick. A real heroin dealer could empathize with the customer in this 
way because he has been in the same pathetic position.”  Therefore, the dealers know what 
their customers are going through and how desperate they can become.  
 
Andrine: ”You cannot be too kind, something I am, though. Because I feel very sorry for 
people when they come and are sick, because I know very well what that is like. I have 
been in situations where I would do anything for a medical certificate (user dose). People 
can become so desperate. They can say: “take my jacket, take my trousers; I can fuck 
you, whatever, as long as you give me a dose.” It is so cynical. I try not to be too kind, 
though. I know what I have to shoot and give away before I go bankrupt. And luckily, 
do I manage to frame it. Otherwise I would have landed on my ass. What nice customers 
we have.” 
 
A common feature in the victim of addiction narrative is the downplaying of the profits of the 
heroin dealing. Heroin dealing is described as a business that barely makes it because it is 
always in danger of going bankrupt. This is due to the interconnectedness between the use of 
credit, violence, and consumption. As Simen explained, “The near death is to buy user doses 
on credit.” Hence, the giving and receiving of credit and how chains of credit develop are a 
central element in the victim of addiction narrative. This is how Henrik, the debt collector, 
talks about the use of credit and violence in the culture: 
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“You need to have the money! And you need them to avoid the same treatment yourself. 
It is the nature of the game. Either you pay or you get pain. The money cannot be 
absent, because then there are fifteen others that stops, because it is one that does not 
pay. And on heroin it is so much more brutal than other drugs. […] I have quite a few 
guns, but first and foremost horrific knives. I know that when you see one of those 
knives then you will respect them more that a gun, to say it, like it is. And it has been a 
necessity that I can pull out the most scaring knives that you can imagine. That is how I 
stop the other five or six people in the room, and not only the one that I am talking to. 
The others would not have been as frightened by a gun. People have seen too many guns 
on TV or otherwise, that they have lost some of their effect; they do not scare people as 
much as they used to. But if you on the other hand, pull out a blade with lots of extra 
ornaments, and with a “Franklin Mint” look; then you make a hell of an impression on 
everybody in the room immediately. I have to admit that the thought of being cut to 
pieces instead of getting a bullet wound cannot be measured up against each other in 
relation to how scared to get. And what scares people most in any situation is what you 
do to yourself, in your own thoughts, while you are in the situation […].”   
 
As with other aspects of the victim of addiction narrative, the violence in the drug subculture 
is well documented (see Svensson 1996, 1997, Bourgois 1995, Lalander 2001, Sandberg and 
Pedersen 2006).  Another issue that highlights the lifestyle aspects of heroin dealing and 
downplays the profits is that the offenders stress how their customers often pay with other 
things than money. In most cases these are stolen goods. Although the offenders claim that 
they prefer cash, they stress having vast amounts of stolen goods, as expressed in the 
following quote by Vinsten:   
“At my house there are not many honest (paid for) things: The TV is not honest, the 
stereo is not honest, and even the couch and the porcelain are not honest. When you deal 
dope, they pay with everything; they pay in nice watches and nice jackets and 
everything.”  
 
Additionally to dealing in stolen goods one female dealer talked about trading sex for heroin:  
Andrine: “The other dealers always want money or something else. In that way it is an 
advantage to be a woman; it is not okay, but it is okay anyway.” 
I: “What are you thinking about now?” 
Andrine: “No, most of the dealers are men, and they are single, so they want to get laid. 
So then you just have to offer yourself, if you don`t have money. Then they might throw 
a dose (of heroin) in your face, when they are fed up listening to your nagging, and then 
you must fuck them. It is better to sell your body than…No, I don’t know how to say this 
properly.”  
 
Andrine and Rakel both claimed that females had an advantage because they could trade their 
bodies for heroin, whereas two of the other female dealers expressed that this was a 
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humiliating and degrading act. The point is that the central meaning of the ending of the 
victim of addiction narrative is to show how heroin dealing becomes integrated into the 
lifestyles of the heroin users. The economical and profitable aspects of the dealings are 
downplayed whereas the stress, cynicism, and brutality of the drug culture are amplified.   
 
Plot and motivation: Financing one’s own habit 
 
“No one knows what junk is until he is junk sick.” 
Burroughs ((1953) 2002  p. 99) 
 
Similar to the previous two victim narratives, the plot of the victim of addiction narrative 
constructs a victim self. However, it is a self that changes throughout the narrative. In the two 
previous victim narratives, the self created through the story remained constant, whereas in 
the victim of addiction narrative, the “real” victim is created after the first injection of heroin. 
This is the case regardless of the storyteller’s childhood. After the first injection, the plot of 
the narrative, that which drives the story further, can be summed up in the following sentence 
uttered by many offenders: “I deal heroin to finance my own addiction.” One question 
becomes: What type of motivation does the narrative encapsulate? Or to follow Schutz’s 
((1992 1967 p. 89) concepts, does the narrative express an in-order-to motive or a because-of 
motive?  
 
One way of interpreting the narrative, is that it is an in-order-to motive in that the offenders 
deal heroin to get money. However, there are two important issues here. First, the offenders 
claim that they do not deal heroin for profit, and second, the reason that they deal is to get 
money so that they can buy heroin to avoid heroin abstinence. In other words, money in itself 
is not present as a motivation for the drug dealing, whereas addiction is. At the same time, 
there are individual differences in how much emphasis that the offenders telling victim of 
addiction narrative place on their because-of motives, i.e. social and economic determents that 
led to the addiction. For example, Gard is the offender who talks about the most extreme 
adolescent years, describes a childhood where he was sent to eight different institutions, from 
the ages of eleven to sixteen. He directly links his use of heroin to his own upbringing and 
views his addiction as self-medication:   
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”Heroin tempers the post stress. A lot of what I experienced as a child for example a slap 
across the face that came unannounced and quick when I was sitting at the breakfast 
table, has got stuck as blocks inside me. When Mother shouted; “what are you doing 
now?” She was a bitch full of nerves that sat and terrorized her kids. And then it 
became a lid out of it, which makes all experiences difficult to verbalize. Heroin tempers 
it; it works here (He points to his stomach).” 
 
However, compared to the victim of social injustice narrative, which placed a lot of emphasis 
on the beginning of the narrative and the socio-economic determents of the illegal acts, the 
victim of addiction, emphasizes the ending events of the narrative. The ending describes the 
spiral of one’s own drug consumption and dealing to finance this addiction. One way of 
interpreting this is that addiction (almost self-explanatory) becomes the because-of motive for 
heroin dealing, and not those socio-economic deterrents that lead to the addiction in the first 
place.  
Agency-expressions: Responding self 
 
Similar to the previous two elaborated narratives, the central self-expression found in the 
victim of addiction narrative is a responding self. Primarily, this is a self responding to the 
demands of heroin addiction. Moreover, the offenders relating this narrative do not deny their 
criminal intent (mens rea) i.e. dealing heroin. However, they do deny the legitimacy of 
labeling their lifestyle as criminal. As expressed by Magne:  
 
“What we do is not criminal; we only do it because we need the money to buy drugs, 
because otherwise we get sick.”   
 
Whereas the previous two victim narratives can be interpreted as excuse accounts, the victim 
of addiction narrative can be construed as a justification (see Lyman and Scott 1989 p. 135). 
The offenders do not deny their involvement in drug dealing; however, they do deny that 
dealing drugs to finance their own addiction is wrong. The following quotes illustrate this:   
 
Henrik: “It is no talk about me feeling any responsibility when I am hooked on heroin. 
It is all consuming. You do not have the possibility to take responsibility when 
everything is on instincts. And if that means knocking people down or just pulling 
money from the cashier on the deck if I have to, because you become so shortsighted 
that everything is about the next 20 seconds instead of the next minute. You shall have 
your next dose, and that’s that. And you almost expect people to understand that.” 
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A similar argument is found in Johannes story: 
”We who live with buying and dealing drugs have a low morale. Although we do not 
consider what we do as wrong; buying and selling dope. So well, there are boundaries 
between what is right and what is wrong, but it is completely different boundaries. To 
knock down an old lady is wrong, but to knock down an ambulatory man is not 
necessarily wrong. To rob a shop is not very wrong, but to rob an old couple on a farm is 
wrong. So you have rules, but they are so different from the rest of the society.”    
 
As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, many contributions in criminology focus on different 
ways in which offenders downplay or neutralize their deviance. A central discussion in 
relation to this is whether offenders are bound by the codes of the street or by conventional 
norms. The most influential contribution in this discussion is Sykes’ and Matza`s (1957) 
techniques of neutralization. Based on interviews with imprisoned offenders, Sykes and 
Matza argue that the offenders have internalized mainstream values. Moreover, this theory 
stipulates that the offenders understand that breaking the law is wrong and consequently they 
perform “self-talk” to reduce feelings of guilt before they break the law. Volkan Topalli 
(2005) has extended the neutralization theory to the study of street offenders’ decision 
making. According to Topalli, street offenders protect a self-image more consistent with a 
code of the streets rather than a mainstream orientation. Furthermore, the offenders also use 
neutralization techniques when they break the norms of the street. Topalli’s basic point is that 
offenders who have not been institutionalized offer street code identity, whereas the offenders 
who have been institutionalized are more likely to project identities which refer to 
conventional values.  
Applied to this study, all of the offenders have been sanctioned, yet, I would argue that the 
narratives identified in the data refer to both conventional values and drug culture values. To 
elaborate, the two first victim narratives which I interpreted as excuse accounts refer to a 
conventional framework, because neither of them denies that being in possession of large 
quantities of heroin was wrong. However, the victim of addiction narrative, which I have 
interpreted as a justification account, refers to oppositional values of drug use and dealing. 
Three central points’ can be made. First, a normative framework that refers to oppositional 
values of drug use and dealing (or codes of the street) is highly apparent in narratives told in a 
prison context. Further, the offenders who referred to a street culture normative framework, 
were those who had been institutionalized (prison and treatment) most frequently. Second, 
when the offenders refer to the oppositional values of drug use and dealing, they also express 
that they are aware of the conventional values, as in the quote of Johannes where he kept 
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referring to what is like for us on the inside, and this is what is might look like from the 
outside. Third, and as previously mentioned, all the narratives are told retrospectively, and 
they offer the offenders’ reasons and negotiations for their criminal identities. These 
narratives cannot be used as examples of “self-talk” before their criminal act, but they can 
shed light on how the offenders’ talk about themselves and their crimes after repeated moral 
confrontations. 
 
Personal responsibilities: Not guilty-ill 
 
How the offenders connect issues of addiction to drug dealing also has consequences for how 
the offenders express their responsibilities. On one hand, they present themselves as totally 
controlled by their hunger for heroin and angst toward abstinence, but on the other hand, they 
present themselves as responsible and rational individuals. This ambivalence between two 
extremes, totally controlled by their addiction or rational and responsible, is embedded in 
where the offenders, at any given time are in their own intoxication. This is how Johannes 
explains it:    
 
”Addiction creates unpredictable people. It creates much instability in the life of all, and 
everybody knows that. I know that other junkies is as unstable as me, because 
sometimes we are recovered (frisk), sometimes we are sick; at other times we are high. 
On top off that we have problems with the police, paying the rent, our family; 
everything is problematic. That is what addiction does.”   
   
To be a heroin addict is described by the offenders, as in the quote from Johannes, as moving 
between three different stages: “junk sickness” (withdrawal) - “recovered” (enough heroin in 
the body not to get sick) – and “intoxicated.” They talk about themselves as totally controlled 
by their addiction when they are “sick” or “intoxicated,” but as rational individuals when they 
are “recovered.” Additionally, the “recovered stage” is described as the ideal period for 
dealing heroin.  
 
Drawing extensively on phenomenological and symbolic interactionistic insights, Alfred 
Lindesmith (1968) developed an account of opiate addiction that distinguished between the 
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physical reactions of withdrawal and its phenomenological experience34. Lindesmith argues 
that opiate addicts first must experience withdrawal, then he or she must develop a concern 
over that experience as such, and then he or she must engage in drug use, taking opiates 
repeatedly to eliminate or avoid withdrawal. The point being that when withdrawal is 
interpreted as a form of addiction, the perceived (and felt) need for more drugs grows. 
Similarly, in the victim of addiction narrative the withdraw experience, or the prospect of 
withdrawal, causes the offenders to repeatedly use heroin to avoid it. This is further important 
because when the offenders interpret their withdrawal symptoms as a need for more drugs, 
they are conceptualizing their experience in terms driven from the medical discourse, and 
perceive themselves as sick. This image of heroin dealers and users as ill is contradictory to 
the image which is stressed within the street level ethnographic studies, where drug users / 
dealers experience of their addiction is toned down, in favour of other lifestyle aspects within 
the subculture. 
 
When the offenders talk about their addiction they use words referring to a health discourse, 
such as, “sick,” “recover,” “health certificate,” “medicine” and so on. In other words, they 
describe themselves and their addiction as an illness. As mentioned in the theory chapter, 
Frank (1997) put forward three key narratives of talking about illness: restitution, chaos, and 
quest narratives. Frank`s basic argument is that people talk about their illness to make sense 
of their suffering. The victim of addiction narrative projects the storyteller as an ill person, but 
it is important to recognize that this narrative is not only told to make sense of the offenders 
suffering or illness, it is a narrative that is told in negotiation with their deviant identities. It is 
a narrative that is being told to make sense of why they ended up in jail, not why they became 
addicted or ill in the first place. However, the way in which the offenders express their 
addiction can be interpreted in light of Frank’s key narratives. He argues that the most 
common narrative is the restitution narrative, with the simple plot of: “Yesterday I was 
healthy, today I`m sick, but tomorrow I`ll be healthy again” (Frank 1997 p. 77).  
 
In most cases the offenders telling a victim of addiction narrative, talked about their addiction 
in terms of a restitution narrative, where the three stages of healthy, sick, healthy correspond 
with how the offenders talk about their addiction. There is one important alteration; it is not a 
                                                 
34 In other words, Lindesmith (1968) showed the relevance of Becker’s theory “becoming a marijuana user” as a 
social learning process, for becoming addicted to heroin.     
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chronological series of events which ends with health, but a chronic circle where the heroin 
functions as the medicine which is needed not to get sick. However common the restitution 
narrative is, Frank (1997) is critical towards its widespread use because “the wounded 
storyteller” has adapted the technical expertise e.g., the physicians’ concepts and perspectives 
on themselves. This might lead to what he calls the “colonization” of the medical practices 
and discourse on the stories of illness. This is particularly problematic if the storyteller is 
chronically ill, or there is no treatment for the illness. The point being that the restitution 
narrative does not offer any meaning that will help make sense to someone who is chronically 
ill. 
 
Following Presser’s (2008) concepts of reform, stability or elastic narrative, one can ask if 
there are any indicators and /or expressions of a reformed offender within the victim of 
addiction narrative. On the one hand, I would argue that the reform potential expressed in this 
narrative is conceded to treatment not punishment. The offenders telling this narrative 
foremost understand themselves as ill and in need of treatment, not as criminals in need of 
punishment. Therefore, some of the offenders a view treatment as a possible solution to their 
problems. On the other hand, the victim of addiction narrative also contains justification 
accounts which can be interpreted as way of legitimating continued heroin use and dealing, 
within a drug culture that should not have been criminalized. The victim of addiction narrative 
can be interpreted as an elastic narrative, containing both a stable justification and a potential 
for reform if the offender is given treatment.     
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9. Entrepreneurs 
 
“Business is business!” 
Fredrik 
 
I have labelled the fourth type of narrative as the entrepreneur narrative. It is a story about 
how the offenders ended up in jail, because they wanted to make a lot of money. The concept 
of an “entrepreneur” commonly refers to a person who has possession over a company or 
venture, and assumes the inherent risks and outcome of the business. Within the organized 
crime perspective this is the most common conceptualization of the upper level drug dealers 
and traffickers (Adler 1985, Reuter and Hagga 1989, Dorn et al. 1992, 1998, Pearson and 
Hobbes 2001 and Zaitch 2002). Moreover, the concept “entrepreneur” is often applied to the 
type of personality who is willing to take risks and who accepts full responsibility for the 
outcome (see Akerstrøm 1985, VanNorstrad & Tewksbury 1999). Thus, the entrepreneur 
narrative is a story that underlines the offender’s knowledge of the risks that they were taking 
by dealing in heroin and their expectation to, at some point, get caught by the police and 
spend time in prison. Moreover, it is a story of buying heroin consignments from two to three 
kilos up to twenty kilos, and selling the heroin in smaller quantities, from five grams to half a 
kilo.  
 
Additionally, it is a story about business, and the parallels between legal and illegal business. 
It includes events of laundering money, controlling the market by controlling the customers 
and having the best quality heroin. This story is told with pride in one’s own achievements 
and the ability to generate money, both legally and illegally. Broadly speaking, this story is 
told by the wholesale dealers. In the following section I elaborate on the structure of the 
narrative by using part of the interviews with Omar, Tarek, Ali and Fredrik. Omar came as an 
immigrant to Norway from an African country. He is in his late twenties and serving a 
sentence for more than eight years. Tarek and Ali were both born in Norway within an Asian 
ethnic minority. They are in their early thirties and have been sentenced to prison for more 
than eight years. Fredrik is an ethnic Norwegian sentenced to prison for three years.  
Furthermore, they are all based in Norway. The structure of the entrepreneur narrative can be 
illustrated in the following way: 
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Figure 9. The beginning middle and ending of the entrepreneur narrative 
 
The Structure of the Narrative 
Beginning: Wants money 
 
The beginning of the entrepreneur narrative is marked by the event of looking for ways to 
earn a lot of money. Similar to the offenders who tell the victim of addiction narrative, Omar, 
Ali and Fredrik claim that they started as hashish dealers but did not use their own drugs, as 
an explanation for why they wanted to deal heroin. Instead, they explained that they wanted 
money. This is how Fredrik starts his story:    
 
”I was 16 years old when I started dealing hashish, and that went well. I made quite a bit 
of money on hashish. But I wanted more money; I became greedy. I bought the hashish 
off some X (Eastern European) contacts, and through them, I was offered to buy some 
heroin; it was incredible easy. Just to pick up the first delivery and start up the shop 
[…]. I want to make money and if that means going killing people (gå over lik)35, I don`t 
give a shit, because I want the coolest cars and the prettiest girls. Do you get it? Now I 
might have seen some extreme variations because I am extreme myself. That is the way I 
am. My cynical side comes out in (mye vil ha mer og faen vil ha flere). I had a new car 
and a boat and lived fancy. It is the money that motivates us; I cannot say anything 
else.”  
 
The entrepreneur narrative emphasizes from the start an aspiration to a lifestyle of status 
symbols and indulgence. This desire for money expressed in the entrepreneur narrative has 
clear parallels to Adler’s (1985) previously mentioned description of the elite upper level drug 
dealers in Sothern California, who were driven by a hedonistic, indulgent lifestyle.  
                                                 
35 Fredrik used a Norwegian expression which directly translates as “walk over dead bodies.” This expression is often 
used to express that one would stop at nothing to attain ones aim.     
Wants 
money
Build up 
illegal and 
legal 
businesses
Caught by 
the police
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A parallel event to the one described by Fredrik, marks the beginning of Tarek’s story:   
 
”I wanted to make money, so I started as a hashish dealer, and then I had some friends 
that dealt heroin. And they said to me, “Why do you go around and earn 100 kr 
(Norwegian crones) a gram, when you can deal heroin and make some real money?” It 
was like that with hashish; when I was finished, dealing I had hardly any money left.”   
 
Contradictory to Tarek, Fredrik and Omar, Ali did not start his carrier dealing hashish. He 
worked, as he said, in a “family business.”  
 
”You can say that I worked for a family business. My father and uncle ran a workshop 
and sold heroin on the side. They got five to ten kilos a time, and sold it on again in one 
kilo. You can say that I worked for them. That worked very well, indeed, and I made 
lots of money.”  
 
The basic meaning of the opening event of the narrative is to institute the storyteller as 
someone who wants easy money and finds ways of making this happen. Compared to the 
victim of addiction narrative, which downplays the profit of drug dealing, the entrepreneur’s 
narratives stress the economical aspects right from the start.   
 
 Middle: Build up of illegal and legal businesses  
  
The middle part of the entrepreneur narrative is marked by the events of building up the 
business. From the onset it becomes important to get the customers. This is how Omar talks 
about establishing up his business:     
 
“So after I got the first heroin of my friends, I kept it for a couple of weeks at my house, 
and then the people (suppliers) called again and again and asked for their money. And 
in the end, I had to confess that I had no money, but I told them that they could get all 
the drugs back. And then they understood the problem, and then they said if you do not 
have any customers, we can help you. So they gave me four or five customers from them. 
And that is how I started. I bought only 100 grams and divided it in user doses and sold 
it. But after a while I had some money, and I thought, why not start for myself? And 
then I got to know some other people that run a larger business, and they let me buy a 
few kilos at the time. In the beginning I had to pay (on delivery) but after a while there 
was more trust between us and I could buy on credit. And then I could buy more and 
more each time. At the end I bought 20 kilos at a time. So you have to start out in the 
field; you have to have contacts. But after your first customers, and if you treat them 
nice and the rumors travel, then they will come and ask if they can give your phone 
number to their friends that also want to buy.”     
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Although there are some differences in the way that the offenders talk about building their 
business, they all stress the importance of having the customers. Thus, the customers are the 
key to a successful business. However, the offenders also expressed an ambivalent attitude 
toward their customers. On one hand, the offenders stated that they were totally dependent on 
their customers, but on the other hand, they were afraid that they would reveal their identities 
to the police. In the following quote, Ali explains how easy it was for the police to get a 
heroin addict to talk: 
 
“The police only have to lock them into an isolation cell for a couple of hours and then 
everything flows out of them. When people are hooked on heroin they cannot keep their 
mouths shut a long time. All they want is to get out and find their next shoot.” 
 
   
A central issue in the middle part of the narrative is the description of how the selling of large 
quantities of heroin is done. This is how Omar describes a big heroin deal:  
 
“The deal would go down in a café in the Centrum of Oslo. I would have my men there 
from the start. Then I would discuss price. That is something I would never do on the 
phone, only face to face. That is how the price is agreed upon and where the money is to 
be delivered. When the money is delivered, the customer gets the goods and leaves. If the 
customer wants to test the goods, he or she gets five grams in a bag and leaves to test the 
goods. But sometimes there are customers that want to test the whole consignment, and 
then I get big problems because carrying the whole consignment into the situation is a 
great risk for me to take.”    
 
In the buying situation, Omar focuses on establishing the price on the consignment. Compared 
to the victim of addiction narrative, in which the offenders downplay the economical and 
profit aspects of the heroin dealing, the entrepreneur narrative amplifies it. Moreover, where 
the offenders who tell a victim of addiction narrative draw on health terminology in 
describing themselves, offenders telling an entrepreneur narrative generally use words related 
to business, such as goods, prices, control and responsibility.    
 
Furthermore, a central issue in the entrepreneurs’ narrative is that when the offenders’ 
business reached a certain level, they invested parts of the illegal money in a legal business. In 
the case of Tarek and Omar, this meant buying a restaurant and a discotheque. This legal 
business was also used to launder money from heroin dealing. A similar point is made by Ali:   
 
“I worked with my family. But I was greedy and wanted more money, so I started 
dealing on the side, and invested part of the money in a shop.”    
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Similarly, Ali claimed his shop was mostly a front for his illegal drug business and a place 
where he could launder his drug money. Fredrik, who also had the experience of running a 
legal business, said the following about the similarities between the two:      
 
”It is about the same things. Find the people that you can trust, get things done, get 
things delivered and get your money. And you can experience the same situation in a 
legal business; that you come to pick up your money, and then the payer is not at home. 
And then he drives a detour not to meet you, and it is exactly that same stuff. The 
difference is that when you run things legally, you can leave a bill and say, “This is what 
you owe me; that`s that!” And then you get your money, or you can go to the cops. That 
is the only difference, and if you have managed well illegally, you can manage well 
legally. Like my wife says: “You can sell what you want. You could make money selling 
beauty products.” It is all about dealing, and if you can sell one thing, you can sell 
everything. It is possible that people are even more cynical in the legal world. Maybe I 
expected that people should be honest. But they are not; business is business.”   
 
Whether the legal business was described as being there before the illegal business, or 
described as a result of invested “drug money,” the offenders telling the entrepreneur 
narrative stress that their illegal activity was not a result of their being failures within 
conventional society or as a result of blocked legal opportunities to earn money. A similar 
point was made by Adler (1985), who argued that with the upper level drug dealers in 
California deviancy did not result from blocked opportunities. The point is that the offenders 
telling the entrepreneur narrative stress their ability to be successful in both the legal and 
illegal business. Compared to the victim of social injustice narrative which stresses the 
limiting possibilities for the offenders, the entrepreneur narrative stresses their potential, 
which is connected to their ability to generate profit. Simply stated, the entrepreneur wants 
money to invest, whereas the victim of social injustice wants money to pay the bills.   
 
Per Ole Johansen (1996) has developed a three-step model to explain the relationship between 
legal and illegal business. The lowest step of the model is characterized by, an active criminal 
taking advantage of an innocent victim in a legal business. The next step in the model 
describes a situation where the people from the legal and the illegal business do favors for 
each other and /or trade roles. The third step is characterized by an intermingling of organized 
crime, legal business, corrupt politicians and the police force. Johansen argues that the 
corruption in Norway is characterized by the two lower steps in the model. In light of this 
model, the entrepreneur narrative describes a situation similar to Johansen’s second step, in 
which the offenders trade roles between legal and illegal business. The central meaning of the 
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middle event of the narrative is to establish the storyteller as an able businessman who 
managed to build up and control both legal and illegal businesses.  
 
Ending: Caught by the police   
 
The ending of the entrepreneur narrative is marked by the event of getting caught by the 
police. This is how Omar tells the end of his story:     
 
“I was expecting to get caught. The police was on me for many years. They asked where 
I had all my money from. I had a discotheque, new cars, new apartments; it was part of 
the game. Well, we got caught in the apartment of the person that ratted to the police, to 
say it like it was. It was a woman that ratted. She was the girlfriend of one of my 
employees, but that fool had been unfaithful. So, because he had been unfaithful, the 
jealous girlfriend ratted to the police. She had nothing to do with this; we only used her 
apartment for cutting and packing the drugs. Our biggest mistake was that we had let 
her see us cutting and packing. She was believed in court, because she knew how it is 
done, and not everybody knows this, of course.”    
  
 
Ali, Omar and Tarek all expressed that they expected at one point to get caught. They knew 
that the police were on to them, and that they had been under surveillance for some time.   
 
Tarek: “The police followed me around. They sat outside my house; they tapped the 
phones, they did everything. But they could not get anything on me. I never carried the 
drug on me. I had other people delivering heroin for me. When I got caught, I think a 
customer had talked.”      
 
A central point in the stories of surveillance of the police is that the offenders like to project 
themselves as smarter than the police. This is evident in the following quote from Tarek:    
 
”I have had taps on my phone and in my apartment, and I have had people coming to 
my home with briefcases and seeking devices and find five, six microphones. So the 
police have been very much on to me. After we saw Beverly Hills Cops a couple of years 
back, I was out and served them (the police) a breakfast right up the street here. I took 
the neighbor’s newspaper and served them breakfast. And then I told them that I was 
going to work, and that they could leave their plates outside my door. And the plates 
were outside my door when I came home. He, he, he. I had noticed that one of the 
undercover cops had been sitting with the same newspaper for days, so I am sure he was 
happy with some new reading material he, he, he.”  
 
In the end Tarek was also arrested by the police, and he claims parallel to Ali, that a customer 
had informed the police. In the case of Fredrik, he sees his downfall as partly his own doing, 
because he understands it as result of his own drug abuse:    
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”The first years I was never empty (heroin), but then I ran out, and laid on the second 
floor of my house. I was empty, and I laid there and cried. I remember that was when I 
shot my first hit, because a pal came by and wondered what I planned to do. He had 
some small bags (of heroin) with him, and we snorted and snorted the heroin, but did 
not get any effect.  And he had a bottle of 4 percent morphine that he had stolen at the 
hospital. And I injected my first hit, and I will never forget it. It tingled in my legs and 
then I was recovered. After that I could only think of the needle, and everything went 
downhill. After that it went straight downhill.” 
I: “What did you think the first time you shot up?” 
Fredrik: “I almost cried. I almost did. It was so good, and I hated it so! I have had a few 
friends who have died from it. After that day, fuck, I don’t know, but I feel that 
everything that is wrong in my life started then, and I blame the drug. It went to hell 
with my business too, you know. I had plenty of money and a nice apartment, a new car, 
and everything was fun, but after that hit, everything went to hell. Then it was dope for 
all the money, and I sold gold and jewelry and everything I owned. So “boff” I was on 
bare ground; I did not even have my apartment. I did not own shit. I was sitting in the 
lavatory shooting heroin, and then the police came storming in. I had become a real 
street junkie.” 
 
Fredrik had used drugs throughout his period of dealing: amphetamines, hashish and sniffing 
and smoking heroin. But he had managed to stay in control. It was not until he started to inject 
heroin that he claims to have lost control over his life and his business. Hence, Fredrik 
switches from telling an entrepreneur narrative to a victim of addiction narrative toward the 
end of his story. This is illustrated in figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. Relationship between two narratives 
 
Even though Omar, Ali and Tarek said that they used drugs regularly, they claimed that they 
did not inject heroin. Omar and Ali both claimed that they used amphetamines and Rohypnol, 
but never injected heroin because that would mean losing control of the business. A parallel is 
found in Tarek`s story; he said he never had touched heroin because his father and uncle 
would not allow “dirty injections,” although smoking opium was common and accepted in his 
Entrepeneurs Victime of addiction
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family. Compared to the victim of addiction narrative, which downplays the storytellers’ 
control over their drug dealing, the offenders telling the entrepreneur narrative stressed their 
ability to stay in control of their lives and business. At the same time, the entrepreneur 
narrative draws some of its strength from a contrast with the victims of addiction narrative. 
 
Plot and motivation: Money, money, money 
 
“Man makes money, and money makes man.” 
(Sheptun 1998 p.1) 
 
Compared to the three prior narrative-plots, which I have argued construct a victim self, the 
entrepreneur narrative’s plot creates an active agent. This is because the different and 
autonomous events of the narrative are bound together by the storyteller’s intent (see also 
Bruner 2003 p. 41, Ricoeur 1991). As expressed in the story told by Omar, Tarek, Ali, and 
Fredrik, the plot of the entrepreneur narrative can be construed as, “My drive to make money 
led to criminal activity.” Thus, it is the offender’s need and desire for money that drives the 
stories onward. The active agent created by this narrative makes his own choices, controls his 
environment and becomes an able businessman. As expressed in the following quote from 
Omar:      
 
“It was the money that motivated me. But after a while, it was also the running of the 
business, because I had success, I had people delivering drugs for me; I had people that 
received and kept money for me, and I had people that cut and packed (the heroin) for 
me. I liked to coordinate the different operations, and make things run, so after a while, 
that was also a motivation. I was the boss, both at the discothèque and in the drug 
business.” 
 
Money as a prime intent is a well-established motive in the legal market economy. Hence the 
perception that profit can be made is perhaps the prime mover of entrepreneurs in all legal 
markets. Simplistically expressed, the profit-logic stipulates to buy at a low price, and sell at a 
higher one, and to keep the difference as a reward for one’s own efforts. Profit then, provides 
the individual with the incentive to utilize his or her skills and abilities along with a calculated 
risk. By underlining their entrepreneur skills, both in the legal and the illegal markets, the 
offenders stressed that they became good organizers, learned from their mistakes and took 
care of their business, while protecting it from the police. As expressed in the following quote 
from Ali:  
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“My secret was that I never gave away my customers’ names. I had one phone for my 
customers, one phone for my suppliers, and one phone for my private calls. But I never 
mixed them up, or let anybody else use them.”    
  
A significant question remains: Following Schutz’s ((1932 1972) concepts, are there any 
because-of motives or in-order-to motives expressed in this narrative? Contradictory to the 
three prior narratives, which emphasize the offenders’ because-of motives, the entrepreneur 
narrative stresses the offenders’ in-order-to motive, which is profit. However, the profit 
motive evident in the other three narratives, is downplayed by the offenders by shifting the 
stress to their because-of motives (addiction and social injustice) which led to the need for 
money in the first place. In contrast, the offenders who tell the entrepreneur narrative 
downplay the social-economical determents (because-of motives) that led to their illegal 
actions, and express themselves as incarnations of the free agent. Accordingly, the profit 
motive becomes almost self-explanatory in this narrative. In other words, this narrative does 
not answer why the offenders wanted money or profit in the first place. Further, in this 
narrative, money becomes both a means (to invest in other businesses legal or illegal) and an 
end (profit).   
 
The dual role of money, as a means and an end of exchange, has been discussed by 
philosophers and social scientists throughout history. In his classic book The Philosophy of 
Money, Georg Simmel ((1907) 2001) argues what a great influence money has over action 
when money becomes an end and not a means:   
 
Never has an object that owes its value exclusively to its quality as a means, 
to its convertibility into more definite values, so thoroughly and unreservedly 
developed into a psychological value absolute, into a completely engrossing 
final purpose governing our practical consciousness. […] The inner polarity 
of the essence of money lies in its being the absolute means and thereby 
becoming psychologically the absolute purpose for most people, which 
makes it, in a strange way, a symbol in which the major regulators of 
practical life are frozen  (Simmel (1907) 2001 p. 232).   
 
 
Simmel’s ((1907) 2001) point is that money has not only changed the world of things and the 
world of people, it has also played a important role in changing the inner world of humans 
such as values, ideas, motives and moral criteria. The entrepreneur narrative cultivates this 
notion to the extreme. 
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Agency-expressions: Choosing self 
 
As mentioned earlier, the main self-expression found in the entrepreneur narrative is that of an 
active, choice-making agent. Primarily, this is a self that makes things happen through its own 
choices. Moreover, the offenders relating this narrative do not deny their criminal intent 
(mens rea) i.e. dealing heroin. One central question then remains: What type of account is the 
entrepreneur narrative? Does it contain an excuse or a justification (See Lyman and Scott 
1989)?  
 
I would argue that this narrative is neither an excuse nor a justification. First, it is not an 
excuse, because the offenders do not admit that dealing heroin is wrong, coupled with a denial 
of responsibility for dealing. Second, the narrative is not a justification; it is not based on an 
admission of full responsibility for dealing heroin coupled with a denial that dealing was 
wrong (See Lyman and Scott 1989 p. 135). Furthermore, because this narrative does not offer 
an account, it is not a narrative that restores the spoiled identity of the offenders, nor is it a 
narrative that minimizes stigma (see Pogrebin et al. 2006). Nevertheless, I would argue that 
the narrative draws legitimacy from stressing the inherent normality of the offenders, by 
pointing out the similarities between legal and illegal business, thus indicating that the profit 
motive is relative. A similar point has been made by Simmel ((1907) 2001), who argues that 
the same degree of passion in acquiring money might seem different in diverse contexts. In 
other words, what is labelled as greed in one context might be seen as healthy entrepreneurial 
activity in another context.   
 
Compared to the victim of addiction narrative, which underlines the differences in the cultural 
context between heroin addicts’ lifestyle and conventional norms, the entrepreneur narrative 
stresses the similarities. In ethnographical studies on street level drug dealing, (see for 
example Bengt Svensson 1997 p 228) it has been argued that the competence achieved in the 
subculture of drug dealing is not convertible to conventional society. This is mainly because 
the specific knowledge of dealing drugs is not met with acknowledgement within 
conventional culture. Consequently, this becomes an incentive for the drug user /dealer to stay 
within the subculture which rewards their detailed knowledge about drugs and illegal 
business. However, the entrepreneur narrative emphasizes the similarities between legal and 
illegal business, and shows how one can be successful in both. This point is that 
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entrepreneurial skill acquired through drug dealing can be converted into legal business. To 
what extent this is possible might depend on how large and extensive the drug dealing is.    
  
Personal responsibilities: Guilty and proud of it 
 
Is the offering of an entrepreneur narrative an expression of guilt? One way to interpret this is 
that telling the entrepreneur narrative is an admittance of legal guilt. The offenders are, as Ali 
expressed it, “guilty as charged.” But does the narrative offer an admittance of a moral guilt, 
in the sense that the offenders express regret or a feeling that dealing heroin for profit is 
morally wrong? As mentioned in the theory chapter, O’Connor (2000) analyses the structure 
of violent offenders’ self-narratives to elaborate different degrees of personal responsibility. A 
central assumption in her studies is that the concept of agency not only draws attention to 
humans’ responsibility for the way in which they act, but also toward the responsibilities 
inherent in the human ability to reflect on their own actions. Therefore, O’Connor develops a 
continuum of personal responsibilities based on the offenders’ different statements, which 
runs from claiming agency (I killed him) to problematizing agency (it might be my instincts 
that made me kill him) to deflecting agency (I had no choice; I had to kill him).   
 
Following O`Connor’s logic, the offenders telling the entrepreneur narrative are claiming 
their agency, by saying that they were dealing heroin. However, I would argue that although 
the offenders telling the entrepreneur narrative admit guilt in a legal manner, the narrative 
does not present any notions of dealing heroin as morally wrong. The only normalization the 
narrative proposes is reference to profit as a motive, which is accepted as the driving force 
within the legal market. In contrast, the three victim narratives create a self which responds to 
social circumstances, in which the offenders’ individual choices and moral responsibilities 
vanish and / or are reduced, and the narrative offers excuses and justifications with the notion 
that dealing and smuggling heroin can be construed as morally wrong. However, the moral 
responsibilities completely vanish in the entrepreneur narrative, which only admits to the 
crime, without further justifications or excuses. Paradoxically, then, the narrative which 
articulates an agency free of social-historical determents, led by a to-do motive, proposes no 
recognition of the moral aspects of the offenders’ actions. Nor does it offer excuses or 
justifications or exhibit in any way the notion that dealing heroin for profit might be 
considered morally wrong.  
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Moreover and following Presser (2008) concepts of reform, stability or elastic narrative, one 
can ask if there are any indicators and /or expressions of a reformed offender within the 
entrepreneur narrative. I would argue that the entrepreneur narrative is a stable narrative, 
which does not offer any hints as to a reformed offender.    
 
Summary: 
 
In Chapters 6 - 9 I have indentified four different narrative structures in the offenders’ stories, 
which vary in regard to the beginning, middle and end part of the narratives. These narratives 
are as follows; the victim of social injustice, the victim of organized crime, the victim of 
addiction and the entrepreneur narrative. Moreover, I have argued that these narratives’ vary 
in regard to expressions of motivation and personal responsibilities. The basic argument that I 
have been making in this chapter is as follows: 
 
First, the victim of social injustice narrative, which is only told by non-ethnic Norwegian 
offenders, can be interpreted as an excuse account, where the offenders use their failed 
integration and exclusion from the legal labor market as a because-of motive for their 
involvement in heroin smuggling and dealing. Further, this is a narrative which primarily 
emphasizes a self that is in response to a given social situation.  
 
Second, the victim of organized crime narrative, which is only told by non-ethnic Norwegian 
offenders, can also be interpreted as an excuse account, where the offenders claims to have 
been forced or tricked into heroin smuggling. Hence, they blame the others involved in the 
heroin business for their involvement in heroin dealing and smuggling and use the others’ 
manipulation as their because-of motive. Further, this is a narrative which emphasizes a self 
which only responds to other people’s demands and downplays personal responsibilities.   
 
Third, the victim of addiction narrative, which mainly was told by the ethnic Norwegian 
offenders, can be interpreted as a justification account, because the offenders do not deny 
responsibility for heroin dealing, but argue that criminalization of their behavior is wrong, 
because they are addicted to heroin. Hence, the offenders express themselves as ill and in 
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need of treatment, not as criminals who deserve punishment. In this narrative addiction is 
used as the offenders’ because-of motive.  
 
Fourth, the entrepreneur narrative, which is only told by four of the offenders, can be 
interpreted as neither an excuse nor a justification account. This narrative offers no 
negotiation with the deviant labels place upon the offenders. Whereas the three victim 
narratives emphasize the offenders’ because-of motive, the entrepreneur narrative only 
expresses an in-order-to motive which is profit, and, thus, expresses a self free of social 
historical determents. The arguments presented in this chapter can be schematically presented 
as follows:      
   
Schema 3: Narratives on heroin smuggling and dealing schematically presented 
Narrative 
 
Victims of Social 
Injustice 
 
Victims of 
Organized Crime 
 
Victims of Addiction 
 
Entrepreneurs 
 
Beginning Outsider Doing a favor or 
getting an offer 
Drug debut Wants money 
Middle Increased monetary 
demands 
Going along with the 
request 
First injection Build up illegal and 
legal businesses 
Ending Taking the offer to 
earn money illegally 
Discovering the 
truth of the situation 
A spiral of drug use, 
dealing and being 
institutionalized 
Caught by the police 
Plot and motivation 
 
Failed integration 
and exclusion from 
the legal labour 
market 
Forced or tricked 
into the heroin trade 
 
Dealing heroin to 
finance own 
addiction 
 
Money and 
materialistic values 
Agency-expression A responding self 
and a responsible 
self 
A responding self A responding self A creative, rational 
choosing self 
Personal 
responsibilities 
Not guilty- meeting 
family 
responsibilities 
Not guilty Not guilty- ill Guilty and proud of 
it 
Collective 
representations 
The social categories 
of immigrants 
The social categories 
of bosses, couriers, 
holders, receivers 
and big scale dealers 
The social categories 
of illness and 
criminals 
The social category 
of businessmen 
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10. The narratives’ manifestation in the judicial practices: Introduction 
 
Figure 11. The narratives’ manifestation in the judicial practices 
 
Narratives                Judicial practices  
 
 
 
My main aim in this chapter is to describe the judicial practices in heroin felonies and to 
analyze ways in which the narratives of the offenders manifest themselves in the judicial 
practices. To accomplish this I will elaborate the following three questions: First, what 
characterizes the heroin cases in the appellate court from 1995-2005? Second what 
characterizes judicial logic and rhetoric in these cases? Third, in what way is the heroin 
smugglers and dealers’ narratives mirrored in the judges’ argumentation in these cases?  
 
To elaborate, in the offenders’ prior court cases, police interrogation and investigation, they 
have met a specific judicial logic and rhetoric. As mentioned earlier, the law can be 
understood as an inventory of motives, as the culturally available “vocabulary of motives” 
used when giving accounts of drug crimes (Mills 1940, Lymann and Scott 1989). Moreover, 
the narratives that the offenders tell serve the function of making sense of their life situation, 
of why they ended up in prison. Hence, the narratives offer negotiations with the offenders’ 
spoiled identities.  
 
Furthermore, there is a tendency for the ethnic Norwegian and non-ethnic Norwegian 
offenders in the sample to tell different victim narratives. The ethnic Norwegian offenders tell 
the narrative of the victim of addiction, whereas the non-ethnic Norwegians tell the narrative 
of the victim of social injustice and/or the narrative of the victim of organized crime. Only 
four offenders tell the entrepreneur narrative; three are non-ethnic Norwegians and one is an 
ethnic Norwegian. This can be illustrated in the following way: 
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Table 2. The four narratives after ethnicity36 
 
 
Victim of 
social 
injustice 
Victims of 
organized crime 
Victims of 
addiction 
Entrepreneurs 
Ethnic Norwegian (14) 0 0 13 1 
Non-ethnic Norwegians (19) 6 9 1 3 
Total (33) 6 9 14 4 
 
 
Some central questions then become:  In what ways are the elaborated narratives mirrored in 
the judicial decisions? Are any of the narratives connected to specific cases; for instance, is 
the victim of addiction narrative mirrored in cases with small amounts or heroin, and is the 
entrepreneur narrative mirrored in cases with large amounts of heroin? Is one of the 
mentioned narratives a more successive legal story than the others?  
 
”The court finds….” is a common expression found in judicial decisions and also in heroin 
cases. But what does the court find? What arguments are heard in court, with reference to 
what, and with what consequences? In the following, I will elaborate upon these questions. 
First I situate my understanding of judicial decisions as texts, and describe the legal 
framework in heroin dealing and smuggling cases. Second, I describe what characterizes the 
heroin felonies in the appellate court from 1995-2005. Third, I elaborate on the judicial 
arguments in the heroin cases and their relevance in meting out punishment. I will give 
special attention to the judges’ use of the argument of “general deterrence,” “profit motive” 
and “danger of spreading.” Fourth, I elaborate on the judges’ argumentation in cases where 
the heroin dealer is a heroin user. These cases are interesting, because they challenge the basic 
judicial logic in heroin cases. 
 
 
                                                 
36 There are more stories told than there are offenders in the sample; the reason for this is that some offenders tell 
more than one of the narratives and are counted more than once.    
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Court Decisions as texts of power 
 
“What better way of preserving a professional monopoly than by locking up your trade 
secrets in the safe of an unknown tongue?” 
(Mellinkoff in Tiersma 1999:28 ) 
 
 
As previously metioned in the method chapter the most salient feature of a structured legal 
text is that they are highly formulaic and/or stereotypical. Appellate court decisions tend to 
follow a predetermined structure that changes little over time. Moreover, court decisions are 
typically expressed in the passive voice, creating the impression that such acts are 
accomplished without fallible human agents. Broad and impersonal statements of legal 
language make the decisions seem supremely impartial.   
 
Jerome Frank (1950) argues that within a logical positivistic position, the judge’s activity is 
understood as logically deducing a decision by applying the law to relevant facts. Hence, the 
judges are seen to make a value-free decision about whether a particular fact does or does not 
pass a fixed legal threshold. The decision then creates a precedent for future cases; the facts of 
each new case will be compared to those of the old to determine whether they are the same or 
different, assuming that there is one right answer. A long-standing critical line of scholarship 
finds fault with this logical positivistic account of the judicial process. Legal realists claim 
that law is an inherently subjective system that produces inconsistent and sometimes 
incoherent results that are largely based on the political, social, and moral predilections of 
state and judges. This school of legal philosophy challenges the orthodox view under which 
law is characterized as an autonomous system of rules and principles that the court can 
logically apply in an objective fashion to reach a determinate and apolitical judicial decision.   
 
Drawing extensively on the philosophies of legal realism, the founding father of Norwegian 
sociology of law, Vilhelm Aubert (1972, pp. 196-198), argues that the court is not the right 
place to determine what actually happened in the different cases. The reason Aubert (1972 
and the legal realists give for this is that the court system is based on a contradictory principle. 
This principle stipulates that two parties in conflict give their account of what happened based 
on a notion of serving their own interests. Thus, Aubert argues, the court’s method is not 
scientific, but a compromise between two different and oppositional sides in a conflict. 
Following Jerome Frank’s (1950) perspective, Aubert (1972 p.197) argues:  “Our court 
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system is comparative to throwing pepper in the eyes of the surgeon while he is performing an 
operation” (Frank 1950 p. 7).   
 
Therefore, a central question is:  If the court is not a place to find out the truth of a situation, 
how should the courts be understood?  Aubert (1972 p. 194) argues that one central function 
of the court is to solve conflicts between people in a peaceful manner. A judicial ruling is, 
therefore, a legitimate and authoritative solution to a conflict. Aubert argues that judicial 
techniques are a good means of solving a conflict in peaceful terms. A juridical decision is an 
authoritative interpretation of law, and a collective manifestation of justice.  Moreover, a 
judicial decision is a text that expresses the images of justice common within a culture. As 
follows, a judicial decision is a key document for analyzing our morality and our 
understanding of justice. Furthermore, a juridical decision is a source of power, a public 
legitimizing of the power that the juridical system implements. One central question then 
becomes: What types of drug policies is the judicial system supposed to implement? 
 
The Norwegian criminologists Nils Christie and Kettil Bruun (1985) argue that the idea of 
criminalizing drugs came through international judicial cooperation at the end of the 1960s. 
Central questions in these early stages of the Norwegian drug policy debate were: How 
dangerous are the different types of drugs? and, should it be illegal to use different types of 
drugs? As an example, the policymaker discussed what type of legal status cannabis should 
have compared to heroin, because the latter was considered more dangerous than the first (see 
Christie & Bruun 1985). As a result of the early stages of drug policymaking, many countries 
developed a restrictive policy in regard to dealing and trafficking “the hard drug” (heroin, 
cocaine and amphetamine), whereas legalizing use and position of small quantities of drugs. 
Norway, however, chose the most restrictive form of policy with a restrictive policy against 
both the possession of and dealing of drugs. In the terminology of Christie and Bruun (1985), 
this policy was summed up as: “Everything is equally dangerous.” Moreover, the level of 
punishment in drug felonies increased through the 1980s. In the theory chapter, I describe the 
Norwegian drug policy as a situation that raises the harm reduction paradigm, and at the same 
time Norway has a strict drug prohibition system. A central question then becomes: How 
should these policy trends be understood?  
 
In Finland, Pekka Hakkarainen et al. (2007) argues that both harm reduction and criminal 
control approaches exit side by side and that they are harmonically allied to create a new dual- 
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track model of drug policy. Drawing on criminologist David Garland’s (2001) distinction 
between adaptive response to crime, which is characteristic with lowering the objectives of 
the public policy because the goal seem unrealistic, and non-adoptive response, which is 
repressive criminal control, Hakkarainen et al. (2007) argues that simultaneous with the 
adaptive response to the drug problem, such as harm reduction, the non-adaptive response to 
the same problem still remains. Moreover, the non-adaptive, repressive responses are needed 
to justify the image of the state as an effective and competent actor who has not given up 
drugs as a social problem (see also Tammi 2005 p. 40). Instead of creating an atmosphere of 
uncertainty at the level of policymaking and administration, Hakkarainen et al. (2007 p. 555) 
states: “After a somewhat stormy debate around the turn of the century, the adoptive and non-
adoptive responses have peacefully aligned with each other.” In relation to my study, an 
important question becomes:  Does the dual-track policy in any way mirror the judges’ 
argumentations in court, and, if so, what type of consequences might this lead to for the 
judicial logic in heroin cases?    
 
The selective function of the judicial practices 
 
“That which today contributes the most to the understanding that crime and low social 
status belong together is the selective function of the legal system”  
(Vilhelm Aubert 1972 p. 96) 
 
A central aim for the critical school of thought is to show how legal practices produce and 
reproduce inequalities. A core principal within the judicial practices is equality. Similarly, 
Ståle Eskeland (2000 pp. 55-56) argues that the principle of equality is shown in two 
distinctive ways in the legal system. First, equality is shown by the idea that the law is to be 
interpreted in the same manner in all cases. Secondly, equality implies that similar illegal 
actions should be met with approximately the same amount of punishment. Within the 
Norwegian sociology of law and criminology, there is a long tradition of questioning if the 
formal equality of the law also means that there is a real equality of the law, or whether the 
idea of formal equality hides or covers a real inequality (see for example Aubert 1972, 
Mathisen 1984, Christie 1982, 2004, Høigård 1996). In elaborating on this issue, Thomas 
Mathisen (1984 pp. 128-132) asks the question, “Why are there so many poor people in our 
jails?”   
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Mathisen (1987 p. 128-132) explains this as a three-step process. First, Mathisen (1984) 
argues that the way in which the law is defined serves the interests of the rich more than the 
poor. To illustrate this argument, Mathisen quotes the French poet Anatole France: "The law, 
in its majestic equality, forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, 
and to steal their bread." Similarly, Aubert (1972 p. 93) argues that the penal code is one of 
several possibilities that the state has used to maintain the class status system and its 
economic foundation within a society. In other words, when a society is built in a hierarchal 
way, Aubert argues that strong forces pull in the direction of creating an interconnectedness 
between low social status and crime.     
 
Second, Mathisen (1984) argues that police work is selective and reproduces inequality. 
Similar, Liv Finstad (2000) argues that the police, through their education and practice, 
develop a “police gaze,” which is a suspicious gaze directed toward a special category of 
people. Through this special “police gaze,” the practices of the police are formed, and these 
practices are selective, because the police focus on their usual suspects and people previously 
known to the police. Drug crimes might be even more sensitive to the “police gaze” than other 
types of crimes because they are normally not reported to the police by the public. This means 
that the police work on drug crimes most be more active and outreaching than for other types 
of crimes. The police must themselves reveal the drug crimes through their investigational 
methods. Hence, the number of arrests in drug crimes will mirror the police work to a larger 
degree than in other crimes.  
 
Third, Mathisen (1984) argues that different selective mechanisms of the legal system work 
together to produce an end result of inequality and reproduction of inequality. One question, 
then, is in what way is the question of inequality and poverty relevant in a study of heroin 
smuggling and dealing? One answer to this can be found in the study by Kåre Bødal (1982). 
Bødal studied the first 350 drug dealers and smugglers to be punished under § 162 in the 
General Civil Penal Code. Although § 162 was meant to punish the organization and 
professional drug dealers and smugglers, Bødal finds that almost all of the dealers were 
themselves users of drugs. Further, Bødal argues that the offenders fit the description of the 
general prison population:  poorly educated, unemployed, and with a history of a problematic 
and abusive childhood. Bødal’s study has been used by Norwegian criminologists such as 
Christie and Bruun (1985 pp. 92-93), and Ragnar Hauge (1982), to argue that the severe 
143 
 
sentences used in drug crimes—meant to punish professional dealers and smugglers—are 
instead used to punish small scale, ethnic Norwegian nonprofessional drug addicts.          
 
Although the following analysis is inspired by Norwegian criminologists, my main aim is not 
to discover the real social and economic background of the accused in heroin crimes, but to 
study how different narratives, which involve different motives, are construed in the legal 
system. Furthermore, I have argued that the offenders stress different socio-economic reasons 
for their illegal activities in their different victim narratives. In the victim of addiction 
narrative the offenders stress their addiction as a because-of motive; in the victim of 
organized crime narrative the offenders stress manipulation by others as their because-of 
motive, and in the victim of social injustice the offenders stress failure of integration and 
exclusion as their because-of motives.  Addiction to heroin is, hence, only one of the motives 
stressed by the offenders. The question then becomes: Are any of these narratives mirrored in 
the judges’ argumentation? 
 
The legal framework; §162 
 
“Amount of heroin equals punishment?” 
 
Heroin smuggling and dealing is regulated by § 162 in the Norwegian General Civil Penal 
Code. As has been mentioned, this is a paragraph that has been the focus of much criminal 
political debate, and since its introduction in 1968, it has been reformulated three times (in 
1972, 1981 and 1984). The paragraph stipulates the following:    
 
1. Any person who unlawfully manufactures, imports, exports, acquires, sends or 
conveys any substance that pursuant to statutory provision is deemed to be a drug shall 
be guilty of a drug felony and liable to fines or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
two years. 
2. An aggravated drug felony shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 10 years. In deciding whether the offence is aggravated, particular 
importance shall be attached to what sort of substance is involved, its quantity, and the 
nature of offence. 
 
144 
 
3. If a very considerable quantity is involved in the offence, the penalty shall be 
imprisonment for a term of not less than three years and not exceeding 15 years. 
 
 
4.  Under especially aggravating circumstances, a sentence of imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding 21 years may be imposed. 
 
5. A drug felony committed negligently shall be punishable by fines or imprisonment for 
a term not exceeding two years. Any person who aids and abets a drug felony shall be 
liable to the same penalty. Fines may be imposed in addition to imprisonment. 
 
(The General Civil Penal Code Ministry of Justice and the Police 1984) 
 
The § 162 is meant to set a judicial framework for drug crimes of very different degrees of 
severity, ranging from fines to 21 years of prison. Andenæs (1999 p. 411) has argued that the 
broad scales of punishment found within the Norwegian Penal Code 2 have a specific 
consequence: “The destiny of the defendant lies not only in the question of guilt, but on what 
punishment the judge decides on given the extensive scale.”  How the judges evaluate and use 
the punishment scale is highly important in drug cases, so the question is:  What are the 
decided punishments in drug cases?   
 
According to the judicial logic, it is the type of drug, the amount and the character of the 
offence that divides the line between simple and aggravated drug crimes. In an analysis of 
how the Norwegian court of laws mete out punishment, Ragnhild Hennum (2002 p. 9) argues 
that through judicial practices and Supreme Court decisions, there have developed “going 
rates” for the amounts of drugs and the usages of the different sections of § 162. Similarly, 
and in an attempt to harmonize the judicial practices in drug crimes, the Director General of 
Public Prosecution (nr.1/1998) created a circular that formulates what amounts of drugs 
qualify for the usage of the different sections of § 162. In the case of heroin, the border 
between a simple and an aggravated drug felony was set at 15 grams, and the border between 
an aggravated and an especially aggravated drug felony was set at 750 grams of heroin. By 
comparison, in cases involving hashish, the border between a simple and an aggravated drug 
felony was set at one kilo, and the border for an especially aggravated drug felony was set at 
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eighty kilos. Hence, cases involving heroin require a much smaller amount than other drugs to 
be considered aggravated.  
 
An important question remains: What characterizes the heroin cases within the appellate 
courts from 1995-2005? In a Royal Proposition from 1997, the following description was 
given of drug crimes in Norway:   
  
The criminality developed in Norway in the last 25 years has shown a 
growing negative trend. Crime is internationalized and organized to a much 
greater extent today than previously. As an example one can mention the 
increasing number of individuals that are involved in aggravated drug 
felonies, whom are connected with organized criminal milieu with 
international connections.[…] In Norway today, the drug criminality is, to a 
large extent, controlled by foreign groups. This implies that it is organized 
crime that controls these groups (st.prp. nr 42 1996-97).   
 
As this quotation illustrates and as earlier mentioned, there is a popular perception among law 
enforcement agencies and policymakers that the drug crimes in Norway have become 
professionalized, organized and internationalized. However, one of the most striking features 
with the appellate decisions from 1995-2005 is that, out of the total of 459 cases, only 87 
cases included more than one defendant. Moreover, in 56 of these 87 cases, there were only 
two defendants, and there were only 13 cases that included four or more accused. 
Contradictory to popular belief, then, the heroin cases within the Norwegian appellate courts 
are not characterized by big groups (gangs) of criminals. Furthermore, one can ask, are the 
gross overweight of single-defendant cases an indicator that the Norwegian law enforcement 
agencies have succeeded in arresting the professional organizers of the heroin trafficking? In 
other words, are single-defendant cases an indicator that the prosecution has succeeded in 
building cases against the “Mr. Big” of organized heroin crime? Or might all of these single-
defendant cases, following the logic of the criminologists, be interpreted as an indicator that § 
162 is used to punish ethnic Norwegian small scale drug users/dealers, who are strongly 
marginalized in society? Following this argument, an important question becomes: What is 
the relationship between ethnicity and the amount of heroin found in the court cases?  
 
Following are the “going rates” for amounts of heroin. The relationship between ethnicity and 
amounts of heroin in the appellate court decisions are illustrated in Table 3.  
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Table 3. Percentage of cases in the appellate court involving the amounts of 0-15 grams 
of heroin, 15-749 grams of heroin and 750 grams or more, in groups of ethnicity of the 
main offender (N=459)37. 
 
 0-14 grams (N=70) 15-749 grams (N=293) 750- gram (N=96) 
Ethnic Norwegians 93 59 7 
Non-ethnic 
Norwegians 
7 41 93 
Total 100 100 100 
 
First, this table shows that in cases with 0-14 gram of heroin, 93 percent had an ethnic 
Norwegian as the main offender, and only 7 percent of the cases had a non-ethnic Norwegian 
as the main offender. Moreover, the table illustrates the opposite situation in the cases 
involving 750 grams heroin or more, here 93 percent of the cases have a non-ethnic 
Norwegian as the main offender, and only 7 percent of the cases have an ethnic Norwegian as 
the main offender. However, in cases involving 15-749 grams, which is the largest category of 
cases, 59 percent of the cases had an ethnic Norwegian as the main offender and 41 percent of 
the cases had a non-ethnic Norwegian as the main offender. This trend supports the argument 
that non-ethnic Norwegians dominate the especially aggravated drug felonies in Norway; 
however, and as previously mentioned, my aim is not to point out that these trends mirror the 
actual levels of heroin crimes within the Norwegian society. Rather my aim is to analyze the 
type of cases that is represented in the court system and the type of judicial logic found within 
them.   
 
Furthermore, the basic judicial logic in heroin cases is that amount equals punishment. One 
question then becomes:  How can I argue that what might influence the issuing of punishment 
is the story told by the defendants, not just the amount of heroin involved in the case? To 
illustrate this, I will use a simple cross table between length of punishment and the amount of 
heroin in all the appellate court decisions from 1995-200538. 
 
                                                 
37 As mentioned in the method chapter, the cases that include more than one offender are coded after the person 
who received the longest punishment in the case (the person in charge). 
38 As mentioned in the method chapter, if the 160 persons missing from the statistics had been included, the 
variation between the amount of punishment and the amount of heroin would have been even larger, because the 
amount of heroin involved in the 87 cases would be constant but the punishment would not.    
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Table 4. The length of punishment and grams of heroin in the appellate courts decisions 
 
 
 0-14 grams 15-749 grams 750-grams Total 
0-2 years 62 100 2 164 
2-10 years 8 190 53 251 
>10-years 0 3 41 44 
Total 70 293 96 459 
 
  
What does this table show?  First, out of the total of 459 cases, 293 heroin cases involve the 
amount of 15-749 grams of heroin, which, according to the “going rates,” qualifies as 
aggravated drug felonies. The second largest category, 96 cases, involve 750 grams or more 
of heroin, which according to the “going rates,” qualifies as especially aggravated drug 
felonies, and the smallest category, 70 cases, involves 0-14 grams of heroin. However, it is 
not very surprising that there are few cases involving 0-14 grams of heroin, because it is 
probable that most of the small heroin cases are settled in the district courts. Moreover, the 
table shows that the most common sentence used in the appellate court decisions are from two 
to ten years (251 cases), followed by sentences ranging from zero to two years, which are 
used in 164 cases, and lastly, in 44 cases, the punishment meted out by the judges was over 10 
years39.     
 
Second, the table shows a variation of punishment within the different amounts. For example, 
there are eight cases involving less than 15 grams of heroin, yet the offenders were punished 
for more than two years. Similarly, there are two cases involving more than 750 grams of 
heroin, but the length of the punishment is under two years. There are 100 cases involving 
more than 15 grams of heroin and less than 750 grams of heroin, where the offenders are 
sentenced to less than two years of imprisonment. Although these cases might be subsumed 
under Section two of § 162 as aggravated drug crimes, since they involve more than 15 grams 
of heroin, they are punished within the frame of two years, which is within the frame of a 
simple drug felony.  
 
Similarly, Hennum (2002), in a study of how coordinated the Norwegian courts are in issue 
punishment, found that there was a difference in how judges issued punishment when she 
only compared the amounts of heroin to the punishment issued. However when Hennum 
                                                 
39 As mentioned in the method chapter, if I had used district court decisions instead of appellate court decisions, 
the largest category would probably have been cases with 0-14 grams of heroin and a punishment of 0-2 years.  
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examined the cases in more detail, she revealed that most of the differences in punishment 
could be explained from other relevant factors in the cases. For example, Hennum found that 
the judges considered the import of heroin as a more serious offence than dealing heroin by 
the judges, and /or there were other criminal activities involved in the cases which could 
explain the differences in the issued punishment40.  
 
However, Hennum (2002) found that a part of the variation she identified in the judges use of 
punishment could not be explain in terms of the judicial logic. Hennum interpreted this 
finding as part of a trend of leniency in drug offences. Moreover she argued that this trend of 
leniency could lead to some confusion in the court about the question of punishment in drug 
offences. It is important to recognize that Hennum’s mission, reading the decisions from a 
lawyers’ point of view, was to examine whether the courts were coordinated in their practices 
of meting out punishment. My mission is not to find out whether the courts are coordinated in 
their practices, but to study how the judicial logic might include some narratives and exclude 
others, and to locate the basis for judicial argumentation on which this evaluation is based.  In 
order to achieve this, I examine closer how and in what ways the judges argue in heroin 
felonies. 
 
The question of punishment 
 
The point I am making is that although the amount of heroin is central when punishment is 
issued, other factors and arguments besides the amount of heroin, are also heard in heroin 
cases. The question is:  Which are the factors and arguments that are reflected in the judges’ 
argumentation, and which are the ones that, according to judicial logic, are irrelevant? In the 
following section, I will elaborate on some of the arguments used by the judges when issuing 
punishment in heroin cases.  
  
General deterrence, profit motive, and the danger of spreading 
 
I have identified three general characteristics of the judge’s argumentation when issuing 
punishment in heroin cases subsumed as aggravated drug crimes. First, general deterrence is 
given by the judges as the main reference for issuing punishment. Second, profit is understood 
                                                 
40 When selecting the heroin cases for this study I removed cases where the prime felony was not heroin, but 
another drug such as amphetamine or hashish. 
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by the judges as the defendant’s main motive. Third, the judges refer to the danger of 
spreading as one of the main reasons for heavy punishment.        
 
When the heroin smuggling and dealing case is subsumed under sections two and three of § 
162, general deterrence is given as the main reference when punishment is measured and 
sentences are passed. Hence, general deterrence is used in cases that vary considerably as to 
the amount of heroin and length of punishment. When the judges in the appellate courts refer 
to general deterrence, this is often expressed in sentences such as the following:   
 
“Because this case involves a substantial amount of a dangerous drug, the Court finds 
that general deterrence directs a very severe punishment” (LB-1997-2648).  
 
According to Andænes (1971), deterrence is commonly divided into two specific types, 
general and specific. General deterrence is based on the notion that people will engage in 
deviant activities if they do not fear apprehension and punishment. Norms, laws, and law 
enforcement are to be designed and implemented to produce and maintain the image that 
negative and unwanted actions will receive punishment. Although specific individuals 
become the target of the general deterrence theory, its main aim is to reduce the probability of 
deviance in the general population. In contrast, specific deterrence aims at punishing known 
deviants, in order to prevent them from ever again violating the specific laws and norms they 
have broken.  
 
Andenæs (1971 p. 68) argues that when judges base their sentencing on general deterrence, 
they are saying two things. First, the judges believe that their choice of punishment has an 
impact on the general deterrence of the statutory provision. Second, they believe that the 
argument of general deterrence is sufficient enough to justify the pain that the punishment 
gives to the accused. Consequently, Andenæs (1971 p. 68) argues that when general 
deterrence is used as an argument for punishment, individual factors such as age, no prior 
convictions, physical state, and physical problems are held in the background when sentences 
are passed. In other words, this means that problematic economical situations, debt, family 
responsibility, and problematic integration are not emphasized when punishment is measured.  
 
Whether or not the heavy sentencing in drug crimes has had an impact on the general 
deterrence of § 162 has been a source of conflict within the Norwegian criminal debate for 
many years. In the report to the Storting (Norwegian parliament) nr 16 (1996-1997 p. 42), this 
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debate has been summed up as follows:  On the one hand, critics of heavy punishment based 
on general deterrence argue that high levels of punishment have a limited general deterrent 
effect; the sentences of drug crimes could be halved without seeing any difference in this. 
Furthermore, the critics argue that Norwegian punishment, both relative and absolute, is much 
higher than the rest of the European countries, and the punishment for drug crimes are too 
severe compared to other crimes such as violence, financial crimes and environmental crimes. 
Some critics are also concerned about the defendants and the effects of the long sentences, 
and how difficult it will be to integrate the offender back into society. On the other hand, the 
supporters of heavy punishment argue that the restrictive drug policy and heavy punishment 
that is practiced in Norway has created a negative attitude in the general public toward drugs.  
In this respect, the Norwegian drug policy has had a general deterrence effect on the 
population’s morality.  
 
My main point here is not the effect the heavy punishment in drug cases has on the general 
population’s attitudes towards heroin, but how general deterrence as a judicial argument 
might affect, and perhaps limit, the judicial logic in heroin cases. More specifically, what does 
it mean that general deterrence is a sufficient argument to justify punishment?  How does this 
affect the judge’s view of motives and what is evaluated as a relevant factor in heroin cases? 
 
Profit as the main in-order-to motive 
 
 “The Court finds that it cannot place any emphasis on the reasons for the defendant’s 
economical trouble. It is of course completely unacceptable to cover an economical need 
with an illegal action.” 
(LE-1994-2618 p. 2) 
 
In the following, I will give some examples of how the judges argue with reference to general 
deterrence in the appellate court decisions. The first examples are from cases involving the 
import of large quantities of heroin. 
 
Case, LB-2003-726 
 
An eastern European man, 32 years old, was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for 
importing 16, 5 kilos of heroin to Norway as a courier. The defendant claimed he had large 
financial problems, and was contacted by a person he did not previously know, and was given 
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the mission of transporting heroin to Norway. When meting out punishment, the judges 
stated:   
 
“This case involves a substantial amount of heroin. It is obvious that this represents a 
great danger of spreading. […] A case like this, for general deterrence reasons, must be 
met with a harsh reaction, and for that reason, personal factors have little impact. […] 
After the defendant’s own expiation, the Court finds that his action was purely 
motivated by profit. He had large economic problems, and accepted twice in a short 
period of time to transport heroin, with a profit of 5.000 euros each time” (LB-2003-726 
p. 3). 
 
In this example, the judges referred to the danger of spreading and the need for general 
deterrence as the reasons that personal factors have little impact in his case, and stated that the 
accused had a pure profit motive for his actions. All of these elements of argumentation are 
common in the appellate court decisions subsumed under Sections two and three of § 162. 
Similar to the judges in this case, Andenæs (1971 p. 64) argues that general deterrence is 
often used in cases the judges evaluate to pose a serious threat to core values within a society, 
and hence require heavy punishment. The threat to society of heroin dealing and smuggling is 
expressed by the judges in the argumentation of “the danger of spreading41.” 
 
Moreover, the most common motive reflected in the appellate court decisions is “profit,” 
expressed in statements such as:  “only profit,” ”done for profit” and “the motive was purely 
profit.” In the mentioned example (LB-2003-726), the courier was offered 5000 euros on two 
different occasions for the mission of transporting heroin, which equals a total payment of 
10, 000 euros. If this courier is driven only by profit, as the judges argue, he has done his cost 
/ benefit calculations which could have looked something like this: 10, 000 euros divided by a 
15 year prison sentence equals 667 euros for every year in prison. In other words, for the 
profit of 667 euros, he is risking one year in prison. Moreover, one could ask, how much 
higher should the level of punishment have been, for the profit not to be worth the risk? Or to 
rephrase the question, does the willingness to take such a risk express something about his 
need for money?      
 
Christie and Bruun (1985 p. 88) have argued, when looking at the criminal political debates 
that led to the introduction of § 162, that the drug dealers and smugglers were perceived as 
                                                 
41 This argumentation is used in most of the appellate court decisions. The danger of spreading is even used in 
cases when the judges find the spreading effect to be a minimum, because the offender is believed when he/she 
claims the heroin is for own use. 
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“the perfect embodiment of an ideal enemy.” This was because they were perceived as 
dangerous, because they led people to death or to life-long suffering. Most importantly, they 
were without scruples, thinking only of their own economic profit. According to Christie and 
Bruun, the drug dealers and smugglers are the ideal persons to punish.  To illustrate how the 
profit motive is mirrored in the judge’s argumentation, I will use some more examples:    
 
Case LB-2000-2347 
 
A 44-year-old, unemployed Eastern European male, with no prior convictions, was sentenced 
to 12 years for importing 4,399 kilos of heroin to Norway from Germany. The defendant 
came as an immigrant to Norway in 1987. When measuring out punishment, the judges stated:   
 
“The Court finds that the defendants’ role was as a courier. Based on the information 
about the defendants’ life situation at the time of the crime, the Court finds that his 
motives were economic. The import was of a large quantity of heroin with a large value 
on the illegal market. General deterrence directs a very heavy punishment” (LB-2000-
2347 p. 2).           
 
Similar to the previous example, the judges in this case interpret the defendants’ 
unemployment at the time of the crime as an indicator of a profit motive, without emphasizing 
why the defendant was unemployed in the first place. While the judges do not explicitly argue 
that the reasons leading to the offender’s economical problems are irrelevant, this is expressed 
explicitly by the judges in the next example. 
 
Case LE-1994-2618     
 
One Eastern European immigrant male (B) and one Eastern European citizen (A) were 
convicted to 10 years and 7 years for importing one and a half kilos of heroin. (A) was 
convicted for being the courier of the heroin and (B) for receiving the heroin in Norway. 
When passing sentence for (A), the judges argued as follows:  
 
“The Court finds that A has played a central role by transporting the heroin to Norway. 
The defendant claimed that he had large economic problems when he accepted the 
mission to transport the heroin, and he claims that he was given 4000 DM for the job. 
Therefore, there were pure economic motives behind his actions. The Court finds that it 
cannot place any emphasis on the reasons for the defendants’ economic trouble. It is of 
course completely unacceptable to meet an economic need with an illegal action” (LE-
1994-2618 p. 2).  
 
If one compares the judges’ argumentation in these three examples to the narratives told by 
the prisoners, the judges’ argumentation has clear parallels to the entrepreneur narrative, 
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which stresses profit as the main motive for dealing heroin. Moreover, the judges’ 
argumentation has a clear parallel to the argument made with the organized crime perspective, 
which most commonly conceptualizes motives only in terms of profit. However, the judges’ 
argumentation does not mirror the victim of social injustice narrative, which emphasizes the 
accuseds’ because- of motives—the socio-economic pressures that led to the defendants’ 
economic problems in the first place. Hence, the judges’ argumentation does not reflect the 
sociological explanations of development of subculture, or understanding that criminal actions 
might be connected to blocked legal opportunities to earn money.   
 
To elaborate, the deterrence perspective is based on the theory of rational choice, as expressed 
by early classical theorists such as Cesar Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham. Aubert (1972) in his 
classic work The Social Function of Punishment offers an excellent introduction to this 
classical theory. Auber’s (1972 p.24-31) introduction can be summed up in the following 
way. The central point in the theory is that people are rational actors. Furthermore, rationality 
involves an end/means calculation. From this it follows that people freely choose all behavior, 
both conforming and deviant, based on their rational calculations. The central element of 
calculation involves a cost benefit analysis:  pleasure versus pain. Choice, with all other 
conditions equal, will be directed toward maximization of individual pleasure. Hence, choice 
can be controlled through the perception and understanding of the potential pain or 
punishment that will follow an act judged to be in violation of the law. Given this perspective, 
the cost/benefit calculations in heroin smuggling and dealing cases would involve an 
evaluation of the profit gained by illegal activities and the cost of the risk given the level of 
punishment in these types of crimes. A central question then is: In what way is the 
deterrence/rational choice approach to crime limiting?  
 
First, and as Andenæs (1977 p. 63) has pointed out, the economical understanding of crime 
offers a limited understanding of the motivational components of certain crimes. As an 
example, Andenæs uses a family killing, which would not easily fit a cost/benefit calculation. 
In other words, a rational theory approach underestimates the emotional components of 
people’s actions.   
 
Second, by stressing that people make their choices freely this approach offers a limited 
understanding of structural differences and power. Hence, it does not offer any insight into the 
fact that although people do make choices they do not choose the structures that they live 
154 
 
within. This approach does not take into account the fact that an unrestrained freedom of 
action might be an illusion, that people’s actions are neither random nor purely self-
determined, that there are always a number of constraints, both material and conceptual, that 
force and /or dispose us to act in certain ways. As mentioned earlier, the subculture theorist 
and the Norwegian criminologist and the sociologist of law have made these structural 
inequalities the focus of their study.      
 
Moreover, Schutz`s ((1932) 1967) distinction between in-order-to motives and because-of 
motives, which I have applied in the analyses of the prisoners’ narratives, are relevant in a 
debate about whether freedom is compatible with determinism. From the perspective of a 
person’s own in-order-to motive, the person experiences himself or herself as a free and 
morally responsible being; however, from the perspective of emphasizing one’s because-of 
motives after the act is completed, the person correlates his or her actions with its social 
economical determinants. It is important to recognize that to Schutz ((1932) 1967), these 
determinants are not to be construed as the real causes of people’s actions but rather as 
influences discovered through the retrospective and reflective act of associating earlier 
influences with the later actions that they seem to have influenced.   
 
The point is that given a deterrence/rational choice approach, the in-order-to motive (profit) 
for heroin smuggling is emphasized, whereas because- of motives are not. Seen from this 
point of view, the offenders telling a victim of social injustice narrative are expressing a 
resistance to the reductionism offered by the courts’ definition of them as simply driven by 
profit. When the offenders highlight their because-of motives—the social /economical 
determinants of their actions—they are giving explanations as to why they needed money in 
the first place and how this is interconnected with their marginal position within society. I will 
give some more examples of how the judges argue when personal factors are held in 
consideration when punishment is issued.   
 
Personal factors and the danger of spreading 
 
As previously mentioned, Andenæs (1971) argues that when general deterrence is used as an 
argument for punishment, individual factors are not emphasized when sentence is passed. 
This is a common argument in the appellate court decisions that are subsumed under Sections 
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two and three of § 162. To further illustrate how the judges argue when personal factors are 
held in the background, I will use two cases, both of them involving non-ethnic Norwegians. 
The first case involves a young man, only 18 years and 10 months, and the second case 
involves a 75 year old man. I have chosen these cases because the ages of the defendants are 
rather sensational and would perhaps lead the judges to take the defendants’ life situation into 
account.   
 
There are two interesting features in these cases. First, both the offenders’ age and life 
situation were emphasized when the appellate court meted out their punishment. Second, both 
cases were appealed to the Supreme Court, where the punishment given by the appellate court 
was reduced. However, this reduction in punishment was not done in reference to the 
defendants’ age and life situation, which the Supreme Court argued was irrelevant, but with 
references to the purity of the heroin involved in the cases.   
 
Case LB-2003-722 
 
A man of 18 years and 10 months of age was convicted to 10 years for keeping 3.5 kilos of 
heroin, 1.8 kilos of cocaine, and 79 ecstasy tablets. The accused was sent to Norway from 
Belgium by his parents, who regularly visited him, collecting money and delivering drugs for 
the accused to sell. When meting out punishment, the judges referred to the severity of the 
crime and general deterrence, and stated:   
 
“The defense has argued that the defendant has had a hard time in custody (395 days) 
and that he as an immigrant will have a hard time serving his sentence. The Court finds 
that these factors cannot be emphasized in a serious case like this one where general 
deterrence is made relevant. [...] It has to be taken into account that the defendant only 
was 18 years and 10 months when he was arrested. Further, it is obvious that his 
relations to the mission-givers (his parents) in Belgium had an impact on how he became 
part of the business” (LB-2003-722 p. 5).  
 
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, where the judges argued the following 
regarding the defendant’s background:  
 
“The defense has argued that the defendants’ relationship to the organizers of the crime 
was special, and that the Court has found that the drug dealing was organized by the 
defendants’ parents. Further it is emphasized that the offender only was 18 years and 10 
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months old at the time of the crime. I cannot see that this should be emphasized when 
issuing punishment” (Rt-2003-1082 p. 3).   
 
In addition to references to general deterrence, the judges of the Supreme Court justified not 
placing any emphasis on the defendant’s young age and the relationship to his parents, with 
the fact that the accused previously had been convicted of acts of violence toward his 
girlfriend and a doorman at a nightclub. The Supreme Court judges argued:   
 
“The district court has concretized the violent behavior toward his girlfriend to three 
separate episodes. The last time was the most serious. In this episode, he hit his 
girlfriend 20 times in the face, strangled her and head butted her. She went to the police, 
who came to their apartment to arrest him. […] The conviction of violence makes it not 
natural to view the relationship to the parents as important to the defendant’s actions” 
(Rt-2003-1082 p. 2).     
 
In other words, the accused was interpreted by the Supreme Court judges as a man who freely 
made his own choices, chose his deviant actions and was held responsible for them. One 
might pause here and ask some questions:  How reasonable is it to claim that this young man 
acted of free will? What had he experienced in his childhood? What would this young man’s 
story be? How would he, if given the chance, have described his own because-of motives? 
The mentioned judicial ruling does not answer these questions, nor do they cite what the 
defendant himself had explained in court. The point is that when personal factors, such as age 
and family relationships are not emphasized, the context of the defendant’s life, the social 
network in which his actions took place, and the actions as part of an ongoing process are not 
made visible nor considered relevant.        
 
Moreover, when a central goal of the judicial system is to treat like cases in the same manner, 
one might ask:  What is a similar case to this one? One answer to this question is given by the 
Supreme Court judges, who argue that a similar case would be a case that contains 
approximately the same amount of heroin as this one. The judges argue:   
 
“Storage of a large amount of 3477 grams of heroin would lead to a long sentence if the 
purity of the heroin had been normal. The question is what type of punishment one 
should give when the heroin is heavily adulterated. In this case there was only 434 grams 
with purity of 29-30 percent, which is the normal level in Norway. 14 grams of the 
heroin had a purity of percent, but most of the heroin had only a purity of 2 percent, 
whereas 198 grams had a purity of 5 percent. The expert witness Tormod Bønes from 
KRIPOS measured that the quantity of pure heroin in this case was 197.8 grams of 
heroin and 738 grams of cocaine. […]The question of the purity of the drug punishment 
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has been an issue in the Supreme Court at several occasions. […] When there is a big 
discrepancy in the purity of the drug and the normal purity, it must be emphasized 
when issuing punishment” (Rt- 2003-1082 p. 2).  
 
When the danger of spreading is strongly emphasized in the judicial logic and the judge’s 
argumentation, the question of the quality of the heroin becomes important, because heroin is 
commonly adulterated, and the quality of heroin can range from a slight percentage to 100 
percent pure heroin. While the amount of heroin is considered to be of great importance in the 
case, the quality of the drug is also discussed at length. The question the Court then addresses 
is:  How much heroin does, for example, 100 grams of heroin with 2-6 percent purity contain? 
And how should this purity affect the level of punishment? In this example, the Supreme 
Court reduced the punishment from ten to nine years with reference to the purity of the 
heroin.  At the other end of the age spectrum, a similar line of argumentation by the judges is 
found in the next example.  
  
Case LA-2003-13450  
 
A man, described as only speaking Spanish, aged 76 years, with prior convictions, was 
sentenced to four years and six months for importing heroin. When issuing punishment, the 
judges argued:  
 
“The Court finds that aggravating circumstances in this case are that heroin is a very 
addictive drug, and that 699 grams of it involves a great potential for spreading, and 
that the defendant has previously been convicted of a drug felony in Germany. This 
conviction has clearly not deterred the defender from doing these types of crimes. The 
Court finds that the mitigating circumstances are the low purity of the drug. Further it 
is emphasized that the offender with his 76 years will have a hard time serving his 
sentence. He only speaks Spanish and it might lead to isolation in the prison” (La-2003-
13450 p. 2).   
 
This case was also appealed to the Supreme Court, which reduced the offender’s punishment 
to four years; similarly to the previous case, however, the Supreme Court judges argued on 
the grounds of the purity of the heroin and not on the defendant’s personal factors. When 
passing sentence, the Supreme Court judges argued:   
 
“In this case, there are reasons to evaluate the personal factors of the defender. He was 
born in 1928 and will soon be 76 years old. When I don’t place any weight on the 
offenders’ age, it is because he has previous convictions in similar cases…The defense 
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has argued that the defendant might be very isolated in jail because he only speaks 
Spanish. This is not an extraordinary situation, and will be the case in many courier 
cases. There is a practice for giving foreigners with fewer visitors and language 
difficulties an early parole. After my evaluation, this is not the situation in this case, and 
should not be taken into account when measuring punishment. [...] That heroin is a very 
dangerous drug, is not necessary to argue. It has to be emphasized in this case that the 
purity of the heroin in this case was only 5 percent. […] Both the number of user doses 
and the risk of overdoses is reduced with a heavily adulterated heroin like in our case, 
compared to the more normal purity of 30- 50 percent. The amount of 699 grams must 
be measured against this. I want to underline that there are many issues in measuring 
punishment in a case like this one, and that it is by no means as simple as an arithmetic 
problem. When I now do this type of mathematical exercise it is to compare this case to 
two other cases. In our case, then, it was 35 grams of pure heroin. If the purity of the 
heroin had been 50 percent, then the amount of heroin would have been 70 grams” (Rt-
2004-643).      
 
By doing this mathematical exercise, the Supreme Court judge could compare this case to two 
previous cases that were given a lower punishment than the 75-year-old accused got in the 
appellate court, and, therefore, reduced his punishment to four years. Similarly to the 
previously mentioned case, the elderly man is not quoted in any of the courts’ decisions. The 
man’s background story is not mentioned apart from the fact that he has been punished 
before, and that he acted with a profit motive. Similar to the case of the young man, the 
context of this man’s actions was not made visible or relevant. One way of interpreting the 
Supreme Court’s reluctance to emphasize personal factors in aggravated drug crimes, even in 
cases with rather sensational personal factors, is that they are afraid this may lead to a 
weakening of the general deterrence effect.     
 
However, when the judge’s argumentation emphasizes the amount and quality of the heroin, 
the judicial practice legitimizes a certain understanding of issues relating to heroin. To 
elaborate, I will give two examples. First, the Supreme Court judges argue that one of the 
dangers of pure heroin is that it leads to overdoses. Although this is a rather widespread 
understanding, scholars within the research field of addiction argue that the relationship 
between the fatal overdoses and the quality of the heroin is much more complicated (see 
Darke and Zador 1996, Zador et al. 1996, Risser and Schneider 1994,). For example, studies 
based on toxicological data have shown that only rarely is a fatal overdose a consequence of 
unexpected high purity (Darke and Zador 1996, Risser and Schneider 1994). Variations in 
purity can cause overdoses, but much more common is a combination of the drug with 
intoxicating levels of alcohol or other central nervous system depressants, such as 
benzodiazepines.   
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Scholars such as Darke and Zador (1996) have also pointed out that heroin overdoses are not 
confined to inexperienced drug users, and that sometimes the difference between a fatal and a 
non-fatal overdose is the social setting where a heroin addict injects, and whether the drug 
user gets adequate help in time, either by other drug users or by medical staff. When the 
judicial logic stipulates that purer heroin is more dangerous than adulterated heroin, a myth 
may be unnecessarily kept alive.        
 
Second, it is interesting to note that although most of the appellate court decisions refer to the 
danger of spreading, none of the decisions referred to how heroin is supposed to spread in 
practice. Are we all at risk, or are some groups in society more at risk than others? None of 
the judicial decisions refer to whether or not the number of heroin users is increasing or 
decreasing, or what might influence and /or affect user patterns.42 However, what the judicial 
rhetoric repeatedly expresses is that heroin is a very dangerous and addictive drug.    
 
Organized crime, mens rea and cooperation with the police 
 
Compared to the victim of social injustice narrative, which, due to the emphasis on general 
deterrence, is not reflected in the judges’ argumentation, the victim of organized crime is a 
central narrative found in the appellate courts’ decisions. As mentioned earlier, a fundamental 
principle in the judicial logic is that crimes need to have both a mental and a physical element. 
Mens rea (guilty mind) refers to the mental element and is the person’s awareness that what 
they are doing is criminal. According to Andenæs (1965 p. 193), there are two different kinds 
of subjective guilt described in the law, intent and negligence. Further, intent is characterized 
by an actor that knowingly engages in criminal activity, whereas neglect is characterized as a 
person who is unaware of the attendant circumstances and the consequences of their actions. 
However, a reasonable person would have been aware. Hence, if the accused can argue that 
they committed the drug crime negligently, they cannot be punished for more than two years 
(see section five § 162).   
 
                                                 
42 It is important to recognize that there is no single empirical paper that tries to verify or prove the following: 
whether longer prison sentences, more drug seizures or more intensive police investigations affect or change 
drug use by current or prospective users and/or drug related problems (see Reuter 1997 p. 273). 
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Similar to the offenders telling the victim of organized crime narrative, a common 
argumentation found in the appellate court decisions was that the defendants did not know 
that they were transporting and or keeping heroin. The most common argument, found in the 
court decisions, was that the defendant thought that they were carrying or in possession of 
hashish, not heroin (see for example LA-2005-116643, LE 1994-2621, LB-1995-1277, LE-
1998-33, LB-1997-1891, LG-2001-2355, LB-2001-1399, LB-2000-3292). However, there 
were many other arguments used to describe that of which the offenders thought they were in 
possession of. Other examples include:  skin lotion (LB-1998-187), money (LB-1997-1355), 
cocaine (LB-1997-3174), amphetamines (LB-2001-220, LB-2002-1676), diamonds (LB-
2005-13851), and ecstasy tablets (LB-2005-1000620). The argument of not knowing at all 
that one was involved in a heroin transport was found in cases that involved more than one 
courier (se for example LB-1998-1436).  There is even one case where the courier argues that 
he came to Norway to apply for asylum, not to smuggle heroin (LB-1999-1801). What all 
these arguments have in common is that if they are believed, the defendants’ punishment will 
be radically reduced.   
 
Analyzing the appellate court decisions, I found it striking and a bit peculiar that the offenders 
were claiming such a similar line of defense. One way of interpreting this is that the judicial 
logic in aggravated heroin cases, which stresses general deterrence, and excludes personal 
factors as irrelevant, gives the defense a very narrow field within which to argue, and hence 
they argue neglect.43 However, in most of these cases, the accused’ motivation is not 
questioned, as it is assumed to be profit, as mentioned earlier. This is because the couriers and 
keepers of heroin are often given money for their missions. What is at stake in these cases is 
whether or not the offenders were manipulated into the mission, and whether or not they knew 
that they were in possession of heroin. It is also important to recognize that the stories that 
these couriers and keepers of heroin tell to the police and in the courts are the sources 
(foundation) on which the law enforcement agencies base their views when they are 
describing how heroin crimes and other drug crimes are organized.44 In the following, I will 
illustrate this with some examples. First, I will give two examples of cases where the 
                                                 
43 It is rather obvious that smugglers and dealers of large quantities of heroin cannot argue the victim of 
addiction narrative, for example 16 kilo of heroin for their own use. However I would like to point out that the 
courts’ resistance to hearing personal factors in aggravated drug crimes might exclude and/or cover drug use 
among ethnic minorities. The interviewed prisoners tell of extensive drug use, although they are not injecting 
heroin. 
44 As mentioned in the theory chapter, not only law enforcement uses these sources, but scientists researching 
organized crime do, as well.  
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defendants were not believed in their line of defense, and second, some examples of offenders 
with a similar line of argumentation whose stories were believed.   
 
Case LB- 2001-1399   
 
An Eastern European citizen, a 33-year-old male, was sentenced to seven years and six 
months for importing one kilo of heroin into Norway in his car. In discussing the courier’s 
intent, the judges argued as follows:    
 
“It is nevertheless argued from the defense that the offender did not act with intent. He 
did not himself place the drugs in the car, and he was not there when the drugs were 
placed in the car. He was under the impression that it was not a dangerous drug, and 
thought that it was nothing stronger than marijuana. The Court has found that it is 
proven without a reasonable doubt that the defendant, although not knowing exactly 
what the packet contained, realized that it might be heroin. Following the defendant’s 
own explanation, he had asked his employer repeatedly what the packet contained, 
without getting a clear answer. One time he was told that it was best that he did not 
know, and he was told that it was nothing dangerous. The Court finds that this cannot 
excuse him. The Court finds that he had considered that the packet could contain 
heroin. When he then, for payment, travels the long way to Norway with the packet and 
imports it here, this is sufficient for him to be judged with intent of having imported 
heroin to Norway” (LB-2001-1399 p. 2).  
 
Since the actual facts of a case happen outside the court, and always in the past, the task of the 
trial is to reconstruct the past from what are, at best, reports of facts.  As mentioned earlier, 
Lyman and Scott (1989) argue that the court must deal with the problematic situation of 
assessing what happened in the minds of the accused at the time of the crime. This is what 
Lyman and Scott labelled “the mind-reading problem of intent.” Simplistically expressed, in 
many heroin cases, this means that the prosecutor will argue that the defendant knew, or at 
least should have known, and the defense will argue that they did not know and that they had 
been manipulated by others. Hence, the question of the offenders’ intent illuminates the 
contradictorily principal of the courts, argued by the sociologists of law, where two sides 
argue to serve their own interest (Frank 1950, Aubert 1972). One more example: 
 
Case LE-1994-2621 
 
An Asian citizen was punished with eleven years of prison time for smuggling four kilos of 
heroin into Norway. In the appellate court decision, the judges argue the following:  
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“The defendant got a request from an acquaintance, asking if he would smuggle drugs 
to Norway. The offender has explained that he was told that this was about hashish, and 
that he would not have been willing to smuggle anything more dangerous than that. The 
Court finds that this is an incorrect statement. The Court finds that from the beginning 
it was a question of smuggling heroin to Norway, something the defendant said that he 
would do. The Court finds that the defendant all along knew that the amount in question 
was four kilos.”   
 
In addition to not being believed in court when claiming neglect, these two previous examples 
have one more thing in common.  Neither of the defendants contributed, by cooperating with 
the police to the arrests of other people. In the next examples, there are two common features: 
first, the accused claims neglect, and second, the accused cooperates with the police.   
 
Case: LB-1997-1355 
 
An Eastern European citizen was sentenced to nine years for smuggling three kilos of heroin 
into Norway from Budapest.  In the appellate court, this sentence was reduced to one year and 
nine months, on the grounds of neglect. He stated he had not known that he was transporting 
heroin but thought that he was smuggling counterfeit money for an employer for whom he 
previously smuggled money. The judges argued:  
 
“When the defendant was confronted with what customs had found, the defendant 
completely fell to pieces. When he came to himself he decided to cooperate with the 
police. […] In a mitigating direction, it must be emphasized that the defendant has 
cooperated with the police, and that the receivers of the heroin were thus arrested. He 
has also contributed with information about the employers in his country of origin. Both 
he and his former wife have received threats as a result” (LB-1997-1355 p. 3).   
 
Similar to the structure of the victim of organized crime narrative, in this judgment, the end 
event—the event that changes the meaning of the previous events—is underlined by the 
judges as an emotional event when they believe that the defendant acted negligently.   
 
One other characteristic of the cases in which the defendant is believed when claiming neglect 
and cooperates with the police is that their willingness to talk is strongly emphasized by the 
judges. This is especially true in a situation when they can claim a threat or a risk of a threat 
to their person. Andenæs (1977 p. 94) makes an interesting point about the similarities 
between organized crime and deterrence; within the classical organized crime (Italian mafia), 
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the internal justice or the threat of the internal justice shows that deterrence actually works. 
When the members are scared of talking because they fear punishment by the ruthless leaders 
of the mob, they are submitting to the norms of organized crime. Additionally, Andenæs 
(1977 p. 94) raised the question: Why does organized crime flourish in connection to 
corruption? The answer is that corruption reduces the effect of the legal system, and gives the 
member of organized crime a feeling of immunity. One might ask:  What would happen if the 
court let a person who was understood by the media to be part of organized crime get off with 
a small or lenient sentencing? Seen from this point of view, cooperation with the police and 
informing on the others involved should be given credit.   
 
However, it is important to first recognize that these ideas of the interconnectedness of 
corruption and organized crime open up the use of heavy sentencing as leverage for the heavy 
sentences. If one follows this argument, the severe punishment of individuals who are 
assumed to be part of organized crime serves the function of bringing legitimatization to the 
court and its power. In other words, the image of organized crime, with all its mythical 
implications, serves as a background in most aggravated single offense drug cases, especially 
when the accused is an ethnic minority.  Second, the practice of encouraging the defendants to 
talk also leads to the earlier mentioned prisoner dilemma, i.e., playing different offenders out 
against one another. Similarly to the prisoner telling the victim of organized crime narrative, it 
is quite common that one of the offenders, in cases that have more than one accused, may be 
believed when claiming neglect. The following is an example: 
 
Case (LB-1997-1891):   
 
Two men were convicted for importing three kilos of heroin. (A) A 48-year-old man with 
prior convictions was sentenced to six years. In the appellate court, this sentence was reduced 
to one year and eight months, whereas eleven months were made conditional. (B) A 40-year-
old man, described as an entrepreneur, was sentenced to eight years. The appellate court 
increased his punishment to eleven years. When meting out the punishment for B, the judges 
argued:  
 
“The Court finds that general deterrence directs a severe reaction in a drug crime like 
this one. For that reason, personal factors have little importance. None of the defendants 
are themselves users of heroin, and the entire heroin consignment was meant for the 
Norwegian market. It was a pure profit motive behind both of the defendants’ actions. 
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[…] B has had a central role in the heroin import. He has had contact with both the 
sellers and the receivers. He organized the couriers and the transportation. The import 
was professionally done, and shows that he has international contacts. There are no 
mitigating circumstances” (LB-1997-1891 p. 2).   
 
When meting out punishment for A the appellate court judges argue:   
 
“Throughout the police investigations, the district courts, and the appeal process, A has 
claimed that he did not know that he was importing heroin. He was under the 
impression that he was importing hashish. The Court finds it has not been proved that 
he knew it was heroin. […] For A, it is appreciated that he laid all his cards on the table, 
so that the case against B was solved. It has been proven that it involved a great deal of 
personal risk to tell the truth that has led to B being punished for his crime” (LB-1997-
1891 p. 2).   
 
It is a common feature in appellate court decisions that the defendants who are believed in 
their claims of neglect are the same persons that cooperate with the police, but I have also 
found examples of a defendant who was believed in his claim that he had acted with neglect 
even though he did not contribute to more people getting arrested. However, he was believed 
to have been manipulated by a much more resourceful and organized actor.   
 
Case LF-2005-76627 
 
A refugee living in Oslo accepted, after hesitation, to transport drugs from Oslo to Bodø. He 
was arrested in Trondheim, and the police found 85 grams of amphetamines, 164 grams of 
hashish, and 97, 04 grams of heroin on him. The accused claimed that he knew that he was 
carrying amphetamines and hashish, but not the heroin. When meting out the punishment, the 
judges argued as follows:   
 
“When issuing punishment it is emphasized that this case involves a large amount of 
drugs which were meant for selling. The defendant was a courier, and had only an 
economic motivation for doing the mission. Having the heroin is the most serious part of 
what A is convicted for. […] When it comes to the neglectful possession of heroin it is 
emphasized that it was a large amount of a dangerous drug, and that A can be criticized 
for not investigating whether or not the drugs he was carrying also included heroin” 
(LF-2005-76627 p. 2).   
 
The defendant was believed to have been exploited by a much more organized and 
professional actor. The court believed his story. He was convicted to 10 months in prison.        
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The offenders that tell a victim of organized crime narrative are—although not to the same 
extent as the offenders telling a victim of social injustice narrative—expressing a resistance to 
the labels enforced on them, as they are negotiating with the frame of organized crime set by 
the Court, and with the argumentation accepted by the appellate court as legitimate (their 
position in regard to others’ involvement and their own intent).  
 
Previously I have argued that both the victim of social injustice narrative and the victim of 
organized crime narrative can be interpreted as excuse accounts. This is because these 
narratives are an admission that dealing in large quantities of heroin was wrong coupled by a 
denial of full responsibility (Lyman and Scott 1989 p. 135). When these narratives are 
expressed in front of the holders of power (the judges), the victim of social injustice is not a 
successful excuse, whereas the victim of organized crime often is, especially if it is told in 
cooperation with the police.   
 
Addiction as a legitimate because-of motive 
 
So far I have looked at how the judges argue in especially aggravated and aggravated drug 
felonies involving mostly non-ethnic Norwegians offenders. Now I want to turn the attention 
to cases where the offenders argue that they are addicted to heroin. First, one important 
question becomes:  Are there any tendencies in regard to ethnicity and the length of 
punishment in the category of cases involving 15-749 grams of heroin? The following table 
can illustrate this: 
Table 5 Percentage of cases where the main offender is ethnic Norwegian, and 
percentage of cases where the main offender is non-ethnic Norwegian, in the appellate 
court decisions involving the amount of 15-749 grams of heroin after length of 
punishment (N=293). 
 
 
Ethnic Norwegians 
(N=173) 
Non-ethnic Norwegians 
(N=120) 
0-2 years 49 12 
2-10 years 50 87 
>10- years 1 1 
Total 100 100 
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What does this table show? First, this table shows that in 87 percent of the cases involving 15-
749 gram of heroin where the main offender is non-ethnic Norwegian, the offender is 
punished from 2-10 years; whereas in 50 percent of the cases where the main offender is 
ethnic Norwegian, involving 15- 749 grams of heroin, the offender is sentenced to 2-10 years. 
Second, this table shows that in 49 percent of the cases where the main offender is ethnic 
Norwegian, involving 15-749 grams of heroin, the offender is sentenced to 0-2 years in 
prison, and in only 12 percent of cases where the main offender is a non-ethnic Norwegian, 
involving 15-749 grams of heroin, the offender is sentenced to 0-2 years. In other words, there 
seems to be a tendency within the category of 15-749 grams of heroin that when the main 
offender is ethnic Norwegian, the sentence issued by the appellate court judges is within the 
frame of a simple drug felony, whereas in cases where the main offender is non-ethnic 
Norwegian, the sentence issued by the appellate judges is more frequently within the frame of 
an aggravated drug felony. 
 
However, the category including 15-749 grams of heroin consists of a fairly wide range of 
different heroin quantities. Hence, one explanation of the differences between cases with an 
ethnic Norwegian main offender and the cases with a non- ethnic Norwegian main offender 
could be that the ethnic Norwegians offenders are systematically charged with smaller 
amounts of heroin than the non-ethnic Norwegians offenders within the category 15-749 
grams. The following figure illustrates this point:  
Figure 12. Percentage of cases where the main offender is ethnic Norwegian, and 
percentage of cases where the main offender is non-ethnic Norwegian in the appellate 
court decisions grouped according to grams of heroin. 
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This figure shows that in cases where the main offender is ethnic Norwegians, they are 
systematically charged with amounts from 15-80 grams of heroin; whereas in cases where the 
main offenders are non-ethnic Norwegian, they are systematically charged with 80-170 grams 
of heroin. Hence, following the judicial logic, this would explain the differences in 
punishment, between ethnic Norwegians and non-ethnic Norwegians, in cases involving 15-
749 grams of heroin. Moreover, seen from within the judicial perceptive, this could also be 
interpreted as a trend where the border between simple and aggravated heroin felonies in 
practice has moved from 15 to 80 grams of heroin, where those offenders charged with up to 
80 grams of heroin get punished from zero to two years, and those offenders charged with 
more than 80 grams heroin get punished to more than two years. However, determine in more 
detail how the judges evaluated and argued these cases, I will analyze some cases which 
involve 15 to 80 grams of heroin.  
 
A central characteristic of the cases involving up to 80 grams of heroin is that the offenders 
often claim that they are themselves addicted to heroin. I have identified three characteristics 
in judges’ argumentation in cases where the defendants claim that they are addicted to heroin. 
First, the judges explain that in recent years45 there has developed a judicial practice to treat 
these cases more leniently. Second, the judges discuss how much heroin in the case was 
meant for personal use and how much was intended to be sold. This issue is important 
because it establishes whether the defendants’ motives were profit. Third, community service 
and community sentences46 are forms of punishment issued by the judges in some of these 
cases, even in the cases involving more than 15 grams of heroin, and subsumed as aggravated 
drug felonies.    
 
Moreover, a striking feature in these cases is that the judges argue in a paradoxical and 
somewhat confused way. On the one hand, the judges stress the seriousness of the crime with 
                                                 
45 Exactly when this trend of leniency started in the judicial practices has been difficult for me to determine. The 
earliest mentioned arguments, which I have found, in which a well-established drug user should be treated more 
lenient than others, was in a Supreme Court decision from 1991 (Rt- 1991-275). However, and as earlier 
mentioned, the first harm reduction measure in Norway was the needle exchange, which was established in 1988, 
in relation to the fear of HIV-virus spreading among the injecting drug users. Hence, four years later, the first 
harm reduction inspired arguments were voiced in the Supreme Court.      
46 Community service is meant to replace a prison sentence. The offender performs unpaid work for a fixed 
number of hours. The work is usually done for a non-profit organization. Community sentence (in Norwegian 
“samfunnstraff”) was introduced in 2002, replacing the former order of community service. A fixed number of 
hours have to be served either by unpaid work, participation in a programme, or other activities aimed at 
prevention of reoffending (See Kristofferesen 2007).   
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reference to general deterrence, the danger of spreading and often include an assessment of 
the quality of the heroin. On the other hand, if the dealer is an established drug user, this is 
given considerable weight by the judges when issuing punishment. To illustrate this, I will use 
an example: 
 
Case LB-2004-16133 
 
A 38-year-old Norwegian male was convicted to prison for one year and one month for being 
in possession of 35 grams of heroin. When meting out punishment, the judges argued:  
 
“As an aggravating circumstance, the Court finds the defendant’s prior drug 
convictions. This time, the case involves heroin which is a very addictive drug with a 
short period of addictiveness, and which is very dangerous to the user. With the amount 
of heroin this case involves, there is an objective danger of spreading. […] The Court 
has, although, come to the conclusion that the punishment must be reduced in this case. 
The defendant is himself a heroin user, and the Court has no proof that the drugs were 
not primarily meant for the defendant himself” (LB-2004-16133). 
 
Similar to the judges’ argumentation in this case, prior drug convictions of the defendants can 
be interpreted either as an aggravating circumstance and/or a mitigating circumstance. To 
clarify, on the one hand, a previous conviction shows the defendant as a reoffending criminal 
which is an aggravating circumstance; on the other hand, if this conviction is for a drug 
felony, it also establishes the defendant as a drug user. Compared to the prisoners that tell the 
victim of addiction narrative, and stress that they sell heroin to finance their own addiction, 
the question mirrored in the judges’ argumentation is:  Was the heroin for their own use or for 
selling?  Hence, one problem the judges struggle with in these cases is that the amount of 
heroin involved stipulates the use of § 162, where the “the danger of spreading” is inherent, at 
the same time, the offenders claim that the heroin was meant for their own use and the judges 
find no proof otherwise.  
 
The danger of spreading is inherent in §162, because the paragraph can only be used in cases 
where there is an intent to sell or spread the drug (Se Ot.prp.nr.23 1983-84). If the drug is 
only for personal use, then § 162 should not be used; instead § 43 in the law Relating to 
Medicines, etc. is made relevant. § 43 stipulates the following: “Possession and use of 
narcotics is punishable by fines and imprisonment of up to six months.” It is the amount and 
type of drug that is important for estimating if a case should be subsumed under the Penal 
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Code or the law Relating to Medicines, etc. The earlier mentioned circular from the Director 
General of Public Prosecution (nr.1/1998) stipulates that in heroin cases, the Relating to 
Medicine Act can be used in cases that only involve one to two users.  
 
This raises the question:  What is a user dose of heroin? It is important to recognize that size 
of a user dose is interconnected with the purity of the heroin, and that the purity of the heroin 
available on the Norwegian market has been reducing over time. Similarly, in the 1980s, the 
Norwegian heroin users /dealers divided a gram of heroin into “tubes” (in Norwegian “rør”); 
one gram could contain two to three tubes, which gave 10-15 user doses. In the 1990s, a new 
system for dividing the heroin developed, whereby a gram was divided into fewer units (four 
or five). These new units where called “quarters” (in Norwegian “kvartting”) (Snertingdal 
2007 p. 51). However, all the appellate court cases in this sample are subsumed under § 162, 
yet, the argument of own use is emphasized and given weight when punishment is issued. One 
question then arises:  What about the dealers who do not argue that they are addicted to 
heroin? How are they met by the courts? Here is one example:       
 
LG-2003-983 
 
An immigrant who came to Norway in 1992 was convicted for selling 17, 5 grams of heroin. 
He was receiving disability benefits and had no previous convictions. The case went all the 
way to the Supreme Court. The defendant was given quite a different punishment in the three 
different courts as seen in Figure 13.  
Figure 13. Case LG- 2003-983, at all levels of justice and length of punishment 
 
 
 
In the Supreme Court, the judges argued as follows: 
District Court, three 
years
Appellate Court, one 
year and three months
Supreme Court, one 
year and eight months
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“It follows from recent years’ practice when meting out punishment, that there has been 
lenience in sentencing for drug felonies that involve buying or storing for own use and 
not primarily with the intent of spreading the drug. However, the defendant in this case 
is not himself a user of drugs, and the dealing was done with a pure profit motive. There 
is no mitigating circumstance” (Rt-2004-219).  
 
In this example, it is argued explicitly by the judges that if one is not addicted to heroin, there 
has to be a profit motive for the dealing.  One can compare this case to a case which involves 
almost twice as much heroin, but where the accused received a community sentence.   
  
Case LA-2005-100956  
  
A 35-year-old Norwegian female drug user was sentenced to one year and two months for 
being in possession of 38, 6 gram of heroin. This punishment was reduced in the appellate 
court to 404 hours of community sentence. The judges argue as following: 
 
“The Court finds that it is not proved that the drugs in question were meant for selling. 
When this is said, there is a potential for spreading with this large amount of heroin, so 
that storing of these types of amount most be punished harder than successively buying 
smaller user doses. [...] In our case, the Court finds that we have an extraordinary case 
where the rehabilitation argument dedicates that we try a reaction in freedom to avoid 
that the defendant falls back into drug use. The defendant is a 35-year-old female that 
has had a childhood marked by drug abuse and child abuse, and has herself been a 
heavy drug user for the last 20 years of her life. […]This might be her last chance for 
breaking out of the drug addiction that has a life treating dimension” (LA 2005-100956 
p. 2).   
 
The main reason given by the judges for community sentences is that serving time in prison 
would destroy the good rehabilitation process that the accused had started. The use of 
community sentence is found in similar cases (example LG-2004-6762, LB-2002-799 and 
LH-2002-804). Compared to the aggravated heroin cases where personal factors are not 
emphasized, the defendants who argue their own addiction often get their background story 
quoted in the decisions. One effect of this is that the context of the offenders lives are made 
visible and relevant, and it urges the judges to be responsive to the human needs. One way of 
interpreting this, and similar to the victim of addiction narrative, is that the offenders’ 
because-of motives are being emphasized when punishment is issued. One important question 
then becomes:  Does this type of argumentation imply that the judges have given up the 
deterrence argument and adopted a more pragmatic attitude to the drug problem? It is 
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important to recognize that the judges are not arguing that the offenders should not be met 
with a reaction, or that the general deterrence effect is made redundant. To illustrate this, I 
will use an example.      
 
Case Rt-2000-254 
  
A 23-year-old Norwegian male was convicted by the appellate court to one year and three 
months for 20 grams of heroin; the accused appealed his verdict to the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court denied the offender’s appeal for community service, but reduced his sentence 
to ten months in prison. This Supreme Court decision is very interesting. First, because it 
involves a dissent; two judges argued for community service and three judges argued for a 
reduced prison punishment. Second, the Supreme Court verdict contains central judicial 
arguments of how to justify the use of community service/sentence in aggravating drug 
crimes. The judges arguing for community service based their argument on the precedents 
which stipulate a lenient treatment for the heroin users. This is expressed in the following 
quote:  
  
“In my view, the addicts buying drugs for their own use are in a totally different 
situation to culpability than the person that buys to deal the drug. This is especially the 
case when the drug user buys, consecutively, small amounts” (Rt-2000-254). 
 
However, the judges arguing against the use of community service claimed:  
 
“With limiting the use of community service concerning aggravated drug crimes to cases 
where there is an extraordinary rehabilitation situation, the Court lets the concern to 
stop the defendant in continuing their involvement with the drug be emphasized more 
than the estimated loss of general deterrence that might happen if the defendant is not 
convicted to prison. If the prison punishment is substituted with community service 
without a concern for stopping the offender continuing their drug use or crime, one only 
gains a loss of the general deterrence effect” (Rt-2000-254).  
 
In other words, the judge is arguing that there has to be situations where the human need and 
motivation for treatment is established for the idea of general deterrence to be made 
redundant. Similar to the image created by the victim of addiction narrative, the judges 
perceive the heroin addict as ill and in need of treatment, not primarily as a criminal in need 
of punishment. This implies that the earlier mentioned criticism raised by the Norwegian 
criminologist and sociologists of law, i.e., that the courts primarily uses § 162 to punish drug 
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users harshly, is a criticism in need of some modification. Addiction is heard as a central 
argument both in regard to what type of punishment it is given and the length of the 
punishment issued in drug cases. However, the courts practice a strict policy of not given 
weight to personal factors when punishment is issued in aggravated heroin drug cases. Other 
determents which might limit people’s choices and opportunities are not addressed by the 
courts and are deemed irrelevant when punishment is measured. One central question then 
becomes, does the judges’ argumentation in these cases mirror a shift in drug policy?  
 
One way of interpreting the judges` argumentation runs parallel to the earlier mentioned dual-
track policy argument (Hakkarainen et al. 2007). Harm reduction has entered the core of 
criminal control, the judicial practices, and has made it difficult for the judges to argue purely 
on the basis of a general deterrence effect and the visions of a drug-free society. Hence, the 
dual-track policy is mirrored in the judges’ argumentation. Moreover one might ask: How 
harmoniously have these two policies aligned in the judicial logic?  
 
One way of construing the dual-track policy within the judicial practices is that it can lead to a 
systematically different understanding of the non-ethnic Norwegian dealers and smugglers 
and ethnical Norwegian dealers. Where the ethnic Norwegian heroin dealers are met by the 
judges with a harm reduction inspired pragmatism and an understanding of their life and 
struggles, these factors are made relevant in court and for issuing punishment. The non-ethnic 
Norwegian heroin dealers and smugglers, on the other hand, could be met with an expectation 
of a pure profit motive; where no personal factors or background expiations are made relevant 
in the case or heard as mitigating circumstances when issuing punishment, except for the 
situations in which the accused is willing to cooperate with the police. Hence, punishing non-
ethnic Norwegians sternly in aggravated drug crimes can be interpreted as serving the 
function of justifying the state as an effective and competent actor which has not given up the 
serious heroin problem. 
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Summary: 
 
As a vocabulary of motive, the judicial rhetoric and logic in heroin cases has proven to be a 
rather slim vocabulary, which mainly consists of the profit motive and addiction as the only 
legitimate because-of motive. Moreover, the basic argument that I have been making in this 
chapter is as follows.  
 
First, the victim of social injustice is not reflected in the judge’s argumentation at all. With 
references to general deterrence, the judges argue that personal factors have no bearing in the 
case of an aggravated drug crime. A consequence of this is that the defendants’ because-of 
motives are not heard as mitigating circumstances in aggravated drug crimes. One exception 
to this occurs if the accused can use his or her own addiction as a because-of motive; this is 
often heard in court and result in a reduction in punishment.  
 
Second, the victims of organized crime narrative can be a successful story, and yield some 
reduction in punishment if told in cooperation with the police. In other words, reduction in 
punishment is given if the offenders inform on the other people involved in the drug dealing 
and smuggling.  
 
Thirdly, the victim of addiction narrative is the most successful story told in court, because it 
can result in a reduction in punishment.  
 
Fourth, the entrepreneur narrative, which was used by only four offenders in this study, is the 
most common narrative reflected in the judges’ argumentation. Hence, the in-order-to motive, 
the profit motive, lies at the core of the judge’s argumentation and justifies heavy punishment.  
 
The introduction of a harm reduction inspired argumentation by the judges might lead to a 
systematical difference between ethnic Norwegian and non-ethnic Norwegian heroin dealers 
and smugglers. The ethnic Norwegian drug dealers’ because-of motives are made relevant in 
court, whereas the non-ethnic offenders’ because-of motives are not given weight when 
punishment is issued. The argumentation presented in this chapter can be schematically 
presented as follows: 
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Schema 4. Judicial logic schematically presented 
    
 Victim of social 
injustice 
Victim of organized 
crime 
Victim of addiction Entrepreneurs 
Use of § 162 Sections two and 
three 
Sections two and 
three 
Sections one and 
two 
Sections two and 
three 
Judicial 
argumentation 
General deterrence: 
danger of spreading 
General deterrence: 
danger of spreading 
General deterrence: 
danger of 
spreading, and 
specific deterrence: 
rehabilitation 
potential 
General deterrence: 
danger of spreading 
Relevance for 
issuing punishment: 
Mitigating and 
aggravating 
circumstances 
Personal factors no 
relevance 
Role in the criminal 
activity and 
cooperation with 
the police relevant 
Personal use versus 
distributing to 
others, and 
rehabilitation 
potentially relevant 
An entrepreneur 
spirit legitimatize 
heavy punishment 
Aggravating 
circumstance 
Motives because-of motives 
not heard 
Profit motive, as an 
in-order-to motive 
but what was the 
offenders’ intent? 
Profit motive as an 
in-order-to motive, 
addiction as a 
because-of motive 
Profit motive, as the 
only in-order-to 
motive 
Guilt A problematic life / 
economical 
situation does not 
justify crime: 
Guilty 
Did or didn’t the 
offenders know that 
it was heroin? 
They should have 
known 
Confessions, the 
offenders ill and in 
need of treatment, 
not prison 
Guilty 
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11. Conclusion 
 
“Narratives that mobilize people to crime are not inventions of the mind but political and 
ideological practices as much part of the material texture of reality as bombs and factories, 
wars and revolutions.” 
(Currie 1998 in Presser 2008 p. 149) 
 
 
There is a longstanding criminological and sociological tradition of researching the selective 
functions of the legal system in general (such as Aubert 1972, Mathisen 1984) and in drug 
felonies in particular (such as Bødal 1982, Hauge 1982, Christie and Bruun 1985). This is 
done by focusing on the offender’s social/economical background and comparing it to the rest 
of the population. In this study, I follow this line of reasoning, which stipulates that the legal 
practices could have a selective function, but I have added some new dimensions to the 
argument. First, I focus on the heroin smugglers and dealers’ language, narratives, and 
expressed motives, and their interconnectedness with the judicial practices. Second, I add a 
new dimension to the traditional criminological approach by focusing on inequalities created 
by the courts’ attitudes toward different defendants’ stories. My focus is on the potential 
treatment among those who are differently accused, rather than how the judicial practices 
selectively target specific marginalized groups within the population.  
 
Moreover, I have argued that the heroin smugglers and dealers’ narratives reveal different 
attitudes toward their past actions. These orientations evolve from the offenders’ use of 
different types of motives in their narratives. In analyzing the offenders’ motives, I draw on  
Schutzs’ (1932, 1967) distinction between because-of motives and in-order-to motives. The 
principle is that when the offenders see themselves in light of their because-of motives, they 
see themselves as a result of their socio-economic determents, and downplay their in-order-to 
motives. However, in the court of law establishing the guilt of the accused, in-order-to 
motives are crucial (Andenæs 1965). Thus, one could, as a point of departure, expect that all 
because-of motives were deemed irrelevant in court.  
 
In analyzing the heroin dealers and smugglers’ narratives, and their expressed motivation, I do 
not entirely understand the offenders’ stories as inventions of the individual heroin smugglers 
and dealers minds, but as stories which are created out of a wider cultural framework of 
176 
 
reference. Hence, culture provides a “vocabulary of motives” (Mills 1940, Lyman and Scott 
1989) for the offenders to talk about their illegal activities.  
 
In this study, I have chosen to explore the interconnectedness between the heroin dealers and 
smugglers’ narratives, and the judicial practices’ central role in establishing a cultural 
“vocabulary of motives.” This choice is based on the recognition that the legal practices are 
significant in constituting legitimate motivations for heroin crimes and for our moral 
conceptions of heroin crimes. This is because the legal punishment is a correction, a therapy 
an attempt at normalization. The judicial process is supposed to measure, assess, diagnose, 
cure and transform individuals. However, no legal trial and legal sentencing are the judgment 
and punishment of an isolated individual; the practices of lawyers, prosecutors and judges 
also represent the social and cultural evaluation of human behaviour, the setting of examples 
as an attempt to recompose normality, and hence constitute our moral understanding of heroin 
smuggling and dealing (see also Carvalho Figueiredo 2002 p. 262). In other words, in the 
meeting between the judicial practices and the narratives of the heroin dealers, there occurs 
both a validation process and a labelling process. 
 
I have shown that there is a tendency for the ethnic Norwegian heroin offenders and the non-
ethnic Norwegian offenders to tell different victim narratives. The ethnic Norwegian 
offenders tell the victim of addiction narrative, whereas the non-ethnic Norwegian offenders 
tell the social injustice narrative and/or the victim of organized crime narrative. Only four 
offenders tell the entrepreneur narrative. What happens, then, when these narratives meet the 
judicial practices?  
 
As an institutionalized practice, the courts administer both a harm reduction ideology, and a 
zero tolerance ideology, which in heroin felonies run together with ethnicity and the 
understanding of organized crime. Moreover, harm reduction as an ideology could guide the 
judges to view addiction as legitimate because-of motive; whereas the zero tolerance ideology 
could lead the judges to exclude problematic integration and marginalization as legitimate 
because-of motives. In effect, the victim of addiction is a winning narrative, whereas the 
victim of social injustice is the loosing narrative in court. Generally speaking then, the judicial 
practices reproduce different understandings of ethnic Norwegian heroin dealers as addicted 
to heroin and in need of treatment, not punishment; whereas non-ethnic Norwegians are 
177 
 
viewed as profit-seeking business criminals, part of international and well-organized criminal 
networks, and in need of severe punishment. 
 
Thus, there is a tendency for the judges to validate and legitimate addiction as an “internal 
forces” issue, which resolves personal responsibilities. “External forces,” however, such as 
marginalization and exclusion, are not viewed as legitimate limiting forces on humans’ 
actions in relation to heroin felonies. Moreover, when “internal forces” such as addiction are 
viewed as legitimate, it invites the medical practices into the courts, to decide whether a 
person is addicted or not, and if the person is motivated for treatment of the addiction. Hence, 
harm reduction as an ideology has brought a medical understanding of the drug problem into 
the judicial practices, which no doubt has helped many individuals. At the same time, it seems 
to exclude other social explanations of heroin trafficking, which could further the unequal 
treatment of ethnic and non-ethnic Norwegian offenders in court.  
 
In other words, the traditional sociological and criminological explanations of crime, and the 
development of subcultures which rely on structural explanations, such as blocked legal 
opportunities to earn money (Merton 1957, Cohen 1966, Cloward and Ohlin 1969) are 
deemed irrelevant in court when used by the accused in heroin felonies. The same can be said 
about contextual explanations which are generated by the ethnographical approaches (such as 
Preble and Casey 1967, Agar 1973, 2002, Bourgois 1995). However valuable and 
praiseworthy the attitude of countering medical and juridical understandings of drug dealing, 
and establishing humanizing concepts of drug user/dealers found in these ethnographic 
approaches, they provide poor ammunition for the heroin dealers and smugglers in the 
courtrooms, because these approaches do not generate individualistic explanations of drug 
dealing. Hence, I would argue that the judicial practices are important to study in relation to 
heroin smugglers and dealers, precisely because the judicial practices hold the power to 
imprison the dealers and smugglers on the basis of their individual explanations.     
 
Whose side am I on? 
 
In the introduction, I quoted Hacking’s (2000 p. 6) description of the main assumptions found 
within a social constructionist approach, as follows: “X as it is at present, is not determined by 
the nature of things; it is not inevitable.” Moreover, I declared that this study’s X was, 
178 
 
“understandings of heroin smuggler and dealers.” However I deliberately left out of the 
introduction the next two assumptions which, according to Hacking, are commonly found 
within a social constructionist approach. These are as follows: “X is quite bad as it is”; and 
“We would be much better off if X were done away with, or at least radically transformed” 
(Hacking 2000 p. 6). The point Hacking is making is that a social constructionist researcher 
tends to be critical toward the status quo, although the researcher’s commitments to the last 
two points of transformation might vary.  
 
The main reason I omitted these two points from the introductions, was because I did not start 
this study on a moral mission to radically alter ways in which heroin smuggling and dealing is 
conceptualized, or with a clear conviction that the way heroin smugglers and dealers are 
conceptualized in society is bad. Rather, I started out with a curiosity about how different 
understandings of heroin smuggling and dealing are created and recreated through a feedback 
loop between the narratives told by the offenders and the judicial practices. However, 
throughout the study, I became more and more aware of and concerned with, patterns of 
inequality. These patterns of inequality are hard to see close up in the individual cases, but 
can be found at a more general level, such as the judicial practices. I will therefore end this 
dissertation with some more reflections on the moral implications of my design, findings and 
research position. 
  
In the classic article from 1967, Howard Becker raises the question, “Whose side are we on?”, 
and elaborates the issues of bias in relation to studies done on deviant groups, such as   
prisoners. A central point for Becker (1967 p. 240), in relation to the question of bias, is that 
the researcher can develop deep sympathies for the ones she is studying. She can become an 
advocate for a one-sided view, where she produces whitewashings of criminals and a 
condemnation, if only by implications, of those respectable citizens who, the researcher 
believes, have made the deviant what he/she is. Becker’s recipe for countering accusations 
/worries of bias, is for the researcher to be open about the limits of one's studies, by being 
explicit about the perspective from which the study is written. Moreover, the researcher 
should acknowledge a “hierarchy of credibility,” which places some people’s accounts as less 
trustworthy than others, and places their own point of view in accordance to this “hierarchy of 
credibility.”     
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Following Becker’s recipe, I can reflect upon whose perspective this dissertation is based. 
First, I can claim that I have seen heroin smuggling and dealing from the viewpoint of the 
heroin dealers and smugglers themselves, and from that of the judges within the appellate 
court. Second, I could make the argument more refined, by saying I have developed a third 
interpretation position. In my interpretation of the offenders’ stories, I took neither the 
defense, prosecutor, nor judge position. Hence, I have not been whitewashing the heroin 
smugglers and dealers, because they have been whitewashing themselves, through telling 
different victim narratives, which express different forms of motivations and personal 
responsibilities. By “acknowledging a hierarchy of credibility,” I went on to study how the 
judges in the appellate court evaluate the offenders’ different narratives, giving legitimacy to 
some motives and stories, and discredit to others. I also address the issue of how the 
offenders’ stories could be adjusted to the judicial practices, by discussing the narratives as 
different forms of response to the labels placed upon the offenders.   
 
However sound the argument, I still feel it does not appropriately address the issue of bias, 
that there is always a gap between data and interpretations and a gap between social science 
and policy. According to Bernard Harcourt (2006 p. 226), there are always “leaps of faith” in 
social studies of deviance, and after review of an extensive amount of literature on crime and 
policy implications, he concludes: “Ultimately the field of social science and law is not 
determined by science but must rest on ethical choice. In the end, we have no choice but to 
dirty our hands” (Harcourt 2006 p. 229).         
 
I agree with Harcourt that there are always “leaps of faith” in social studies of deviance. In 
this study, one such “leap of faith” is connected to the moral implications of allowing 
different motives into our courtrooms. To rephrase the question, should all types of because-
of motives be heard in court, in heroin felonies? In this dissertation, I have emphasized that 
addiction has become legitimate because-of motive, whereas lack of integration or poverty, 
are not viewed as legitimate motives. Further, I have elaborated what consequences this might 
lead to for the different offenders in heroin cases; however, I have not provided any 
arguments as to whether the victim of social injustice should be paid attention to by the 
judges. By doing so, I am making my “leap of faith.”  
 
In my view, there are no empirical grounds for claiming that “internal forces,” such as 
addiction, limit personal responsibilities in a more fundamental way than “external forces,” 
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such as marginalization or poverty. Therefore, one could argue that neither the victim of 
addiction nor the victim of social injustice narrative should be heard in court. Then, what type 
of narrative does this leave the judicial practices with? It leaves the victim of organized crime, 
which either is a strategically told story, or a story about a real victim, paying an unjustly high 
price. Moreover, it is a narrative which, at best, can be said to have dubious reform potential. 
Further, it leaves the entrepreneur narrative, which only stipulates the in-order-to motive -- 
profit -- as the driving force in heroin dealing and smuggling, yet yields no re-integrative 
power.  
 
To elaborate, if the heroin trafficker uses problematic integration and lack of legal means to 
earn money as their because-of motive, then the victim of social injustice narrative hints of a 
way out of criminality, which would involve altering or eliminating unjust social structures. 
Hence, through altered social conditions, individuals would change their actions. Further, if 
the heroin smugglers and dealers argue that others manipulated them or tricked them into 
heroin dealing and smuggling, then the victim of organized crime narrative offers a possible 
way out of crime, through cooperation with the police and informing on others involved. 
Moreover, if the heroin dealer uses his or her own addiction as their because-of motive, the 
narrative of victim of addiction offers a way out of crime through addiction treatment.  
However, if the offenders stress that their motive for heroin smuggling and dealing was purely 
profit, what way out of crime does the entrepreneur narrative offer?  What is the available 
cultural script for quitting as a business criminal? The point is that although the entrepreneur 
narrative lies at the core of the judicial practices, it offers no scripts which hint at a way out of 
crime. The entrepreneur narrative therefore, is valuable for justifying heavy sentencing in 
heroin felonies, but it has no re-integrative power, since it lacks a script as to how the 
offenders should be re-integrated into society. 
 
Not taking people’s personal narratives into account can further rejection and opposition, 
which could lead to further stigmatization and marginalization for the non-ethnic Norwegians 
telling the victim of social injustice narrative.  Attention should be paid to the offenders, who 
relate the victims of social injustice narrative, as well as the offenders who relate the victim of 
addiction narrative. In conclusion, I will parallel with Harcourt (2006), and because I make 
my final argument based on an ethical choice, claim; “in the end I dirty my hands.” 
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